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USING BURKE’S DRAMATISM TO UNPACK INTRACTABLE CONFLICT: BUSH 43 AND THE PROCESS 
OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
by 
 
TRENT MILLS 
 
Under the Direction of Elizabeth Lopez 
 
ABSTRACT 
I investigate how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as an exemplar case study of intractable 
conflict, might be re-envisioned by destabilizing the paradigms of the belligerents. I detail how 
paradigms and our perceptions of and interactions with them influence, direct, and even defeat 
attempts at understanding social situations (of which violent conflict is one). Furthermore, with 
the premise that proposed solutions are reactions to existing paradigms, I analyze the potential 
benefits and risks of revealing the assumptions, premises, and biases of the paradigms with 
which belligerents, and those who represent them, construct their realities. In addition, I 
demonstrate how narratives and rhetorical myths prescribe action, not passively reflect action. 
Ultimately, I demonstrate the recursive relationship amongst originating paradigms, rhetorical 
myths, and the terms and concepts of narratives. This problem set transcends the motives of 
individual Agents and directs the focus on the rhetorical nature of the conflict’s intractability, 
not its ultimate resolution. I destabilize the assumption underpinning demonstrated U.S. policy 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: direct negotiations, as the core of the peace process, 
will result in peace.  
This project joins current efforts to extend Burke’s dramatism into arenas where multi-
ple rhetorical artifacts must be critically analyzed simultaneously to produce a more synoptic 
perspective. My approach leverages the heuristic character of Burke’s pentad to reveal a set of 
variables and relationships which account for a phenomenon: a “dramatistic” methodology for 
unpacking intractable conflict.  My methodology also treats other Burkean concepts generally 
nested under the Dramatism moniker: god terms, comic and tragic frames of acceptance, en-
telechy, and the pitfalls of the scapegoat. I demonstrate how the suite of Dramatistic terms and 
concepts might be leveraged to reveal the interconnectivity amongst U.S. policies, the Scenes 
the artifacts call forth, and the Agents who manipulate them. Furthermore, to address the im-
plications of prescriptive paradigms on problem formulation, I align my approach with Burke’s 
mythic, constitutive, and narrative projects. 
This study is significant for rhetorical studies and peace and conflict studies because it 
provides a rhetorical framework to destabilize paradigms: a first step toward shifting a conflict 
from an intractable to a tractable condition. To that end, policy makers should be able to assess 
phenomena, like the Arab Spring, as part of a Dramatistic framework burdened with countless 
motives, rhetorical myths, competing narratives. For these reasons, this project is immediately 
relevant for understanding problem constitution at the intersection of rhetorical studies, peace 
and conflict studies, and policy development.  
INDEX WORDS: Paradigms, Pentadic analysis, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Rhetorical myth, U.S. 
foreign policy 
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1     INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 
Politics, insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to signify—in both 
ideal and objective terms—simply the survival of states confronting the potential 
threat created by the existence of other states…the art of politics teaches men to 
live in peace within collectivities, while it teaches collectivities to live in either 
peace or war (Aron 6-7) 
 
Raymond Aron’s 1966 theory of international relations delineates foreign affairs from 
any other form of social intercourse because interstate relations “take place in the shadow of 
war or, to use a more rigorous expression, relations among states involve, in essence, the alter-
natives of war and peace” (5).  From this dire characterization alone, rhetoricians have rightfully 
focused on the rhetorics of international politics by focusing on the most influential statesman 
in U.S. politics: the president. The perception of the institution of the president is perhaps more 
valuable than the efficacy of any solitary rhetorical act. In terms of rhetorical power in inter-
state social discourse, the privileged position of the institution of the president relies on the 
preeminence of political realism; a concept of realism where the “the focus of international re-
lations is on the behavior of the state, its security and interests being the highest priority of po-
litical life” (Haslam 12).  As a successful sociologist and political journalist in early twentieth-
century France, Aron’s theory of international relations resists traditional political realism cred-
ited to Morgenthou which considers politics a “constant across time and space” (Davis 91) and 
is overly reliant on rationalism (Haslam 10). Instead of the conventional realism that is arguably 
still the dominant paradigm for international relations (Kraig), Aron views the social discourse 
at the core of international relations though the “refracting prism of a very specific circum-
stance indeed, namely, state sovereignty” (Davis 90, emphasis mine). For Aron’s theory, sover-
eignty serves as a “god term” from which all other terms and concepts gain consistency and 
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relevance from, or as Burke would designate it: “the ultimate motivation, or substance, of a 
Constitutional frame” (A Grammar of Motives 355).  Joining the abundant scholarship focused 
on presidential rhetoric, this study interrogates the rhetorical functions of the statesman as the 
very definition of statehood is problemetized.       
 As a requisite for understanding historical causation, rhetoric and communication 
scholars have leaned on rhetorical methods to analyze the relationship between presidential 
discourse and the rhetorical context a president navigates to achieve political objectives 
(Medhurst 4, Winkler 4-7, Campbell and Jamieson 3-6, Graham 2, Kraig 3, Wander 340). With 
ample scholarly distance between the historical event and the associated analysis, most con-
tributors to Medhurst’s Critical Reflections on the Cold War map presidential rhetorical artifacts 
(and their commensurate labels) as they help construct our perceptions on history. Because of 
the centrality of the office in U.S. culture, there is an indisputable exclamation point that punc-
tuates presidential oratory no matter how subdued the delivery. Furthermore, as Campbell and 
Jamieson argue, understanding the presidency-as-institution relies on consideration of public 
rhetorical artifacts instead of the non-public correspondences that lead up to the public ones 
(4). Instead of an exclamation point, it would seem that an ellipsis or some other inconclusive 
icon generally accompanies bureaucratic policy documents. Of Medhurst’s many contributors, 
only Newman distinguishes between presidential oratory and the policy documents that physi-
cally operationalize a president’s vision; documents produced through a discrete dialectic pro-
cess facilitated by policy advisors.  
Whereas oral policy can frame a public discussion on an issue, written policy, like New-
man’s analysis of how the declassified National Security Council memo 68 (the oft-cited blue-
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print for U.S. Cold War policy) provides useful insight into the policy-making process that ac-
counts for the behind-the-scenes actors Campbell and Jamieson avoid. As it relates to interstate 
conflict, an emphasis on the lesser known nodes of the policy-making system is important be-
cause it emphasizes the rhetorical nature of a policy-making system—what Graham calls “policy 
web construction” whereby rhetorical justifications are linked (5)—and invites a consideration 
as to how policy makers wielding rhetorical analytics might re-envision problems as they consti-
tute them.  
From the perspective of a rhetorical critic, there is little substantive difference between 
a political context and a historical context. Political reality is constituted by political rhetoric 
(Medhurst 7) just as history is historicized through whatever paradigm is used; both are rhetori-
cally constructed. Medhurst’s compilation of Cold War analyses partners the methods of the 
rhetorical critic with the “tools of historiography” to discern how a message functions to create 
change in its original context as well as how we historicize events retrospectively (268-269). The 
historian, according to Medhurst, shares characteristics with rhetoricians and political scientists 
in that a historian assigns labels, prescribes meaning to the labels, and “uses language to make 
and remake the world around us” (6). This study follows Medhurst’s attention on the methods 
of rhetorical critics but instead of historiography, my focus is on possible rhetorical tools and 
approaches for shifting a conflict from an intractable to a tractable condition.  
1.1 Background to the Problem 
When the Arab Spring—Revolt, Awakening, or Uprising based on your perspective—
began in early 2011, the world tuned in to watch how this turbulence might translate into posi-
tive transformation.  But as North Africa and the Middle East continue to experience their in-
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ternal shifts of power, one wonders how these simultaneous upheavals might affect the direc-
tion of long-standing regional conflicts that have traditionally carried global economic and secu-
rity implications.  For example, the international effort to resolve the conflict between the Is-
raelis and the Palestinians (colloquially known as the Middle East Peace Process or MEPP) is 
several decades old having endured several attempts at the publically-stated, shared objective 
of a two-state solution. Results and motives notwithstanding, nearly every nation that borders 
Israel and the Palestinian territories is now either a failed or potentially failing state based on 
even the most charitable metric making the geopolitical context as uninviting as possible. Yet, 
the U.S. administration has made negotiations between the government of Israel and the politi-
cal representative of the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority1 (PA), a centerpiece of its re-
gional foreign policy strategy (National Security Strategy of the United States 2010). The deci-
sion to attempt to disrupt the status-quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, i.e. bring focus on 
final status agreements between the belligerents, is therefore an interesting one. With the re-
gion in turmoil, why interrupt a “peaceful” status quo? 
 In the week preceding President Obama’s first presidential trip to Israel and the Pales-
tinian territories in early 2013, columnists, activists, and policy wonks clamored enthusiastically 
about where he might focus his visit. While the calls for renewal of the MEPP were predictably 
well represented, other voices made note of the evolving function of a peace “process” itself 
and the dramatically shifting regional environment framed by the War on Terror; an unpredict-
able Arab Spring; Iranian influence across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; threat of nuclear prolifera-
                                                     
1
 The PA is the political apparatus of the internationally-recognized representative of the Palestinians: the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PA was created in 1993 to help transition the PLO into a Palestinian 
state.  
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tion; the U.S. pivot to the Pacific; China’s pivot to the East; and civil war in Syria.  Complement-
ing those concerned voices were columns by Thomas Friedman and David Brooks citing fore-
casts that the U.S. will be the largest exporter of oil by 2020 and the possible foreign policy 
reprioritization the U.S. might have to make regarding its traditional commitments to the Mid-
dle East region. Vali Nasr argues in his unflattering critique of the first Obama administration’s 
foreign policy decisions that the “eye of the storm in the Middle East” has shifted east from the 
fractures in the Levant2 to the Arab-versus-Persian and Shia-versus-Sunni tensions centered on 
the Persian Gulf region (199).  Regardless, President Obama leveraged much of his foreign poli-
cy political capital and momentum from his first term toward restarting the MEPP in his second 
term. As an example of this emphasis, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, invested the first 
half of 2013 and six personal trips to the Levant just to get Israelis and Palestinians to return to 
direct negotiations. An assumption underpinning the overall U.S. policy is that the efforts of di-
rect negotiations, as the core of the peace process, will actually result in peace.  
 In an interview on the topic of the MEPP, Hrair Balian, the Director of President Carter’s 
Conflict Resolution Program, outlined two narratives to help explain part of the complexity. 
One narrative was oriented on “human rights” and prioritized universal rights for the people of 
both belligerent communities over the second narrative he referred to as, “facts on the ground” 
which reacted to the frequent, often politicized and traumatic events like the fence (or wall 
based on who you ask) between Israel and the West Bank. These narratives as Balian offered 
them prompt three claims pursued in this study: 1) the narratives were rhetorically-constituted 
and could be disentangled and analyzed as such, 2) the narratives are reactionary approaches 
                                                     
2
 The Levant region predates borders established following WWI. From north to south, it runs from Turkey 
to Egypt. From east to west, it includes Israel and the western border of Iraq. 
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to at least two different paradigms for experiencing and understanding the same reality, and 3) 
the narratives may explain events, but they also revivify the paradigms and myths which influ-
ence future action.  This study interrogates the above claims by analyzing how intractable con-
flict can be re-envisioned through unpacking and reconstructing the rhetorical paradigms of the 
belligerents thereby revealing avenues for resolution. I address how rhetorical paradigms and 
our perceptions of and interactions with them influence, direct, and even defeat attempts at 
understanding—let alone predict outcome in—social situations (of which war is one). I investi-
gate how and why narratives and rhetorical myths prescribe action, not passively reflect them 
and ask whether myths are something that can (or should) be changed or controlled via rhetor-
ical methods. Following the premise that proposed solutions are reactions to existing para-
digms, I analyze the potential benefits and risks of revealing the assumptions, premises, and 
biases of the paradigms with which belligerents, and those who represent them, construct their 
realities. Ultimately, I provide a heuristic framework for disentangling intractable conflict based 
primarily on Burke’s dramatistic methodology. 
1.2 Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is linked to the role paradigms play in problem formulation 
in foreign policy decision making. Treating paradigms begs the question whether conflict reso-
lution should focus on solving problems or changing paradigms, via rhetorical methods, or even 
to accept the problems as organic to the situation while working to make them less relevant. 
Moreover, isolating paradigms can be problematic as there are multiple belligerents and col-
laborators each burdened with a distinct paradigm through which to (re)define a single envi-
ronment. A poignant example of this problematic is the posturing of Israel and the Palestinian 
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Authority regarding the Syrian civil war. Peace between Israel and Syria has long been argued to 
be an integral step (if not prerequisite) for eventual peace between Israel and the Palestinians 
(Ross and Quandt). It follows that anyone interested in Israeli-Palestinian peace must figure the 
civil war in Syria in terms of potential changes to the existing network of relationships that 
comprise the problem between Israelis and Palestinians.  Therefore, if one defines a prerequi-
site for progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace as peace (or at least stasis) between Israel and 
Syria3, then any threat to the later relationship should be considered a concern for Israeli-
Palestinian peace.  In fact, Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute, points to the para-
dox of instability in Syria contributing to breaking the stasis between Israel and the Palestinians.  
As long as Syria is in a state of civil war, the negotiation table is “clear of painful decisions” re-
garding Syria-Israel and therefore Israeli-Palestinian issues can be dealt with one less Agent at 
the table (Eisenstadt).   
Although there is a nascent body of analysis regarding the impact of the Arab Spring on 
the region, few have articulated it as a trigger to re-visit—perhaps revise?—the paradigm upon 
which the MEPP was originally conceived and is currently operationalized by the U.S. and en-
dorsed by numerous foreign secretaries in the Middle East and Europe. Following Sil and 
Katzenstein’s work with analytic eclecticism, I establish interdisciplinary links to investigate how 
paradigms of Middle East peace provide context for competing paradigms, myths, and narra-
tives (of which the Arab Spring is just one) which recursively contribute to the U.S. policy per-
spective for better or worse.  There are as many paradigms, with resultant myths and narra-
                                                     
3
 Syria and Israel have fought three wars (1948, 1967, 1973) and have never had diplomatic relations. This 
relationship has always been considered a key component to the “comprehensive” peace represented by the 
MEPP. 
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tives, as there are disciplines and interest groups. For example, a humanitarian paradigm may 
privilege the impact of Syrian refugees on regional efforts to deal with an already calamitous, 
half-century-old, Palestinian refugee problem. An economic paradigm may frame issues in light 
of instability along Israel’s border with Egypt due to the unrest following President Mubarak’s 
ouster and subsequent political turmoil. A U.S. security interest paradigm will privilege the bal-
ance of power (lethal and political) between Israel and Egypt. In contrast, if rhetorically con-
structing the Arab Spring as a focusing event reveals new policy opportunities for peace makers, 
how might a narrative of paralysis manifest itself to work against progress in any paradigm? 
As the global socio-political environment changes, so do the various disciplinary and cul-
tural paradigms through which we understand peace and its alternatives. The U.S. has consid-
ered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict using various paradigms since the earliest wars between Is-
rael and its neighbors beginning in 1948. This is not to imply the problems began after WWII; 
only that it was a situation Great Britain was burdened with. At the outset, the U.S. paradigm 
was arguably a post-WWII (Holocaust) perspective followed by a 40-year Cold War lens (nested 
within was the influential rise of the oil-states). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
post-Cold War decade was a paradigm bracketed by the liberation of an Arab nation (Kuwait) 
by predominantly Western powers and ended with the outset of the War on Terror decade(s) 
of which we are now a part of and I will treat in detail in Chapter Four. Of course none of these 
paradigms are as clearly delineated in reality as I have made them out to seem here. Moreover, 
each one overlapped with its predecessor and successor and often only defined in retrospect. 
Regardless, with each paradigm came proposed solutions to the problems the paradigm itself 
determined were relevant. Solutions not consistent with the dominant paradigm were either 
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ignored, or they forced the paradigm to shift to accommodate it. Thus, I contend that, to date, 
proposed solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are simply reactions to a prescriptive para-
digm or as “explanations that gratify our own ideological preferences and prejudices, but that 
function like mental stencils: they are a priori patterns we superimpose on events to create the 
picture we want to see, but only by concealing other events that do not fit the pattern” 
(Thornton). Therefore, this study is significant for the disciplines of rhetorical studies and peace 
and conflict studies because it provides a framework4 to destabilize paradigms: a first step to-
ward revealing new potentials—the Arab Spring being an unavoidable potential. 
Although resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is well outside the scope of this pro-
ject, this research has implications for policy makers and peace and conflict practitioners inter-
ested in unpacking intractable conflict through an appreciation of the intractable(ness) of con-
flict: an undoubtedly rhetorical condition. Integral to this appreciation is the task of expanding 
what Burke describes as the “circumference” of key concepts in a paradigm. As outlined in 
Chapter Four, treating the “circumference” of the “god term” security, will change how terms 
and concepts animate a narrative which in turn reifies the dominant paradigm. For example, as 
a point of contention between belligerents, the term border may bring with it strictly physical 
connotations like separation and protection. Approaching the term with an eye on the circum-
                                                     
4
 Framework-Theory-Model. Framework: set of variables and relationships that presumably account for a 
set of phenomena (may include a hypothesis). Theory: Denser and more logically coherent set of relationships. 
Several theories may be consistent with the same conceptual framework. From Aron’s description of theory of 
international relations,  
. . . the meaning of theory is dependent to some degree upon the meaning of the object. We cannot de-
termine the structure and function of economic theory, for example, until we have first determined the 
nature of economic behavior. Similarly, we cannot establish the nature and purpose of a theory of inter-
national relations until we have first determined the nature of international relations . . . the structure of 
theory, like the structure of all intentional objects, is thoroughly dialectical. (Davis 88)  
Model: representation of a specific situation; narrower in scope; precise assumptions; increasing logical intercon-
nectedness and specificity in scope. 
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ference of terms may expand the meaning of border to account for metaphysical issues like 
human rights or equality. As the narrative (comprised of numerous concepts and terms) affects 
its governing paradigm, the terms of the paradigm may shift to the point where the very frame 
of acceptance is shifted from a tragic to comic.  Although it may sound counter-intuitive, I in-
vestigate what happens if policy-makers carefully avoid the objective of peace when trying to 
design an often clumsy path toward peace.  Phrased differently, what if reaching peace was less 
about reconciliation (or breather between wars) and more about arriving at a shared under-
standing of how intractable conditions are rhetorically constructed?  
1.3 Chapter Overview 
With these stakes in mind and in the chapters that follow, I contend that by joining the 
conversation with an eye toward the rhetorical (re)construction of paradigms and investigating 
how rhetorical methods might be used in understanding intractable conflict, this research may 
help make explicit the interconnectivity of competing agendas within and between nation-
states, unpack intransigence, and approach a heuristic framework to disentangle motives 
shaped and constrained by paradigms. The balance of this chapter provides a structure of 
knowledge on the topic which addresses the myriad relationships between paradigms and ways 
policy makers approach interstate conflict. In addition to demonstrating how the trends and 
potentials in the study of paradigms converge with understanding intractable conflict (specifi-
cally the MEPP), I show how key tenets of Burke’s dramatism can be deployed in conjunction 
with an appreciation of prescriptive paradigms to reveal gaps relevant for rhetorical and peace 
and conflict studies.  Informed by Burke’s dramatism, I outline the methodologies employed to 
refine the problem, guide collection, and frame the interpretation of results. With Burke as a 
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methodological guide for discerning motives in a human situation, I demonstrate in Chapter 
Two how discerning the rhetorical myths underlying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is fundamen-
tal to understanding the recursivity of paradigms, the myths that emerge from paradigms, and 
the narratives that animate the myths. Chapter Three situates the conflict within Burke’s comic 
framework and demonstrates how the comic frame might be used to unpack the intractable 
conditions that comprise the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Four argues the viability of ap-
plying dramatistic methodologies toward understanding the intractable(ness) of conflict by ana-
lyzing key artifacts from the early years of the George W. Bush administration relevant to the 
MEPP. With this timeframe of the MEPP as rhetorical context, Chapter Four also demonstrates 
how rhetorical methodologies can help U.S. policy-makers build a synoptic analysis of a body of 
rhetorical artifacts in order to map the (potential) trajectory of a policy initiative. Taken togeth-
er, these chapters provide a thoroughly rhetorical, yet also pragmatic, way of understanding 
the malleable conditions of intractable conflict and what it might take to transform it.  
1.4    Review of Literature 
To the intrinsic difficulties of the enterprise we might add that Averroes, who 
knew neither Syriac nor Greek, was working from a translation of a translation. 
The night before, two doubtful words had halted him at the very portals of the 
Poetics. Those words were “tragedy” and “comedy.” He had come across them 
years earlier, in the third book of the Rhetoric; no one in all of Islam could hazard 
a guess as to their meaning. He had pored through the pages of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias . . . and he had found nothing. Yet the two arcane words were eve-
rywhere in the text of the Poetics—it was impossible to avoid them. (Borges 236) 
 
1.4.1 Paradigms of Peace, War, and the Spaces Between 
Nathan Funk and Abdul Aziz Said’s Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East, invites 
consideration for new approaches to conflicts within and with the Islamic world in the context 
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of a post-9/11 world.  They argue that Islamic precepts provide a coherent and affirmative posi-
tion on the desirability of peace for human flourishing. To that end, Islamic culture provides not 
one but multiple paradigms to help translate Islamic precepts into reality while shifting discus-
sion of Islam and peace away from the hackneyed dichotomy of extremist versus moderate. 
  Funk and Aziz argue that variances between Western and Islamic “peace vocabularies” 
may frustrate but should not be misconstrued to signify inevitable conflict. Common ground 
exists when concepts of Western peace (i.e. “smoothly functioning social order”) are compared 
to Islamic understandings laden with religious conceptions of “social solidarity and justice” (50). 
Their five paradigms of Islamic peacemaking draw out the interconnectivity among the political, 
religious, and cultural spheres of Muslim nations and provide a framework for resisting “those 
who fatalistically resign themselves to escalating conflict [because they] tend to view Islamic-
Western conflict as an unalterable fact of history, an outcome of incompatible doctrines and 
values” (231). Considering peacemaking through these paradigms sensitizes us to meanings 
that are central to collective identity and provide a basis for shifting away from paradigms pre-
supposing exclusion, injustice, and war (54). Their assumptions and research methods are not 
bracketed by a West versus Islam binary; instead, Funk and Aziz focus on conflict amongst Mus-
lim nations reaching back to embryonic Islam.  As components to their ultimate recommenda-
tions, the authors also emphasize the importance of reconciling Islam with democracy and de-
velopment: two concepts generally considered as Western models with Western definitions 
(246).  
According to Funk and Aziz, as some peace vocabularies center around the absence of 
war, others burden the definition of peace with broader connotations “implying a presence of 
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social, spiritual, or ecological harmony” (52). I agree with the authors’ claim that concepts for 
peace should be the foundation for any critical analysis of value systems within which goals as 
development, democratization, and conflict resolution are selected, defined, and pursued (52).  
Of particular relevance to the object of this study is Funk and Aziz’s delineation of the concept 
of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Although Israeli conception of peace is best repre-
sented in “shalom”, which includes expectations for wholeness and safety, a Palestinian con-
ception includes overtones “suggesting a desire for dignity, justice, and honor” (52).  Although 
not irreconcilable, observers should not be surprised by divergent paths towards peace.  
The authors assemble resources for intercultural and interreligious peacemaking by 
crafting a welcoming common ground where Western peace paradigms might intersect with 
Islamic ones. Their proposed paradigms for peace may appear familiar to non-Muslims, but as 
the authors employ a truly Islamic set of terms of reference, the difference among paradigms 
become quite dramatic and invites discussion of Western paradigms for understanding peace. I 
agree with the authors that Western conceptions of international relations are based on 
Westphalian secularism that originated as a response to thirty years of Protestant versus Catho-
lic warfare. If such a characterization is accurate, a charitable critique may be that Western 
conceptions of international relations are constrained by secularism’s overreliance on rationali-
zation or political realism. Western policy theorists have tempered this through a concept of 
bounded rationality and agenda-setting which accepts politics as never driven solely by ration-
ally-calculated interests (Jones).  Funk and Aziz did not treat the differences between Western 
international relations and Western peace paradigms. In fact, their approach focused more on 
“Western” as a homogenous people instead of a way of thinking about peace and conflict (as 
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they applied it to Muslims). To remedy this, the authors might have contrasted their five Islamic 
peace paradigms with the numerous Western peace paradigms outlined by Milton Rinehart in 
1995.  
Rinehart goes further than simply listing major Western peace concepts, he assembles 
them into two contrasting orientations of peace: Popular and Numinar paradigms. By Popular, 
Rinehart means the prevailing paradigm practiced by presidents and other world leaders seek-
ing the absence of war, violence, and conflict—a (negative) paradigm that continues to inform 
Western concepts of peace (Boulding).  Rinehart appropriates “Numinar” from a body of phi-
losophies linked to “numinous” individuals belonging to a paradigm of peace represented by 
Buddha and Jesus and manifested by Gandhi.  The Numinar paradigm is a micro-social approach 
to peace exampled when “previously antagonistic parties are able to hear and understand each 
other, resolve their disagreement, and leave making plans for friendly get-togethers” (386). 
“Numinar” does not appear to have gained the traction Rinehart hoped for but it can still be 
useful as a way to structure knowledge on the topic if we follow Funk and Aziz’s recommenda-
tion that ‘concepts for peace should be the foundation for any critical analysis of value sys-
tems’. 
From a practioner’s perspective (albeit Western), the peace paradigms proffered by 
Funk, Aziz, and Rinehart (among others) tend to be more useful when they can be operational-
ized and then applied to unique situations. Perhaps “Numinar” did not take as an applicable 
paradigm for peace because it was not fully regimented for use? Even Rinehart’s example of 
Gandhi is problematic as a case study of the Numinar paradigm—as I will discuss later in re-
gards to Burke’s comic frame. That leaves us with the Popular paradigm which focuses on one 
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end of the peace spectrum: absence of war, conflict, and suffering. With a set of measurable 
conditions to represent peace, one can appreciate why politicians and diplomats are comforta-
ble with the Popular paradigm which further reifies the approaches of the conflict theorists.  
No-Yang Park would likely scoff at both of Rinehart’s paradigms and instead direct at-
tention on the source of both. In his 1948 book, The White Man’s Peace, Park refuses to enter-
tain any path toward peace which does not first address the “state of anarchy” where milita-
rism is an inevitable condition. On the heels of WWII and the birth of the United Nations, Park’s 
thesis was an intriguing one: the cause of all wars is the absence of a means of preserving in-
ternational and intrastate justice (50). Park blames the state of anarchy where humans struggle 
for survival and develop “militant cultures and institutions” and expectations for nationalism, 
patriotism, and “absolute sovereignty” that then feed a perpetual cycle of war.  For Park, even 
the vocabulary of the current world order is a reaction to the state of anarchy:  
. . . a state cannot survive in anarchy without sovereignty, because without the exercise 
of absolute sovereignty, it cannot coerce its citizens or subjects to sacrifice their private 
interests for the safety of the state . . . [it] is the symbol of life and liberty and the inal-
ienable right to survive. In other words, sovereignty is not the cause of lawlessness; it is 
the lawlessness which is the cause of sovereignty. (51)  
The fourth edition of Plano and Olton’s The International Relations Dictionary (1988) begins 
with a definition of balance of power which can be problemetized just as readily as Park treats 
sovereignty. According to Plano and Olton, the balance of power phenomenon is necessary 
“because states are sovereign and seek to maximize their individual national interests, the bal-
ance of power is normally in a condition of flux” (3).  Their definition concludes with a caveat 
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that reaches back to Park: the balance of power mechanism would be irrelevant if the world 
was organized on a basis other than “that of a decentralized system of independent sovereign 
states” (4, see also Haslam 7). Extending from balance of power, the editors overlay several 
categories of competing ideologies, economic theories, international laws, and vocabularies of 
war and peace—in all, 570 terms and concepts to help diplomats and politicians maintain our 
international system of relationships—all based on an assumption regarding sovereignty.   
Evans and Newnham provide a well-cited dictionary for international relations (1998) 
which subtly, if not inadvertently, rehabilitates Park’s thesis and points to my general interest in 
disentangling the paradigms underlying intractable conflict.  Unlike Plano and Olton, Evans and 
Newnham’s view on sovereignty considers a post-Cold War international environment coupled 
with the exponential growth of economic and social interdependence.  This pivot from a pre-
dominately binary balance of power (U.S. vs U.S.S.R.) points to turbulence in the traditional pa-
rameters of sovereignty: “sovereignty has been eroded on all fronts, especially with the devel-
opment of human rights and humanitarian intervention norms” (43). Although Evans and 
Newnham acknowledge the consequences of such a shift, their purpose is not to initiate or 
propagate a paradigm shift. Furthermore, it is not Plano and Olton’s responsibility to reconsider 
their 570 terms through an eroding perspective because that would not serve their audience 
well. These dictionaries offer definitions involving factual propositions that Edward Schiappa 
might consider a reasonable combination of facts of “essence” and facts of “usage” (6) that are 
dominant in that they remain unchallenged (31). Both sets of dictionary editors reflect a partic-
ular perspective on reality and offer terms of art as they are commonly used and reinforced 
within the parameters of that reality.  Challenging the factual propositions of contemporary in-
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ternational relations dictionaries is outside the purview of this literature review. However, fol-
lowing from Schiappa’s distinction between “definitional gaps” and “definitional ruptures” (8), 
what might be revealed when focus shifts from reconciling a misunderstanding using a diction-
ary as arbitrator (gap) and destabilizing the assumptions of the entire dictionary (definitional 
rupture) used by the belligerents or their policy advisors?  
According to Schiappa,  a “definitional rupture” occurs when “the natural attitude has 
been disrupted because the assumption that dominant [concept] usage as recorded in diction-
aries corresponds to what things are has been called into question in such a way that the partic-
ipants in the conversation have to reconcile the difference” (9, emphasis original). It is im-
portant to note that Schiappa’s definition presumes one or both participants recognize that 
there is a controversy regarding how words are defined—I wonder if this is always the case?  In 
fact, it might be argued that one or both participants actually benefit domestically from the 
‘rupture’ and take pains to maintain confusion as integral to perpetuating the status quo. Re-
gardless, Shiappa’s methods for mitigating a ‘definitional rupture’ may offer an interdisciplinary 
approach to discerning the motives of belligerents in an intractable conflict much in the same 
way Burke uses “identification” to establish common ground in the communicative act (see also 
“adherence” in Perelman, Realm of Rhetoric 42).  Furthermore, Shiappa’s analysis of how the 
act and process of definition functions within the rhetorical situation is also revealing. Of par-
ticular relevance to this study is how he attributes prescription to definition (50, 131), the social 
influence of “framing” (165), and the normative implications of definition (175). Although he 
addresses ethical obligations for an arguer (45), perhaps the most relevant component of 
Shiappa’s project is his claim that all consequential definitions are political because they serve a 
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particular interest and are empowered through rhetorical methods (69). From a characteriza-
tion of politics as who gets what and why, Shiappa’s project might be considered a framework 
for a political paradigm which can control, as well as inform, a rhetorical environment. 
Jurgen Habermas’s “public sphere” can be shown to be an example of such a controlling 
paradigm. The depth and breadth of scholarship across multiple disciplines is testament to the 
relevance and, by the prevalence of calls to “rethink” it, controversy of his theory. But as the 
theory is applied as a paradigm for social discourse, it may work to silence alternative demo-
cratic models. Fraser’s well-known critiques of Habermas acknowledge the appeal of a public 
sphere that “provides a way of circumventing some confusions that have plagued progressive 
social movements and the political theories associated with them.” Unfortunately, Fraser con-
tinues, successful circumvention conflates the state apparatus with the public sphere of dis-
course causing all sorts of confusion by appropriators ("Rethinking the Public Sphere” 56). Fra-
ser’s mitigation is a post-bourgeois conception of the “public sphere” designed to undermine 
the normativity of the bourgeois “public sphere” and introduce a critical theory of an “actually 
existing democracy” (77). This later objective was initially comprised of four tenets functioning 
together to resist the exclusionary determinism of the public sphere. The core of her proposal is 
to “expose ways in which the labeling of some issues and interests as ‘private’ limits the range 
of problems, and of approaches to problems” (77). Thus, Fraser proposes a counter-theory to 
expose the limitations of capitalist democracy. Fraser’s strategy shifts, however, in her 2005 re-
rethinking on the topic. Instead of proposing a new theory, she seeks to “reformulate the criti-
cal theory of the public sphere in a way that can illustrate the emancipatory possibilities of the 
present ‘postnational constellation’” ("Transnationalizing the Public Sphere” 2, emphasis origi-
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nal). This pivot to the underlying paradigm, or constellation, argues for “major institutional ren-
ovation” to force critical and social theorists to “rethink the [public sphere] theory’s basic prem-
ises, both institutional and normative” (Ibid 7, emphasis mine). While Fraser’s particular pro-
posal to “repoliticize” public-sphere theory is not the focus of this review, the evolution of her 
theory demonstrates the important distinction between a paradigm and the theories con-
strained by it.   
This review does not seek yet another rethinking of Habermas’s public-sphere theory 
nor his broader theory of communication; however, I am interested in how scholars are refining 
our understanding of prescriptive paradigms in general as they are often invisible: Habermas’s 
public sphere being a poignantly relevant one that I will return to shortly. Bracketed by Thomas 
Kuhn and Kenneth Burke, the next section brings forward rhetorical concepts applicable to un-
derstanding intractable conflict.  
In the landmark work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn explains how the re-
lationship between a paradigm and the community it serves reveals the prescriptive role a par-
adigm can play in the development of a theory or model that then informs the actions of the 
community. Although Kuhn seeks to understand how paradigm shifts in certain scientific com-
munities result in revolutions across multiple communities, one can appropriate his work to il-
lustrate epistemic patterns and reveal useful implications in the fields of rhetoric and commu-
nication. A complex environment where a problem may not have a solution seems a perfect fit 
for rhetorical theory; however, if the paradigm is taken for granted, Kuhn warns us that the de-
terminism of paradigms can trap us into fulfilling only the desires of the paradigm (23). Moreo-
ver, a community, according to Kuhn, deems a problem acute because it is important to fur-
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thering the aims of the paradigm and is solvable according to the rules of the paradigm (37). It 
follows that a paradigm can assume an instrumental function because it determines the objec-
tives, means, and ways available to the rhetor.  Finally, a paradigm can “insulate the community 
from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they 
cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies” (37). 
This ‘insulation’ is perhaps the most problematic for scholars interested in the role of para-
digms in social scenarios because the paradigm may inadvertently discipline a scenario into ir-
relevance.   
In his extended defense of Habermas, Goode concludes with a challenge to extend 
Habermas’s body of work into the arena of reflexive democracy. While he addresses 
Habermas’s comprehensive theory of communicative action, Goode argues specifically that the 
narrative of the “public sphere” destabilizes the terminology of democracy that the public 
sphere was intended to support. Terms like politics and citizenship are contested because of a 
process of constant reinvention that is less about a “clean break with the past” and more about 
recognition of shifting political models that “bubble up to the surface in the context of opaque 
and shifting power relations which increasingly escape the grasp of liberal democracy’s official 
polity” (121-122). Goode incorporates a fundamental element of Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm 
shift” but maintains focus on the downstream positive effects of the “public sphere” thus, he 
neglects the prescriptive influence of the paradigm as Kuhn warns. Both Goode’s conception of 
Habermas’s public-sphere theory and Kuhn’s structure of revolutions consider overlapping par-
adigms as the process whereby change occurs. In fact, Kuhn reinforces Goode’s refrain of ‘con-
stant reinvention’ when Kuhn characterizes scientific paradigms along what one might consider 
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a Burkean “terministic screen” where “once a first paradigm through which to view nature has 
been found, there is no such thing as research in the absence of any paradigm” (Kuhn 79).  
As Sil and Katzenstein define paradigm usage in accordance with Kuhn’s precepts, they 
also point to intersections with terministic screens like ideology, narrative, perspective, reli-
gious faith, and even research tradition:  
Proponents of particular paradigms proceed on the basis of specific sets of a priori as-
sumptions not shared by others. They pose research questions, establish boundaries for 
investigations, and evaluate research products in a manner that reflects these assump-
tions. Based on ontological and epistemological principles established by fiat, they posit 
clusters of theories or narratives that assign primacy to certain kinds of causal factors 
rather than others. (2) 
One should see from this description that paradigms precede the tangible markers typically as-
sociated with a paradigm, e.g. narratives or scientific processes. Paradigms are also exclusive-
by-design as once one it is employed, it obscures or marginalizes new inputs that do not con-
form to the a priori assumptions of the community. It follows then that the same paradigm that 
excludes also mandates epistemology and even truth.  In other words, if the “markers” of the 
paradigm fail to keep up with the shifts, or revolutions as Kuhn would say, that “occur in those 
brief interludes when scientific communities, frustrated by increasing numbers of anomalies, 
begin to focus on new problems and take up new approaches that help resolve such anomalies 
. . . a new door opens for the emergence of new paradigm” (Sil and Katzenstein 5). The same 
door that opens for a new paradigm “closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted 
so that the anomalous has become the expected” (Kuhn 53 and 64). In other words, new inputs 
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(potential knowledge) adhere to the community’s a priori assumptions because the a priori as-
sumptions have been redefined. A new vocabulary and concepts for interrogating events are 
prerequisites for the paradigm shift.  
In contrast with Kuhn’s criteria for paradigm shift, Burke’s bureaucratization of the im-
aginative explains how “an imaginative possibility is bureaucratized when it is embodied in the 
realities of a social texture, in all the complexity of language and habits, in the property rela-
tionships, the methods of government, production and distribution, and in the development of 
rituals that re-enforce the same emphasis” (Attitudes Toward History 225).  A heavily-rhetorical 
process; what was once imaginative becomes a “cow path” in the epistemological structure of 
the community that represents a body of abstract concepts (Ibid 228). Ultimately, a shift occurs 
when a nomenclature fails to explain a phenomenon and “value placed upon a new phenome-
non . . . varies with our estimate of the extent to which the phenomenon violated paradigm-
induced anticipations” (Kuhn 56). 
 Lucaites and Condit’s analysis of the culturetypal and counter-cultural rhetorics of Mar-
tin Luther King and Malcom X offer a useful contrast to Burke’s version of paradigm and para-
digm shift. According to the authors, characterizations begin as labels placed on agents, acts, 
scenes, etc from outside a community.  Narratives then connect the characterizations to form a 
“network of a community’s public vocabulary” and in so doing infuse the characterizations with 
“rhetorical puissance and resonance.” Ultimately, narratives become ideographic as per 
McGee, e.g. liberty and equality, thus contributing significantly to the identity of a community 
(7-8).  The contrast between Burke’s and Lucaites and Condit’s models emerge as one analyzes 
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the transition between paradigms, e.g. what causes them, who causes them, and who uses 
them.   
Within Lucaites and Condit’s characterization-narrative-ideograph model, conditions 
demand social change (authors use displaced groups as an example). This demand requires the 
existing public vocabulary be “managed and reconstituted” via culturetypal and counter-
cultural rhetoric—rhetorics wielded by rhetors like Martin Luther King and Malcom X to pursue 
their political objectives. In sum: a demand for social change is the purpose, a rhetor wielding 
rhetorics is the agent, and the same rhetor uses the “new” public vocabulary as agency to 
achieve a political objective.  
The significant differences turn on the question of what causes change in the respective 
systems. As I mentioned earlier, paradigm shifts occur when a nomenclature fails to explain a 
phenomenon and ‘value placed upon a new phenomenon . . . varies with our estimate of the 
extent to which the phenomenon violated paradigm-induced anticipations’. Was there an indis-
cernible phenomenon that occurred in the 1960s that could not be conceptualized using the 
existing vocabulary? Perhaps, but I don’t think this is what Lucaites and Condit were arguing. In 
fact, the authors credit the “historical confluence of [Martin Luther King’s and Malcom X’s] per-
sonal experiences with those of their listeners” as what enabled black people to even hear the 
culturetypal and counter-cultural rhetorics (19). A displaced group (African-Americans) judged 
something (equality) was inadequate in the dominant system; rhetors identified weaknesses in 
the dominant system and exploited them rhetorically; finally, the dominant system changed 
from within to account for the judgment.  I return to Lucaites’s and Condit’s characterization-
narrative-ideograph in Chapter Two as it relates to Burke’s mythic project. 
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1.4.2 Narrative, Myth, and Burke’s Dramatism 
The previous section of the review is not intended to simply reify the power of para-
digms to better understand epistemic revolutions. Rather, I hope to have offered reasons to 
reconsider prevalent, and in many cases omnipresent, paradigms for their biased, prescriptive, 
and constraining influence on any discipline. As to the efficacy of any given paradigm, one 
might pivot the emphasis from the delivered text to what Burke called the “more or less orga-
nized system of meaning by which a thinking man gauges the historical situation and adopts a 
role with relation with to it” (Attitudes Toward History 5). Incorporating Burke’s “frames of ac-
ceptance” into a conversation about paradigms is immediately problematic, yet revealing. 
Burke would likely reject the centrality with which I have characterized Kuhn’s conception of 
paradigms as being essentialist while simultaneously acknowledging the bracketing of human 
motives his own “frame of acceptance” purports. Coope’s 2005 analysis of Burke’s myth project 
best captures his reluctance. For Burke, the  
adoption of a paradigm necessarily involves selectivity, overemphasis, and even distor-
tion, so that it is a theorist's duty to remain open to the possibility of error . . . [and that] 
theoretical orientations should include some scope for the critique of their own premis-
es, that they should be knowingly provisional and partial, on the grounds that ultimate, 
integrated knowledge is a long-term aim rather than an immediate objective. (45)  
Therefore, the ameliorative nature of Burke’s “frames of acceptance” provides a useful contrast 
to Kuhn’s brand of determinism which can be used to further frame the paradigmatic elements 
of Habermas’s theory.   
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As Goode argues, the “public sphere” debate continues around fault lines like public and 
private, system and lifeworld, universal and particular, moral and ethical, and expert and citizen 
(113). Kuhn might enter this debate by arguing how the paradigm itself acts to delimit the ar-
gument with predetermined methods and instruments so as to produce a result commensurate 
with the designs of the paradigm. In contrast, Burke would caution us to beware the 
essentializing nature of paradigms and instead recommend transcending the binary construct 
of the public sphere for his “frames of acceptance.” In fact, Burke preempts Habermas’s idealis-
tic notion of a bourgeois public sphere (and its accompanying binaries) that arguably sought to 
“fix attitudes that prepare for combat . . . it was the bourgeois interregnum that tried to elimi-
nate [social classes] by fiat, in treating the bourgeois class as universal mankind” (Burke, Atti-
tudes Toward History 20). Instead, Burke argues that it is “out of such frames we derive our vo-
cabularies for the charting of human motives. And implicit in our theory of motives is a program 
of action, since we form ourselves and judge others . . . in accordance with our attitudes” (Ibid 
92).  Whereas both Burke and Kuhn transcend the binary for the higher paradigm and its asso-
ciated premises, the distinction as it relates to prescription is that Burke’s vocabulary for mo-
tives helps us chart motives whereas Kuhn’s brand of determinism would direct human motives 
in accordance with the paradigm.  
Burke’s description of the “didactic frame” may also contribute to the rationale for in-
vestigating the problem-solving power of myth and myth’s mode of conveyance: narrative. In 
Attitudes Toward History, Burke’s didactic “frames of acceptance” provide space for an artist or 
rhetor to transcend conflict by creating a higher category that obviates the binary conflict and 
offers a rhetorical common ground where productive discourse can take place. This value 
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judgment sets up a higher level synthesis based on a fabricated class the artist or rhetor uses to 
“coach” his attitude according to a class philosophy. Furthermore, the propagandist, according 
to Burke, transcends the apparent discontinuity by appealing to a “higher synthesis” (Ibid 80).  
The didactic poet recognizes binaries, but refuses to submit to them as the dominant framing 
elements. Instead, he or she perceives the world through a “frame of acceptance” that resists 
the “us versus them” narrative that can so easily restrict avenues for understanding the condi-
tions of intractable conflict (see also Schiappa 112).   
In a rhetorical analysis of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, Michael Carcasson describes a 
way to approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a paradigm situating peacemakers 
against enemies of peace (214). Through Carcasson’s paradigm—akin to Burke’s “frames of ac-
ceptance”—observers and practioners of conflict resolution could consider actions as steps to 
fulfill, or operationalize, competing narratives. The narratives allow for members of the bellig-
erent communities to both belong to the “peacemaker” category. Thus, it rhetorically reframes 
the conflict from between opposing sides to between different categories. This paradigm in-
vites belligerents to look inward to realize the problem may not be a question of “us versus 
them” but instead one of “us versus us.” According to Carcasson and others, one can use narra-
tive as a schematic to better understand the rationale behind seemingly incoherent actions (see 
also Rotberg). In contrast, practioners of conflict resolution, like Robert Rothstein, might argue 
that a narrative can become stagnant and even inextricable from our conceptions of the con-
flict. And, when left unattended, a dominant narrative can devolve into a normative logic that 
constrains potential solutions instead of revealing them (Rothstein 2). What if the use of narra-
tive was not limited to retrospective understanding as Carcasson argues and Rothstein warns?  
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As a way to interrogate the tension (and positive potential) inherent in narratives, one might 
consider conflict through a rhetorical perspective that accommodates the normative attributes 
of narrative: Robert Rowland’s model for rhetorical myth.  
The central claim of Rowland’s 2011 model is that myths evolve as they are rectified 
with changing perceptions of reality.  Citing shifts in the “Zionist myth,” Rowland argues that 
even the most obstinate myth system will eventually be tempered by the constraints of reality. 
It follows then that Rowland’s framework for a peace process begins with the Palestinians and 
Israelis revising their “mythic symbol systems” that left as is will continue to thwart any attempt 
at peace through the more visible means of shuttle diplomacy and peace initiatives (“Mythic 
Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 44).  Rowland’s criteria provide a 
useful model for deconstructing conflict by understanding its underlying myths, but in order to 
create the change Rowland hopes for, his program requires a party “rectify” its mythic system 
according to a singular reality: a prerequisite Schiappa would likely criticize as being grounded 
in “metaphysical absolutism” (40) and thereby reject Rowland’s project completely.  
Following Schiappa (and by extension Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca) I too would char-
acterize Rowland’s “rectification” as an effort to “maintain a given lexicon while changing its 
referents.” In other words: an attempt at dissociation (Schiappa 36-39). Dissociation can be 
problematic for practical and philosophical reasons (Ibid 39-41); when applied to a discernible 
context, however, the rhetorical act of dissociation can “remodel our conception of reality” (Pe-
relman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 413) thus destabilizing the referents that contribute to incompati-
ble myths.  Perhaps Rowland presumes too much by making the act of rectification a blunt ob-
ject to apply directly to a rhetorical situation as a way to reject connecting links. I will expound 
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on this assertion in Chapter Two. Whereas Rowland would use rectification to change one side 
of an incompatible equation once it becomes problematic (when it is likely too difficult to 
change), Jullien would instead advise us to “intervene upstream” from where the turbulence is 
likely (42). Applied to Rowland’s process of mythic rectification, looking upstream from the 
proximate problem would require shifting the focus away from the point where the incompati-
ble myths intersect and result in violence. Such a re-focus would invite a longitudinal analysis of 
relevant myths and their narratives simultaneously.   
In regards to conflict resolution, practitioners have tried to understand the role of myth 
in the policy-making process in order to understand where an “upstream” policy might be em-
placed to compel or coerce the situation into alignment with U.S. objectives. One of the most 
prolific scholars on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and early foreign policy advisor to President 
Obama, Dennis Ross, frames his assessment of the MEPP with the pervasive myths held by Is-
raelis, Palestinians, and Arabs in general (A Missing Peace). However, in his recent work written 
in coordination with David Makovsky, he makes no effort to distinguish between myth and as-
sumption; in fact, he characterizes them as synonymous. Moreover, Ross and Makovsky argue 
that the benefits of myth emerge only when they are debunked by reality. For the authors, “we 
use the term ‘myths’ because these assumptions don’t reflect reality but are taken as givens. 
They may be untrue or invalid, but for those who embrace them, they are unquestioned . . . 
[however] they fail to fit the reality of the Middle East” (8). Specific to the MEPP, Ross and 
Makovsky attempt to debunk key assumptions that they argue realists and neoconservatives 
involved in U.S. policy in the Middle East operated under for decades; I address this move in 
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Chapter Four. Instead of debunking Ross and Makovsky’s approach, however, my study adheres 
to Burke’s warning about debunking in Philosophy of Literary Form:  
I think the typical debunker is involved in a strategy of this sort: He discerns an evil. He 
wants to eradicate this evil. And he wants to do a thorough job of it. Hence, in order to 
be sure that he thorough enough, he becomes too thorough. In order to knock the un-
derpinnings from beneath the arguments of his opponents, he perfects a mode of ar-
gument that would, if carried out consistently, also knock the underpinnings from be-
neath his own argument. (171, emphasis original) 
This review of literature is not a defense against those looking to debunk myth; such a move 
would simply be another manifestation of debunking. Instead, I wish only to draw attention to a 
perspective on myth held by an expert on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which may provide 
space for a broader question regarding disentangling the conditions of intractable conflict of 
which myth and narrative are integral components. 
There are countless narratives to account for the many perspectives on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. For the purpose of this review of literature, I include a representative col-
lection from Rotberg which offers a set of contrasting historical narratives and the myths that 
underpin them. Rotberg does not propose a theory or model of understanding how the narra-
tives function rhetorically.  Instead, he argues that ending the immediate conflict and achieving 
eventual reconciliation will require mutual recognition of the legitimacy of both narratives. In 
addition, a recurring theme throughout Rotberg’s work is a call for changes in the belligerents' 
"collective narratives." For the purposes of this review, Rotberg’s collection is also a useful ex-
ample of how historical events can serve as focus points for myth and by doing so trap its 
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members in a paradigm that limits options. One essay in particular attempts to "build" bridges 
between the narratives as if they were static banks of a river. By applying elements of Burke's 
dramatistic methodology, I will describe how the banks of this river are shifting and eroding. 
Therefore, it does not matter what kind of rhetorical bridge you build, the central span of the 
bridge will always be too short. While my characterization admittedly sounds cynical, it also 
begs the question whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires a bridge, a dam, a dredging, 
or following Jullien, an intervention “upstream”.   
In his 2006 study for the U.S. Institute of Peace, “How Not to Make Peace, ‘Conflict Syn-
drome’ and the Demise of the Oslo Accords”, Rothstein blames the failure of the 1993 Oslo 
Peace Accords on a “set of attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs that become embedded over 
decades of bitter conflict and are difficult to unlearn even if some kind of peace agreement—or 
exploratory truce—has been signed” (1, see also Carcasson). Rothstein calls this condition Con-
flict Syndrome and he argues it brought with it a vocabulary and a cognitive framework that 
doomed the diplomatic proceedings in 1993, each subsequent effort to reconcile, and by exten-
sion likely doom the 2014 effort.  In contrast to Carcasson’s more optimistic framework where 
belligerents can share the moniker “peacemaker”, acts of political violence (or terrorism) fit 
neatly into the narrative of Conflict Syndrome. Although political violence is often a symbolic 
act designed to achieve a desired effect (fear), Conflict Syndrome shapes an environment 
where violence is the dominant form of symbolic action. Therefore, it can be argued this em-
bedded model of perception restricts action as well as thought. Concessions can only be tenta-
tive because distrust of the opposite side’s motives is the default position (Rothstein 3). Con-
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cessions, or any other form—or rhetorical trope—of negotiation, becomes an invitation for 
cheating and thus construed rhetorically as politically naïve or dangerous. 
Using Burke’s dramatistic methodology to re-envision the rhetorical environment may 
enable an alternative model to Rothstein’s Conflict Syndrome or binary narratives like 
Carcasson’s and perhaps reveal opportunities that always existed in the system, but were simp-
ly concealed by the dominant vocabulary. If our actions are constrained by our vocabularies, 
then discerning the origin and movement of a vocabulary is essential if one wishes to learn 
from Oslo and perhaps recognize future opportunities as paradigms U.S. policy-makers use 
come into view.  
1.4.3 Peace as Process 
This section of the review deals with three prominent American scholars on U.S. policy 
regarding the MEPP. All three have experienced the process first-hand as senior advisors to 
multiple U.S. administrations and so provide wide-ranging and largely apolitical perspectives on 
a constantly shifting environment. The purpose of this section is to articulate the general 
framework (including shared vocabulary) for U.S. policy-making by emphasizing commonalities 
amongst the scholars and revealing where they differ. Ultimately, I hope to outline the U.S. 
paradigm for the MEPP prior to George W. Bush. In Chapter Four, I will narrow the scope to-
wards a finer understanding of the underlying paradigms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict em-
ployed by the early George W. Bush administration. 
Quandt’s third edition of Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Con-
flict Since 1967 (2005) concludes with a first draft of the history of George W. Bush’s admin-
istration in the MEPP and is widely considered by the U.S. foreign policy community as a com-
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prehensive guide to how previous administrations have envisioned, executed, and often revised 
their paradigms of the MEPP. Beginning as a senior advisor during the Nixon and Carter years, 
Quandt was sought after as a theoretician by every preceding administration and as recently as 
2006 participated in a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) study group (the subject of the 
third book in this section by Daniel Kurtzer). As a product of his vast experience, Quandt pro-
vides a framework for understanding U.S. policy that has endured largely unmodified since the 
Clinton administration. Key elements and assumptions are the following: 
 The basic U.S. principles toward the MEPP are predictable, presidential “policies” are 
not.  
 There are three primary perspectives that must be accommodated: Arab, Palestinian, 
and Israeli. 
 To understand policy-making in the MEPP, three models for U.S. policy development 
must be considered: strategic (president-centered), bureaucratic politics, and domestic 
politics. 
 There is a general consensus amongst all parties as to what a permanent solution looks 
like.  
 Success requires maximum energy from all parties, especially the U.S. as a third party. 
 Incremental improvement or incremental effort towards peace is ineffective. 
 U.S. policy-making has a procedural bias and is “rhetoric-heavy” over substantive.  
 Israeli flexibility regarding negotiations is tied to the perceived strength of its relation-
ship with the U.S. 
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 U.S. administrations consider Israeli settlements in the West Bank (and previous settle-
ments in the Gaza Strip) as obstacles to peace.  
 The most important metric for progress is the number of negotiated settlements be-
tween the parties to address the primary points of contention: settlements, borders, 
refugees, Jerusalem, and security. 
 The majority of Israelis and Palestinians consider a final negotiated settlement the best 
way to solve the conflict. Same analysis found that majorities on both sides supported 
hard-line political leaders who privilege national self-interest over reconciliation.  
 Visionary speeches must be supported by visionary strategies. 
There are others. But the above elements represent the primary thematic movements in 
Quandt’s approach that are readily interrogated using rhetorical methods as well as pointing to 
the methodological assumptions Quandt makes. His approach is unapologetically prescriptive 
as he implores the reader to adopt his principles and recommendations for the sake of peace. 
There is a dramatic sense of urgency in his recommendations to U.S. policy-makers underlined 
by a tone of impatience (on his part) or perhaps frustration. Moreover, Quandt emphasizes in 
multiple places and ways how integral understanding what has worked and what has not 
worked in the past is to any future American effort to break the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate (2, 
16, 416, and 424).  The near-certainty of his historical (deductive) analysis does well in crafting 
a feasible solution, but his narration borders on presentism and may sacrifice understanding 
the problem for his readily acceptable and clearer solution. Although he admits that the adap-
tive environment means that “successes change the environment, leaving new problems in 
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their wake” (424), he does not propose a methodology for how to learn from those successes 
and failures.  
Having served in senior advisory roles in the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama administrations, Dennis Ross might be considered as the only practical 
and theoretical continuity for U.S. policy in the Middle East (Quandt 420). Ross’s approach in-
corporates Quandt’s suite of feasible solutions, but instead of only emphasizing the particulars 
of mistakes and successes, Ross adds that “it is important to recognize what is possible and 
what is not possible and shape objectives accordingly. If a solution is not possible at a given 
moment, then act in ways designed to defuse tensions and hostility” (777, see also Jullien 84-
103). This nod to alternate, perhaps intermediate, objectives is important because it shifts the 
emphasis from final resolution elements that typically entail great political risk for great politi-
cal gain, towards “narrowing the gaps” among the three narratives (44).  As Ross entertains the 
issue of mismatched narratives, it draws attention to the consequence of negotiating from un-
synchronized departure points.   
Perhaps the most striking difference between Quandt and Ross, which also creates 
space for my project, is that Ross takes the material events and issues of the MEPP I abstracted 
from Quandt earlier and reconfigures them as part of distinct mythic superstructures. Consider-
ing this divergence as part of Ross’s methodological assumptions provides an avenue to unpack 
elements of the MEPP project through a rhetorical perspective.  
Aligned with the three perspectives (Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli) on the MEPP outlined 
in Quandt, Ross attributes three explanatory myths. For the Arab nations the fundamental myth 
was that they could capitalize on the Palestinian crisis for their own self-interest and never be 
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threatened by it. For the Israelis: any compromise for land degrades Israeli nationalism or cor-
relates to a loss of Jewish identity. For Palestinians: their victimhood means they do not have to 
compromise nor acknowledge mistakes of their own making (41-45, 773-775). Instead of un-
packing these myths to learn how to amend them, Ross summarily “debunks” them simply as 
obstacles to “getting all parties to adjust to reality” (773, see also Burke, Attitudes Toward His-
tory 106 regarding debunking, and Coupe 80-81). Although Ross underestimates the prescrip-
tive potential of myth by denigrating it as primarily a subset of untruth, he manages to expand 
the conversation from proposed solutions to include mythic sub-structures thus inviting a criti-
cal approach to disentangle underlying motives. Following Ross, therefore, I hope to avoid the 
false choice Quandt offers: that of focusing either on the traditional peace process or the prod-
uct.  
As with both Ross and Quandt, Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky conclude their 2008 
analysis of U.S. policy-making in the Middle East with recommendations for future administra-
tions.  Their concise review incorporates interviews with top officials from previous administra-
tions involved with the MEPP portfolio—to include Ross and Quandt. It reads like Machiavelli 
advising his prince as Kurtzer and Lasensky boil down Ross’s 800 page tome into a handbook of 
ten lessons in 85 pages with 100 pages of reference material. I include this text in the literature 
review primarily because it represents the perspective of an elite practitioner: Kurtzer served as 
U.S. Ambassador to Egypt (97-01) and Israel (01-05). Kurtzer’s scathing characterization of 
George W. Bush’s foreign policy as being disconnected and the seemingly unobstructed clarity 
of his recommendations reveal an interesting discontinuity. Kurtzer is joined by Ross and 
Quandt in the opinion that George W. Bush broke with 30 years of diplomatic precedence re-
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garding the MEPP (discussed in Chapter Four). However, Kurtzer’s assessment of efficacy is 
based on a metric that demands overt U.S. engagement to “move the parties toward a settle-
ment” (77), i.e. focus on the ends. As he chastises George W. Bush for his disengagement, 
Kurtzer’s penultimate recommendation is to invest heavily in a form of unorthodox diplomacy 
coined by many as “Track II” which creates connective tissue between academics, economists, 
and social scientists and deemphasizes the punctuation marks associated with presidential in-
volvement (82). The apparent incongruity of Kurtzer’s recommendations is a reflection of the 
ever-shifting context framing the MEPP: a dynamic context with deep-running roots yet influ-
enced dramatically by events on the ground.  
The purpose of this section is not to evaluate George W. Bush’s policy decisions or its 
legacy regarding the MEPP. As evidenced in Kurtzer, the fluidity of the rhetorical environment 
makes the task of mapping the structure of knowledge on this topic all the more reliant on rec-
ognizing predominant assumptions that shape paradigms of peace, war, and peace-making. At 
the time of this writing, the numerous trips to the region by the U.S. Secretary of State and the 
one visit by President Obama has successfully restarted negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO. The images of Secretary Kerry flanked by representatives Israel and the PLO adhere to the 
prevailing diplomatic wisdom originally espoused by Quandt, Ross, and Kurtzer.  However, 
much like Kerry in 2013, Ross entered the diplomatic stage of the MEPP in the late 80’s and also 
wondered if his efforts could to bring the parties together to negotiate. When Ross left the 
Bush administration in 2004 he wondered whether negotiations could ever produce peace 
(Ross 45).  
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According to Secretary Kerry, the current U.S. strategy is based on a long-standing 
framework called the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) which was reaffirmed by its signatories 
twice since then. As recently as March, 2014, Secretary Kerry has endorsed both the API as a 
viable solution to the conflict as well as reaffirmed what the “end-game” looks like: 
security arrangements that leave Israelis more secure, not less; mutual recognition of 
the nation-state of the Jewish people and the nation-state of the Palestinian people; an 
end to the conflict and to all claims; a just and agreed solution for Palestinian refugees, 
one that does not diminish the Jewish character of the state of Israel; and a resolution 
that finally allows Jerusalem to live up to its name as the City of Peace. (Kerry, 3 Mar, 
2014) 
As discussed in many of the texts in this review and in Chapter Four, the API was originally sup-
ported by 22 Arab nations, yet summarily rejected by Israel as untenable. Is it adherence to 
Quandt et al’s strictures regarding the MEPP that has created an environment where a failed 
approach like the API might suddenly succeed? Or has the Arab Spring changed the calculus of 
the parties? Perhaps the Arab Spring will frame the negotiations as the Cold War, Saddam Hus-
sein, and the War on Terror did in the past? These may be the wrong questions because they 
focus on a current environment that shifts almost daily. So perhaps to understand where the 
Arab Spring might take the MEPP, one must understand where the War on Terror left the peace 
process.    
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1.5 Methodology 
For years I myself accepted the Dramatistic perspective as a metaphor, but now 
I’ve gone up in my price. I claim that the propositions “things move, persons 
act,” is literal. (Burke, “Dramatism” 331, emphasis original) 
  
 Kenneth Burke’s epigram to A Grammar of Motives, “Ad Bellum purificandum” or “to-
wards the purification of war” offers an introduction-purpose-conclusion to his entire work that 
may help in my own theoretical framing. By following Weiser, one avoids characterizing Burke’s 
epigram as a call to purify our world of war by somehow replacing it with a pure peace. Instead, 
A Grammar of Motives along with its complement, A Rhetoric of Motives, “promotes a persua-
sive dialectic as an alternative” to the “monologic unity” that can lead to war (Weiser 290-291). 
Integral to his wider body of work, Burke outlines a way to discern the common motives behind 
(or underlying) competing doctrines: a process of “identification” theorized in his Attitudes To-
ward History, operationalized as his broader dramatistic methodology, and ultimately formal-
ized through his pentadic model of analysis.  
 As I consider the motives feeding an intractable conflict through an application of this 
methodology, my findings shapes a heuristic framework for understanding conflict where one 
belligerent can look across the negotiating table and be confident that he or she is just as com-
fortably uncertain about the truth as the other belligerent is—defaulting to skepticism of reality 
instead of reductive intolerance or ‘monologic unity’. I acknowledge that Burke might take issue 
with the heuristic character I am applying to his dramatistic methodology. His emphasis is un-
doubtedly more on appreciation: “[dramatism] offers a system of placement, and should ena-
ble us, by the systematic manipulation of the terms, to ‘generate,’ or ‘anticipate’ the various 
classes of motivational theory. And a treatment of these terms, we hope to show, reduces the 
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subject synoptically while still permitting us to appreciate its scope and complexity” (A Gram-
mar of Motives xxiii). This project applies Burke’s dramatism as both a heuristic and as a tool for 
appreciation. To refine the problem, guide collection, and frame the interpretation of results, 
my theoretical framework is best aligned with Burke’s dramatism which serves as “a technique 
of analysis of language and of thought as basically modes of action rather than a means of con-
veying information” (Burke, “Dramatism” 332, emphasis mine).  With Burke as a methodologi-
cal guide for discerning motives in a human situation, I ultimately address how unpacking para-
digms following Burke’s dramatistic framework can help U.S. policy-makers negotiating issues 
of intractable conflict by revealing the constructed nature of the terms and concepts which op-
erationalize a narrative and the recursive influence those same terms and concepts have on the 
originating paradigm. 
1.5.1 Dramatism: Refining the Problem 
Without choice of terms, human beings would be incapable of their unique and 
defining gift, symbolic action. But each choice becomes a screen that is both a 
reflection of reality and a deflection of reality . . . Each [terministic] screen tends 
thus to distort the whole of things by exploiting a partial view that pretends to 
be the whole and that struggles to perfect itself by triumphing over all other 
views. The result is of course more conflict—conflict of a kind that shows an in-
herent drive toward total confrontation. (Booth 256) 
 
Using Burke’s dramatism-as-method encourages a resistance to defining a human prob-
lem in certain, and rhetorically loaded, terms while acquiescing to the criticism associated with 
admiring the problem for too long. Instead of naming a problem of social relations using the 
established lexicon of the MEPP, dramatism-as-method invites what Overington calls the con-
struction of “a vocabulary of terms” (97). With a new vocabulary of terms, perhaps better ques-
tions and better problems will emerge that can resist the constraints of the dominant para-
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digms.  Andrew King warns the rhetorical critic against using Burke’s Pentad “as a cookie cutter” 
approach that can be used “almost mindlessly” and instead encourages using it as a heuristic 
device to break the gridlock of polarized alternatives which “generally ended badly, in violence, 
horror, and death” (175-177). Others consider the Pentad within the context of Burke’s larger 
dramatistic method because for Burke, “dramatism was the way in which people interacted 
with their language. Burke did not analyze language as a means of conveying information or 
truth, but as a vehicle of action” (Anderson et al 147). For sake of brevity I will not detail the 
process of pentadic analysis itself (Robert Ivie offers an appropriate application); instead, I offer 
Burke’s own summary of his pentad offered to colleagues in 1966:  “For there to be an act, 
there must be an agent. Similarly, there must be a scene in which the agent acts. To act in a 
scene, the agent must employ some means, or agency. And there cannot be an act, in the full 
sense of the term, unless there is a purpose . . . the Dramatistic pentad” (“Dramatism” 332). 
For rhetoricians familiar with the three constituencies of Bitzer’s rhetorical situation--exigence, 
constraints, and rhetorical audience—the distinction between Burke’s Scene and Bitzer’s three 
constituencies turns on causality.  Whereas Scene is called forth by the rhetorical artifact, e.g. a 
stage play set in a prison calls forth conditions of isolation, the three constituencies working 
together calls the rhetorical artifact into being, i.e. the artifact is a response to the situation.  
Maintaining the link (overtly) between the Pentad and Burke’s more encompassing dramatistic 
method invokes other Burkean ideas like god terms, frames of acceptance, scapegoating, and 
circumference, which are not typically addressed in traditional Pentadic analysis.  
Although this study is concerned with world events and problems that will not be re-
solved within the timeframe of this project, my research is situated within the ongoing efforts 
41 
of the various communities currently working to improve (or perhaps better understand) the 
guiding assumptions and logics of the MEPP from a U.S. perspective. To that end, an important 
aspect of my methodology is that it be situated within a qualitative research paradigm agile 
enough to deal with the often unforeseen changes in the political and rhetorical environments 
like the recent re-start of formal negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians facilitated by 
U.S. Special Envoy Martin Indyk. What problem or problems are within Indyk’s mandate? What 
problems are ignored? From the scant published reports available, one might presume that the 
“final status issues” outlined by Quandt are on the negotiation agenda, i.e. borders, settle-
ments, Jerusalem, refugees, etc; however, agenda items are not necessarily the problems that 
need to be solved. What if the conditions which make the agenda items relevant are the actual 
problems that need to be addressed by the peace process?  Ultimately, my study capitalizes on 
the distinction between the reality of a problem, and the rhetorically-constructed perception of 
a problem.  
1.5.2 Dramatism: As a Guide for Collection 
As a representative international intractable conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pro-
vides the context for this study, and the rhetorical actions regarding the MEPP by the George 
W. Bush administration serves as the case study from which I have assembled rhetorical arti-
facts for analysis. Artifacts include, but are not limited to, presidential correspondence, treaties, 
speeches, transcripts of conferences, press releases, reactions to diplomatic correspondence, 
and interviews with conflict resolution practitioners and scholars. Primary source research in-
cludes analysis of political discourse, media commentary, and key Presidential foreign policy 
decisions made throughout the MEPP. As Burke approached poetry with an interest in the poet-
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ic act, not solely the poetic artifact, my research is focused on what the policy does in the rhe-
torical environment and not just how an Agent used the artifact.  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a useful context for my study for several pragmatic rea-
sons. First, because it is an ongoing conflict, the literature is constantly describing a shifting re-
ality. Each new truth is born obsolete as the volatile geo-political context resets premises, hy-
potheses, and guiding assumptions. As illustrated in my Review of Literature, describing a 
common reality or theorizing causal relationships and motives in an on-going conflict is elusive 
and invites skepticism and revision. Second, the adaptive and porous rhetorical environment is 
patient. Although a catastrophic success is always possible—Secretary Kerry succeeded in get-
ting the belligerents to the negotiation table, now he needs them to produce—to my 
knowledge there is little reason to expect final agreements regarding the primary points of con-
tention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the short timeframe of this project. The demand 
for a “new theory” to unravel the paradigms of this particular conflict will likely remain low. 
Moreover, although renewed attention on negotiations reflect “motion” along the MEPP (to 
borrow from Burke), I contend there is little “action.” Therefore, my scholarly interests benefit 
from a perceived lack of interest in changing the way policy-makers think about U.S. policy in 
the MEPP.  There is space for introspection. Third, as a political focusing event for many cul-
tures, the rhetorical artifacts are limitless in quantity, scope, and ideological orientation. A help-
ful by-product of the renewed negotiations is that scholars are flooding the conversation with 
timely research which reaches back to the timeframe of my project: the early years of the 
George W. Bush administration. 
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The foundation of this study is the library-based research necessary to build a meta-
level understanding of major concepts. This analysis includes how policy makers on all sides of a 
conflict negotiate the commonplaces of the rhetoric of conflict resolution: speeches, letters, 
state-controlled press, and published interviews with strategic leaders. With Burke’s dramatism 
as primary research guide, complementing methods for rhetorical analysis include mythic 
(Rushing, Burke, and Rowland) and constitutive (Burke and Charland). To problemetize this rhe-
torical foundation, my data collection strategy incorporates the personal insights and experi-
ences of practitioners of conflict resolution and philosophers of war and peace making, keep-
ing, and building. Interview subjects include conflict resolution experts at the Carter Center, the 
Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College, former diplo-
matic senior staff, and active contributors to Washington DC think tanks.  
My interview strategy focused more on the subject’s underlying assumptions and cogni-
tive frameworks and less on their professionally charged opinion on the MEPP itself. The long-
er-term objective is to abstract my findings upwards so as to not be channeled into a heuristic 
framework applicable to only the MEPP. Therefore, my interview tactic was to seek pentadic 
elements in the subject’s responses to help structure my own learning about what and how 
paradigms guide practitioners as they engage complex problems.  Moreover, I selected partici-
pants who had a direct role in either the development or implementation of the very rhetorical 
artifacts I selected to represent the early years of the Bush administration’s perspective on the 
MEPP. Implications for policy makers are apparent, but implications for communication and 
rhetorical studies also emerged as pentadic ratios, e.g. Scene-Act or Scene-Agency, ultimately 
privileged Scene over other pentadic terms. Although my subjects provided valuable eviden-
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tiary insight into the issues related to intractable conflict, as a generating principle, the empha-
sis on Scene in their interviews (which themselves became rhetorical artifacts) provoked ques-
tions of determinism that Burke cautions about in A Grammar of Motives and which I will detail 
in Chapter Four.  
My professional and personal interest in the MEPP also shapes my collection strategy. 
Years of designing approaches for the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives related to the 
Middle East has greatly influenced the terministic screens through which I approach complex 
problems. This study does not propose a general theory or distinct model for solving intractable 
conflict. Guided by the general rules of the pentad—as a logic of inquiry or “analytic model of 
the social world” (Overington 104)—my approach leverages the heuristic character of Burke’s 
dramatism to help reveal a set of variables and relationships that presumably account for a set 
of phenomena: a “dramatistic” framework for unpacking intractable conflict.   
1.5.3 Dramatism: Framing the Interpretation of Results 
Dramatism also effects how the data might be analyzed. One example how dramatism 
frames the interpretation of results is with discourse analysis. Overington argues that a “pursuit 
of dialectical substance” is the fundamental operation in Burke’s pentadic framework (106). 
Although absent a replicable method, this fundamental operation is perhaps best understood 
through the clustering of words around the “master” pentadic term that emerges through an 
analysis of the pentadic ratios evident in the rhetorical act or artifact. In addition, the 
connotational logic of the cluster means that pulling on any one term within the cluster will 
mobilize the entirety of the cluster toward an explanation (Ibid): a critical move to recognize as 
it happens in a rhetorical act, but one that only works if the rhetorician can demonstrate fidelity 
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between the audience’s cultural expectations and the discursive moves that take place. Arriving 
at the “master” pentadic term then enables the emergence of the “god term” representing “the 
unitary substance in which all human diversity of motives” are grounded (Burke, A Grammar of 
Motives 111).  Therefore, choice of terms can reveal motives—what Andrew King calls, “a stra-
tegic symbolic summing up of an action” (167)—which shape how an advisor to a U.S. Secretary 
of State might consider a complex problem.  
As a tool to interpret results from primary and secondary source research, Burke’s 
dramatistic method invites questions about how a rhetorical act or artifact leads to identifica-
tion—as opposed to mere persuasion—and points to the power inherent in defining or redefin-
ing a particular event. The distinction between identification and persuasion turns on the role 
of the audience and the goals of the rhetor. In his overview of pentadic criticism, King argues 
that while persuasion includes appeals to emotions and deeply held values, Burkean identifica-
tion is characterized by an increase in mutually beneficial interaction and shared common feel-
ings amongst an audience (165). But as they inform the ends of a rhetorician’s charge, both 
terms chart a movement to act using different ways and means. For example, if the rhetor’s ob-
jective is to move an audience to action, then persuasion offers a plethora of tools. On the oth-
er hand, if the rhetor’s task is to shape an environment which then enables an audience to pur-
sue its own tendencies, then Burke’s critical method (identification) is the better choice. Ways 
and means may differ, but action is still the ultimate objective of both approaches. As a guide 
for interpreting results, dramatism-as-guide serves to unmask intentions and reveal logics that 
comprise the paradigms employed by anyone party to an intractable conflict.  
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Using pentadic ratios to analyze data and interpret results is a technical process provid-
ing necessary shape to a “dramatistic” framework for unpacking intractable conflict. 
Dramatism-as-guide, however, involves the creation of a “perspective of perspectives” of which 
pentadic analysis is but a part of.  As detailed earlier, my methodology also treats other 
Burkean concepts generally nested under the Dramatism moniker: god terms, comic and tragic 
frames of acceptance, and the scapegoat. Furthermore, to address the implications of prescrip-
tive paradigms on problem formulation, I align my approach with Burke’s mythic, constitutive, 
and narrative projects—perhaps the most understudied in regards to problem formulation: 
myth. 
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2 A ROLE FOR MYTH IN “PERFECTING” THE PROBLEM 
Mythology for Burke is at once historical and universal, temporal and transcend-
ent . . . he reads myth not only as a means of affecting social cohesion but also as 
a bridging device to relate humanity to the earth and the wider universe—in 
short, the cosmos. (Coupe 4)  
 
The MEPP brings with it a vocabulary, an agenda, and a set of codes and myths which 
generations of Palestinians and Israelis (as well as an ever-growing body of international par-
ties) have internalized. For example, the term concession means more than its lexical definition. 
To a Palestinian, it may mean give up land. To an Israeli, it may mean give up security. To both it 
means sacrificing a bit of their identity (Ross, The Missing Peace 15-29).  What is at risk when 
concession emerges as a rhetorical commonplace which can threaten the identities of both dis-
tinct communities?  
Following Lucaites and Condit, this chapter appreciates how narrative connects charac-
terizations to form a “network of a community’s public vocabulary” and then addresses how 
characterizations of agents, acts, and scenes are shaped by a community’s myths. In this way, I 
argue for what provides the foundation for Lucaites and Condit’s characterization-narrative-
ideograph model: myth. For Burke, myth “sums up all the principles felt to have been guiding 
the socio-political order . . . the ‘perfecting myth’ becomes like the originator of the order it 
perfects” (The Rhetoric of Religion 240-241, emphasis original). It follows then that one might 
begin with myth in order to understand how terms like concession might be recognized as a 
rhetorical commonplace and understand the potential of narrative. As a way to interrogate the 
tension (and potential) inherent amongst competing narratives, one might consider the intrac-
table nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a perspective which accommodates for 
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both the prescriptive and normative attributes of narrative: Robert Rowland and Burke’s mod-
els for rhetorical myth.  
As noted in the Review of Literature, the central tenet of Rowland’s model for rhetorical 
myth is that myths change as they are rectified with changing historical and rhetorical contexts.  
Decades-old myth systems made obstinate by wars, unstable peace, and pervasive animosity 
will eventually be pulled into alignment with and by physical reality. Rowland’s framework for a 
peace process begins with the Palestinians and Israelis revising their “mythic symbol systems” 
that left as is will continue to thwart even the latest attempt at the MEPP facilitated by Secre-
tary Kerry (Rowland, “Mythic Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 44).  
While Rowland accounts for the Israeli “revisionist” myth in accordance with prevailing scholar-
ship on the issue, his treatment of the Palestinian myth is overly reductive because he elevates 
the myth of Hamas (a Palestinian political and military body the U.S. classifies as a terrorist or-
ganization) as the representative myth of all Palestinians. While many consider rockets from 
Gaza, launched or passively supported by Hamas, as the preeminent problem that needs to be 
solved, others would argue Hamas is simply a symptom of a greater problem. When foreign 
leaders consult with Hamas instead of the Palestinian Authority regarding Palestinian security 
and economics, it is understandable why observers like Rowland would hope to make solving 
the Hamas “problem” synonymous with solving the much broader Palestinian crisis. According-
ly, many might agree with Rowland when he states that “the mythic foundations of Hamas, as 
expressed in its charter, explain its commitment to maximalist territorial claims and willingness 
to use violence” (43). But what if focusing on Hamas only distracts from addressing the condi-
tions that make the Hamas “problem” relevant?  
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In this chapter, I argue that Rowland’s application of his own criteria for myth can pro-
vide a useful model for understanding intractable conflict by laying bear its underlying myths to 
a critical eye. However, in his attempt to reveal the underlying myth of the Palestinian people, 
Rowland constitutes a Palestinian myth through the lens of his own mythic criteria and inad-
vertently subordinates the arguably broader problem, lack of Palestinian unity, to the symptom, 
Hamas.  Therefore, Rowland’s programmatic decision reveals the vulnerabilities in his narrow 
definition of myth that was interrogated thoroughly in a 1990 volume of Communication Stud-
ies. This chapter addresses these fundamental vulnerabilities first, then draws correlations and 
distinctions between Rowland and Burke concerning myth, and concludes with thoughts as to 
how an “end” of the rhetorical myth underlying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be used to 
emphasize what Burke considers humanity’s “pursuit of perfection.” Ultimately, by creating fis-
sures in Rowland’s mythic criteria and his posture on entelechy, I incorporate elements of 
Burke’s foundational work on myth and reinvigorate the generating principle behind paradigms 
and the myths in which paradigms are manifested. 
2.1 The Problem-solving Power of Myth 
Robert Rowland entertained a maelstrom of resistance when he proposed an exclusion-
ary set of criteria to determine whether a text or narrative is mythical. As Rowland emphasizes 
in his rejoinder, his purpose for establishing a “functional/formal” definition of myth is less 
about judging a particular artifact and more about “the appropriateness” of the rhetorical 
method a critic uses to analyze it (Rowland, “On a Limited Approach to Mythic Criticism—
Rowland's Rejoinder" 151). Many of his circa 1990 critics endorsed his characterization of myth 
as the ultimate problem solver and Rowland offers perhaps the best explanation of the problem 
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solving attributes of myth when he writes, “myths are stories which symbolically solve the 
problem facing the society, provide justification for a social structure, or deal with a psychologi-
cal crisis” (Ibid 103).  Rowland eventually considers rhetorical myth within the context of violent 
conflict. Therefore, it is important to discuss further how rhetorical myth functions in a prob-
lem-solving capacity.  
According to Rowland, instead of analyzing E.T. or Star Wars as myths, critics should in-
stead reserve the myth-moniker for texts that function to answer “human problems that can-
not be answered discursively . . . to transcend ordinary life and provide meaningful grounding 
for that which cannot be supported rationally” (Rowland, "On Mythic Criticism" 102-103).  Row-
land’s detractors were generally less affronted by how he defined the function of myth and 
more concerned with how he defined the structure of myth. This is understandable because by 
proposing the structure of myth, Rowland establishes what myth is not.  For Rowland, 
Myths are our most powerful stories. It is therefore quite exciting to discover a hereto-
fore unrecognized myth. But the power associated with myth is precisely why the func-
tion/formal definition is useful. If myths are our most powerful stories, then it is im-
portant that we not confuse such powerful narrative forms with works that lack the 
power. An overly broad approach to myth risks losing the capacity to draw such distinc-
tions. (Rowland, "On Mythic Criticism" 102)  
Contention over what myth is and is not is warranted and important not just for the critics who 
traffic in rhetorical analysis, but with the policy makers envisioning a path to peace but are par-
alyzed, perhaps unbeknownst, by the myths underlying the conflict. Policy makers who under-
estimate, or simply misunderstand, the relationship between a people and their myths may find 
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their perfectly rational approach to a problem doomed before its even implemented. The prize 
(the definition of myth) is worthy and Rowland’s rejoinder to his critics calling for a broader def-
inition of myth does not concede an inch of the argument. Detailing his structural criteria for 
myth as well as some of his informal components from 1990 provides a framework for how 
Rowland describes conflict in his own 2011 article on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
For Burke, social contexts where we “presume myths sponsor communal identification 
and division, affirm a preferred order while simultaneously opposing others, and offer humans 
transcendent meaning” (Rowland, “Mythic Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict” 42) are surely rhetorical situations that can be explicated as such.  Furthermore, 
Burke’s description of the “didactic frame” may also contribute to a defendable rationale for 
the problem-solving power of myth. The didactic poet recognizes binaries, but refuses to sub-
mit to them as the dominant framing elements. Instead, he or she perceives the world through 
a “frame of acceptance” that resists the “us versus them” narrative that can so easily restrict 
avenues for approaching problems.  
Burke even criticizes Marx for his own narrow concept of antithesis “pitting one ‘morali-
ty’ against another, without analyzing the possibility that the imaginative writer tends to ‘ad-
umbrate’ the eventual synthesis, hence confusing the simple for-or-against attitude that pre-
vails in lawyer’s-brief polemic” (Attitudes Toward History 76, emphasis original). Transferring 
the didactic attributes of Burke’s “frames of acceptance” to the problem-solving aspects of 
Rowland’s rhetorical myth offers a method to disentangle relationships contributing to a con-
flict. Furthermore, as ascribed in the systemic nature of Burke’s didactic “frames of ac-
ceptance,” the community that employs the myth must exist as a coherent system if the prob-
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lem-solving attributes of myth are to be realized. Rowland echoes this sentiment when he 
claims that the myth must be taken “deadly serious” by the audience where the myth operates 
("On Mythic Criticism" 108).  
In the conclusion to his 1990 essay, Rowland writes that “the power of traditional myth 
largely can be traced to its form” (Ibid 102).  Moreover, he argues that as the form loses resili-
ency, it also loses its ability to function as a model for action for the community it serves; thus 
the importance of defining the structure of myth. For Rowland, myth is comprised of the fol-
lowing criteria: 1) myths are stories believed to be true by their community; 2) the greater the 
problem facing the community, the greater the hero required to solve it. There must be heroes; 
3) “myths usually occur outside of normal historical time (such as the American Revolution) 
that, because of the great symbolic power associated with it, has been transformed into mythi-
cal time” (104); 4) as myth usually occurs outside normal time, it is also located outside our 
normal conception of space and is bestowed a “special symbolic power” for the community; 
and 5) a lexicon of archetypal language that situates the myth as universally human. But, ful-
filling Rowland’s formal criteria is only part of the equation. There are informal components 
that hold the whole theory together and often compensate for a deficiency in one criterion or 
another. Because Rowland’s critics have already taken his formal component to task as an over-
ly-exclusive theoretical model of myth, I focus on Rowland’s own application of his method and 
the gaps which emerge. Moreover, because Rowland seeks to articulate the rhetorical myth 
underlying the Palestinian narrative, my analysis does not attend to the aesthetic components 
of myth often associated with literary myth.  
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2.2 Form and Function of Rhetorical Myth 
 With a rationale for myth-as-problem-solver, this chapter now moves into the specifics 
of Rowland’s formal and functional definition of rhetorical myth. The first structural require-
ment is that myths are stories which “symbolically solve the problem facing the society, provide 
justification for a social structure, or deal with a psychological crisis” (Ibid 103).  This categoriza-
tion would easily encompass both J.R.R. Tolkien’s work and the U.S. frontier stories if it were 
not for the role of truth. As he critiques mis-applications of myth later in his 1990 essay, Row-
land extends this first criterion by carefully distinguishing between literary and rhetorical myth. 
Whereas Tolkien’s work might be considered literary myth, rhetorical myth (often termed social 
myth) requires a component of literal or psychological truth.  
Rowland approaches truth from a necessarily broad perspective. For him, truth is not 
dependent on historical evidence or a sense of objectivity and is more reliant on whether 
something is treated as true by the community that practices it. Truth is something constituted, 
not revealed. This gives Rowland space to consider the interpretive attributes of a given com-
munity but it also creates a vulnerability in his mythic model due to the inherent instability of a 
truth in constant revision. In terms of efficacy, Rowland’s model warns of the vulnerability by 
noting that “if the basic story in a myth loses its character as ‘objective truth’ the power of the 
myth dissipates” (Ibid 103). Thus, there is an inherent instability to a rhetorical myth with nu-
merous interconnected components reliant on a tenuous truth.  
It should be noted that this discussion of truth is within the context of a ‘true story’ that 
a community takes ‘deadly serious’. By following Rowland’s criterion for perceived objective 
truth, texts like the movie E.T. shift away from rhetorical myth and closer to literary myth with-
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out much controversy. Although the truth prerequisite demonstrates how easily Rowland can 
exclude a text like E.T. from the rhetorical myth category, it invites a wider discussion as to the 
importance of context. What if the rhetorical context for E.T. somehow invited its viewers to 
consider “the basic story of the myth” (Rushing 138) as an objective truth? If so, would the re-
vised context then shift E.T. from literary to rhetorical myth? My point here is not to defend 
Rushing’s “evolution of cultural consciousness” nor out-rightly endorse Rowland’s stringent cri-
terion regarding stories. My purpose is to create space where Rowland’s contextual nature of 
truth can still serve as a prerequisite for rhetorical myth if rectified with how Burke describes 
the relationship between form and truth. 
Burke provides a necessary conflation of scientific truth and truth realized through ritual 
or revelation:  “revelation is ‘scientific,’ whether its ‘truth’ be founded upon magic, religion, or 
laboratory experiment. Revelation is ‘belief,’ or ‘fact’” (Burke, Counter Statement 168).  From 
this conflation, Burke and Rowland might agree about the legitimizing role the community plays 
in creation of truth and by extension, myth. Furthermore, both consider myth as a model for 
action: a prescriptive characterization which ends with the fulfillment—or in Burke’s parlance, 
“perfection” —of the myth.   
In his earlier work, Burke distinguishes between a psychology of information and a psy-
chology of form to argue that scientific criteria was being “unconsciously introduced into mat-
ters of purely aesthetic judgment” thus creating breaches between form and subject-matter 
and one between technique and psychology (Burke, Counter-Statement 31). Burke’s distinctions 
are important because they demonstrate how form and function exist in an oscillating relation-
ship in much the same way that Rowland distinguishes literary and rhetorical myth along the 
55 
lines of literal and “believed” truth. For Burke, ‘form’ is the delivery of a desired satisfaction to 
an audience by an artist (Ibid 31). The ‘psychology’ comes in to play because the artist must 
first create the appetite in the audience before satisfying it. This methodology requires an un-
derstanding of audience that cannot be based on a generalized formula or checklist (read: sci-
entific). Instead, the methodology raises—if not returns—expectations for the artist to produce 
subject matter that is valuable to a specific audience because it shapes their future appetites, 
not just informs them about a set of facts. Therefore, assessing aesthetic value equates to judg-
ing artistic truth.  For Burke, the goal of articulating an aesthetic truth is less about the assem-
blage of facts, which is more appropriate for the “psychology of information,” and more about 
how the presentation adheres or supports human propriety regarding poise and rhythm (Ibid 
42). In other words, aesthetic truth is assessed in terms of appropriateness to the rhetorical 
context. In contrast, Rowland treats truth as a product of a rhetorical myth that shifts, if and 
only if, the myth itself is rectified with reality and changed accordingly (Rowland, “Mythic Rhet-
oric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 54). For Rowland, rectifying the arc of 
myth with reality determines what will endure as truths promulgated by the terms and con-
cepts employed by a narrative. The process of “rectification” becomes an important amend-
ment to Rowland’s original criteria for myth that he revises and then applies to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In contrast, my project considers rhetorical myths as organic components 
which can only be affected indirectly by attending the narratives which connect a rhetorical 
myth to its public. In other words, the recursive relationships amongst paradigm, myth, and 
narrative invite an appreciation for the centrality of myth not as something to change unilater-
ally in an effort to direct corresponding narratives, but as the connective tissue between para-
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digm and narrative. To be clear, this is not to argue that rhetorical myths are impermeable and 
so should be accepted axiomatically; instead, as I argue in Chapter Four, we should focus on the 
terms and concepts employed by a narrative (which by extension are manifestations of the rhe-
torical myth). My own treatment of rhetorical myths “as our most powerful stories” is a distinct 
contrast from Rowland’s “rectification” of myth which is essentially, in my assessment, another 
way of “debunking” a myth.  
Written in coordination with David A. Frank, a scholar well-versed in the rhetoric of the 
Palestinian crisis, Rowland’s 2011 article extends his 1990 criteria for myth with the concept of 
“rectification.” The article argues that peace between the Israelis and Palestinians is achievable 
only when the belligerents rectify their mythic symbol systems with reality—put a bit more 
provocatively, to change the truths of the environment. This hypothesis would be useful if it 
was allowed to transcend the common binaries (a la Burke’s transcendence) and reveal areas 
for “identification” from which to address the underlying problems. Instead, Rowland extracts 
Hamas from the wider Palestinian community and then argues that Hamas represents the en-
tire Palestinian body when he states that “for Hamas to admit the existence of Israel at this 
point would be to cede its ‘historic right’ to the land of Palestine and would serve to undermine 
Palestinian identity” (Rowland, “Mythic Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Con-
flict” 50). This decision enables Rowland to elevate the Hamas Charter synecdochically as the 
preeminent text reflecting the underlying myth of the Palestinians. Although there are surely 
those who agree with Rowland’s synecdochic move, this move runs counter to other scholars 
and peace practitioners who view the narratives of the Palestinian crisis as ones which should 
transcend the violent resistance to the “state” of Israel (espoused by Hamas) and focus instead 
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on the issue of human rights for all (Bar-on 143).   Moreover, reducing the conflict to a “Hamas 
versus Israel” binary ignores the regional and global socio-political contexts which may result in 
solving the wrong problem and exacerbating the “right” one.  
My purpose is not to refute a proposed solution to the conflict—I don’t have a better 
one—my interests are in revealing the methodologies theorists and practitioners follow as they 
seek to understand the intractable-ness of conflict. To that end, I grant that in an analysis of the 
myths of Hamas, Rowland fulfills much of his own myth criteria without much controversy. 
Rowland argues that as a political resistance movement with a violent apparatus, Hamas is 
founded upon a myth that is widely believed in: a Palestinian right to land occupied by Israel. 
Returning to his myth criteria, two criterions involve a return to a “mythical time” and a space 
with “special symbolic power” for the community; for this Rowland easily connects the 1988 
Hamas Charter with an implied narrative calling for a return to the glories of the early Islamic 
caliphates.  Rowland’s approach becomes problematic, however, when he pursues the criteri-
ons involving heroes and archetypal language.  
The criterion regarding heroism is perhaps the broadest in Rowland’s structure for myth 
but suffers from vulnerabilities that his critics revealed and I will also address as they relate to 
his own formal application. Rowland cites the numerous articles in the Hamas Charter that re-
call the initial glories of the rising Islamic caliphates in the eighth and ninth centuries through 
the successes of Saladin and into the birth of the Palestinian resistance movement triggered by 
the creation of Israel in 1948. However, Rowland over-extends the purview of the Hamas char-
ter across all Palestinians when he argues that for Palestinians, the “jihadist fighter” is the 
mythic hero opposing the physical invasion of Palestine and the ideological invasion that began 
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with the Crusades and continues with Zionism (Rowland, “Mythic Rhetoric and Rectification in 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 50).  It is undeniable that the Hamas myth is appealing to Pales-
tinians who consider violent resistance the best (or only) way to achieve Palestinian objectives.  
The charter does provide a clearly defined enemy (Israel and its allies) and the problem (Zion-
ism) that makes the jihadist fighter the logical hero to align with Rowland’s criterion for heroic 
action (Hamas Charter 1988). The trouble with this ready hero is that if the jihadist must sym-
bolically solve the problem facing the community, the problem must be a literal one the com-
munity can agree upon.  
To be a rhetorical myth underlying a “true” story, Rowland’s jihadist hero relies on a 
shared belief in what is true according to all Palestinians, not just the slice of the community 
that Hamas represents or claims to represent. Achieving this level of representation is made 
even more difficult due to the disparate “community” of Palestinians where hundreds of thou-
sands are still refugees spread across the Middle East. It might also be argued that there is a 
hierarchy of truths, which even if all were accepted, would spawn myths that would contrast if 
not contradict each other. Proposing that a representative rhetorical myth must be rectified 
with reality as a precondition to peace between Israelis and Palestinians invites high expecta-
tions. The mythic hero is not just a product of a mythic narrative, it helps constitute the myth. 
Without the hero, the myth (thus the narrative) becomes something less. 
In contrast to a rhetorical myth, I contend that Rowland offers more of a cultural myth 
that Janice Rushing might characterize as “embodying fundamental values that are widespread 
throughout the culture, or that impose the ideology of a privileged class upon under-classes” 
(Rushing 143, emphasis mine).  Similarly, Michael Osborn’s “culturetypes” provides a con-
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trasting model to reconsider a Hamas Charter as trying to spread ideology, not presuppose it. 
Osborn points to the seams between archetype and culturetype by way of their respective 
scopes:  
Culturetypes could be read as including the more restricted category of ideographic ab-
stractions, but they also must embrace specific, concrete sacred symbols such as Row-
land has mentioned—Valley Forge, for example or the New Frontier, which would be in-
telligible in few if any other cultural contexts. To complete the circle again, culturetypes 
receive their charge of special symbolic meaning through narratives that are heavily 
freighted with social significance . . . archetypes and culturetypes brace and comple-
ment each other, culturetypes expressing the special values and meanings of a society, 
archetypes anchoring the cultural system in enduring meaningfulness. (Osborn 123) 
Arguing for a broader interpretation of myth, Rushing and Osborn recommend ways of refining 
myth through additional layers of categorization—to increase fidelity—instead of elimination.  
In her resistance to Rowland’s formal mythic system, Rushing reminds us of the relationship 
between cultural and archetypal myth that points back to a vulnerability in Rowland’s fifth for-
mal criterion (the need for archetypal language) as applied to the Hamas Charter. For Rowland, 
this fifth criterion may be the least useful defining characteristic (“On Mythic Criticism” 105), 
but it nevertheless destabilizes his own formal application because it clearly excludes the Ha-
mas Charter from possessing the archetypal attributes necessary for myth (Ibid 104 and Row-
land, “On a Limited Approach to Mythic Criticism—Rowland's Rejoinder" 156). Therefore, 
whereas the Hamas Charter provides a clear hero against a clear villain, the consequence is that 
it also excludes those Palestinians who do not ascribe to violent resistance to Israel.  
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To find a mythic hero to meet Rowland’s criteria, one might benefit from turning to 
Burke’s twelve “motivational ingredients” for hypothetical myth outlined in his 1947 essay, 
“Ideology and Myth.” Burke calls for a revision of ancient notions of heroism based on great 
achievements against great problems: “Above the sincere praise of great deeds, should hover 
the thought of human folly, the concern ever with the ironic possibility that much courage, 
power, ambition have been misdirected: not the ‘explaining’ of this so much as the constant 
meditating upon it” (Burke, “Ideology and Myth” 205 quoted in Coupe 21). Coupe continues 
this introspective move as he argues that “humility directs us not only to see our culture in his-
torical context . . . but also to acknowledge the inevitable contradiction of all human endeavors, 
whereby apparent progression often turns out to be regression” (21). It follows then that when 
applied to the Palestinian crisis, a mythic hero is not one who resists an invasion even though 
the resistance creates a perception of progress. Although the jihadist fighter may not be elevat-
ed to mythic hero status, it might instead assume an important role as a “culturetype,” to re-
turn again to Osborn, which may remind Palestinians that identity is a harmonious combination 
of culturetypal and archetypal symbols (Osborn 123). Therefore, because of Rowland’s own 
constraints regarding heroism and archetypes, the charter should not be considered a reliable 
articulation of the rhetorical myth for all Palestinians.  
Thus far I have introduced some of the vulnerabilities in Rowland’s approach with the 
strengths associated with Burke’s foundational understanding of myths. Although there are 
useful intersections, I contend that in order to solidify his premise that privileges the Hamas 
myth, Rowland overextends Burke’s treatment of entelechy, and in so doing further under-
mines his own mythic criteria. 
61 
2.3 Burke and Rowland on Entelechy: A Necessary Distinction 
According to Burke, entelechy is a vital component to myth because “there is a kind of 
‘terministic compulsion’ to carry out the implications of one’s terminology” (“Definition of 
Man” 18). An entity may have a desire to “fulfill the possibilities intrinsic to its nature” (Burke, 
“Doing and Saying” 110), but this should not be taken to mean that the group—in this case, 
Hamas—exists on some kind of linear path with an inflexible end determined by some myth-
maker. 
For his 2011 pragmatic demonstration of his mythic criteria, Rowland introduces a rejec-
tion of entelechy as a new informal element to hold his model together.  He argues that when 
threatened, an ethnic group will deploy an entelechial mythic system to protect its identity. 
This tendency, according to Rowland, eventually results in an intransigent mythic system “im-
pervious to the suffering of others and [resistant to] historical change”: a brand of obstinacy 
that mirrors the “terrible results” achieved by the Nazi pursuit of perfection (Rowland, “Mythic 
Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 43). For Rowland, the logical corre-
lation is that any recognition of Israeli claims for legitimacy represents a clear threat to Hamas’ 
identity (Ibid 43). Therefore, Rowland’s version of the entelechial principle explains tautologi-
cally why Hamas is forced to pursue obstinacy and violent resistance over compromise.  
As Rowland applies it, the entelechial construct diverts responsibility for conflict from 
the group committing a violent act to whatever act threatens the group’s identity. One might 
consider this move an extension of his second formal myth criterion where “myth takes us out 
of history to solve the problems posed by history . . . [and] can now signify not only the perfec-
tion of beginnings in the mythical past but also the perfection that is to come in the future” 
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(Rowland, "On Mythic Criticism" 104, emphasis mine). In other words, violence is perfectly 
commensurate with the expectations inherent in Hamas’ mythic system. However, there are 
two immediate problems with Rowland’s application: 1) He assumes an unwarranted level of 
certainty as to the “threats” to Hamas. According to Rowland, the singular threat is conclusively 
Israel and its foreign benefactors; however it is often argued that there are other internal 
threats to Hamas, e.g. economic security, waning Arab support, legitimacy of political rivals like 
Fatah (C. Smith 517). In contrast, Rowland characterizes the threat to Israeli identity as being 
predominately internal (“Mythic Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 
48); this move puts the cause for Israel’s militancy squarely on its own publics and enables Row-
land to propose tautological solutions that can be defended by his myth criteria; and 2) The 
problem most relevant to my interest in rehabilitating Rowland’s approach is that he extends 
entelechy to a brand of essentialism Burke would likely find unnecessarily constraining.  
Although Rowland cites “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle” as an “obvious” demonstration 
of entelechial myth and the “terrible results” associated with entelechy, I agree with Coupe that 
Burke is actually less concerned with a single myth system, e.g. Nazi, and more concerned with 
articulating the dangerous potentials inherent in his concepts of “scapegoating” and “congrega-
tion by segregation” (Coupe 171). Furthermore, I contend that Burke’s conception of a “perfect 
enemy” in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle” was meant to depict an ironic aspect of the principle 
of entelechy, e.g. “perfect fool,” ("Definition of Man" 19), not as a predictive formula to apply 
to a current situation as Rowland does.  Pertinent to Rowland’s myth project, Burke takes pains 
to rectify what he evidently considered a prevailing tendency of mythographers at the time 
when he writes,  
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in adapting the principle of fulfillment that is central to the genius of Aristotelian ‘entel-
echy’, I propose what I would call a ‘logological’ critique of the mythologists . . . This 
[words about words] critique also involves my claim that the mythically tinged cult of 
the ‘archetype’ over-universalizes the nature of such symbolizing in human relations. 
(“Doing and Saying” 117)  
It follows that Burke would likely take issue with the very idea of overlaying a deterministic par-
adigm—entelechial or not—on a myth. There is a tendency, Burke warns, that “just as the 
search for paradigms leads one in the direction of such words as ‘prototype’ and ‘archetype,’ so 
the essentializing nature of mythopoeia attains its terministic fulfillment in narratives which 
deal with things now, in terms of imputed origins from which the relevant manifestations now 
are said to be temporally descended” (Ibid 110). Coupe picks up on Burke’s concern about the 
hunt for archetypal language when he states, “when Burke refers to the ‘cult’ of the archetype, 
he seems to have in mind any theory of myth in which the theorist himself adopts the role of 
tribal ‘myth-man,’ claiming to offer a ‘rounding out,’ a ‘symbolic doubling,’ a ‘formal culmina-
tion’ of mythology” (Coupe 49-50). Where for Rowland a prescribed end is necessary to under-
stand the symbols and traditions of a mythic system, I contend that a prescribed end closes off 
the myth to potential narratives (of which violence could be an expected attribute). Instead, the 
end of a rhetorical myth would serve as an “orientation,” to borrow again from Burke, that 
would welcome non-linearity and uncertainty, not the ‘terrible results’ from Rowland’s applica-
tion. 
Burke further burdens the “theorist of myth to recognize the project of ‘perfection’ in-
volved . . . [and yet] one must be careful not to carry the mythic project over into the theory 
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itself, lest various intellectual maneuvers be made surreptitiously” (Coupe 47). Stripped of 
Burke’s nuance, entelechy becomes a convenient way for Rowland to rationalize why Hamas 
embraces a “fundamentalist (entelechial) ideology/myth system” and to explain its “commit-
ment to maximalist territorial claims and willingness to use violence” (“Mythic Rhetoric and 
Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 43).  In stark contrast to Burke’s definition of 
man as one “rotten with the pursuit of perfection” (16-19), Rowland argues that “human beings 
are not entelechial beings by nature” and so instead of confronting Hamas, the international 
community (and Israel) should offer patience and support for Hamas as it deals with its unnatu-
ral challenges and eventually rectifies its obstinate charter with reality (Ibid 43-53). It seems 
that Rowland successfully recognizes the ‘project of perfection’ at play in the Hamas myth, but 
over-extends his conclusions when he elevates the Hamas myth as the representative Palestini-
an myth.  
Rowland’s deterministic use of entelechy might be made more pliable by contrasting it 
with a more elegant application of the “principle of perfection” in Burke’s own literary criticism. 
Burke’s 1966 essay, “Myth, Poetry, and Philosophy,” is an extended criticism of “Python, A 
Study of Delphic Myth and its Origins” by Joseph Fontenrose. Through a literary analysis of the 
“combat myth,” Burke offers us another way to conceive of the entelechial principle which piv-
ots gently from a tendency toward perfection to a pursuit of “thoroughness.” At the risk of 
oversimplifying, one might consider “thoroughness” a step back from the pursuit of perfection 
without losing fidelity with the Aristotelian principle of entelechy. As a “thoroughness” test, 
Burke proposes two stories depicting dream sequences representing the theme of lost love. 
One dream involves a man dropping a garment of the jilted lover. The other describes a woman 
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being dropped off a cliff by her lover. Although both dreams include the act of dropping, the 
later is obviously a “more thorough” depiction of tragic fulfillment (“Myth, Poetry, and Philoso-
phy” 392-393).  Burke does not judge the efficacy of the two dream sequences; he simply dis-
tinguishes them from each other in order to illustrate variances in the “entelechial pressure” 
toward a perfect paradigm. I contend that one might nullify the obstinacy of Rowland’s strict 
application and replace it with an “attitude” toward “thoroughness” indirectly crafting a more 
pliable mythic system for Hamas which, according to Rowland’s own approach, would reveal 
potential for re-determining where the Hamas myth leads.   
The search for an underlying Palestinian rhetorical myth should be a recursive one 
which puts the Lucaites and Condit model of characterization-narrative-ideograph into oscilla-
tion. If Rowland would have envisioned the rhetorical environment more systemically, he might 
have seen Hamas as but a single aspect of the Palestinian myth, not the representative of the 
whole, i.e. Hamas as synecdoche for Palestinian. Burke warns of such an oversight when he 
notes in his essay “Four Master Tropes” how  
a similar synecdochic form is present in all theories of political representation, where 
some part of the social body (either traditionally established, or elected, or coming into 
authority by revolution) is held to be ‘representative’ of the society as a whole . . . And 
though there are many disagreements within a society as to what part should represent 
the whole and how this representation should be accomplished, in a complex civilization 
any act of representation automatically implies a synecdochic relationship insofar as the 
act is, or is held to be, “truly representative”. (Grammar of Motives 508)  
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Ultimately, Rowland becomes comfortable with Hamas pursuing an entelechial myth, but, as I 
have argued, Hamas (like any political organization) represents its own ends, not the ends of a 
broader Palestinian myth. Therefore, Rowland becomes entangled in his own constraining crite-
ria and perhaps misses an opportunity to reveal and perhaps interrogate the underlying Pales-
tinian myth that, as I will argue in the following section, may be refined by studying the criteria 
for what constitutes intractable conflict. This chapter detailed how rhetorical myth provides a 
paradigm within which narratives can then connect characterizations and develop ideographs 
along the lines of Lucaites’ and Condit’s culturetypal/counter-cultural model.  With rhetorical 
myth on one side of the equation, the concluding section points to another model for peace 
(like the Oslo Accords) and demonstrates how proposed solutions might be mapped onto rhe-
torical myths in an effort to understand how a conflict is perceived. 
2.4 Toward a Shared Myth  
The 2009 English publication of the Geneva Accords articulates the final (albeit informal) 
agreements made in 2003 between non-governmental representatives of the Israeli and Pales-
tinian peoples. Although the Geneva Accords are generally agreed upon as an ideal state of af-
fairs for both parties (Balian and Larocco), as a strictly rhetorical artifact it is not as useful in and 
of itself. Rather, the Geneva Accords provides a helpful taxonomy to begin a rhetorical analysis. 
For example, it cartographically delineates a shared vision of future borders thus avoiding rhe-
torically charged terms like, “1967 borders” or “land swaps” that are so prevalent in the popular 
consumption of the conflict.  Rhetorical critics and political theorists might work backwards 
from this purported end state to analyze the myriad rhetorical moves on all sides of the conflict 
as a general approach toward a shared agreement. In so doing, one might conclude that neither 
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myth system (Israeli or Hamas) ends with the equitable peace outlined in the Geneva Accords.  
Here I agree in part with Rowland who describes the Geneva Accords as a general consensus on 
the “shape of peace” frustrated by the recalcitrance of the belligerents’ myth systems (“Mythic 
Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” 44); but for different reasons. 
Whereas Rowland sees the Geneva Accords as the solution and the recalcitrant myths as the 
obstacle, I contend the myths should be accommodated for as natural conditions of the rhetor-
ical environment and the effort should be to mitigate the negative effects of myth on the Gene-
va Accords (or any other solution): a rhetorical task. 
Frameworks, theories, and models for peace have been proposed in the past, and like 
the Geneva Accords, these were also solution-oriented. As such, they have been trumpeted in 
varying degrees to the point where all concerned believe they knew the “answer” to the “prob-
lem” and their respective publics were carried along with them.  The Geneva Accords was a 
unique exercise in that it was a 500 page description of how a future two-state solution would 
actually function. Unfortunately, it were these same details which naysayers would pick apart 
as a way of delegitimizing the entire project (Abrams 85-86). Although the belligerents were 
able to codify the ends of concession in a political artifact, e.g. borders, the artifact still failed to 
articulate what the act of concession meant to both parties.  Furthermore, the Geneva Accords 
was written under the assumption that the belligerents considered the problem and solution 
through a shared paradigm. Finally, it reified the misnomer that there are two distinct paths 
that invariably intersect at this place, or condition, called Peace.  As a plan, the Geneva Accords 
leapt past the myths and established a goal—orientation—at the intersection of all of the con-
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flict’s underlying myths. Unfortunately, it failed in implementation: a pattern I will explore in 
detail in the next chapter. 
If one considers the Geneva Accords a transcendent “higher synthesis” of desires as 
Burke might seek, the conversation would shift away from Rowland’s focus on competing 
myths and instead seek arena where they overlap or intersect.  Instead of trying to rectify indi-
vidual myths with reality as Rowland argues, one could look to reconcile contrasting myths at 
points where they might intersect productively: the terms and concepts of their respective nar-
ratives. Such an approach would not ask for time and support for the belligerents to rectify 
their myths with a changing reality. Instead, this approach deconstructs contrasting myths 
where they intersect, e.g. terms like sovereignty, legitimacy, and security. For example, it would 
acknowledge the tragedy of occupation (Palestinian) and the right to self defense (Israeli) but 
transcend both by merging the issue as one of protection of human rights which could apply to 
both. Instead of obstinately protecting identity as Rowland requires, all would have to com-
promise positions on identity and perhaps sovereignty; following this deconstruction, this ap-
proach would require a reconstruction of respective narratives so that the threats to identity do 
not equate to threats to existence, i.e. narrowing the circumference. In fact, the very concept 
of threat would be destabilized (at the paradigm level) so that the terms and concepts of the 
narrative might then promulgate an expanded conception of threat which includes, if not privi-
leges, an appreciation for human rights.  
The prescriptive potential of the paradigm would not be diluted because of its instabil-
ity. In fact, it should direct actions of belligerents and collaborators (like the U.S.) alike toward a 
single objective with the foreknowledge that an amalgamation of the details of the agreement 
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does not equate to peace. In other words, peace is not a sum of its parts and should not be dis-
carded because of deficiency in one part. To accommodate for the intransigent mythic systems 
which invariably frustrate reconciliation efforts as Rowland argues, one might introduce addi-
tional myths to incorporate expectations for the international community’s incremental in-
vestment in the process. Additional rhetorical myths would still have Rowland’s heroes and ar-
chetypal language and be initiated by a literal or psychological truth, but it would not be con-
strained by an aversion to entelechy. Instead, it would invite entelechy with open arms because 
fulfilling the potential of a rhetorical myth is the best way to map the trajectory of a paradigm. 
Moreover, what I hope to demonstrate in the following chapter is how using Burke’s comic 
framework might reveal the recursive tendons amongst paradigm, rhetorical myth, and narra-
tive. Revealing the rhetorical myth is just one element in Burke’s larger dramatistic methodolo-
gy.  One needs to understand how all three elements work together to constitute intractable 
conflict.  
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3 THE COMEDY OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT  
How did the desire for peace supplant the safety of the status quo in Northern Ireland, 
South Africa, or Bosnia where the backdrop was hundreds of years of ethnic, racial, religious, 
and political tension? For all the investigative approaches to understanding why conflicts end 
and some kind of peace replaces it, scholars are still absent a methodology or logic for under-
standing the “intractableness” of some conflicts. Does the conflict end? Or just its intractable 
condition? Even the term peace resists definition and formula because it is a social construction 
and can be almost as unpredictable and unstable as war.   
As a framework for motives, Burke argues that comedy engenders a level of introspec-
tion or “maximum consciousness” enabling people to transcend the binaries of conflict by re-
vealing their own motives (Burke, Attitudes Toward History 171) or as I argue, the motives of 
the system.  A consciousness where people are “observers of themselves, while acting” may 
direct the belligerents toward what Matyok calls, “better problems” which effectively trans-
forms the intractable conflict by offering new bridging motive for it (Matyok). Changing the 
form and function of an intractable conflict might help people avoid the trap of overemphasiz-
ing the actors who, constrained by political motives, engage in acts that seemingly defy rational 
decision-making. In fact, in terms of degrees of influence on a peace process, the actual motives 
of the actors may be subordinate to the cognitive framework (motives) chosen to understand 
the actions.  As Crocker et al argue, the process of resolving intractable conflict can span dec-
ades. In fact, intractable conflict can be distinguished from tractable conflict by the durability of 
the conflict; the qualitative ability of the conflict to resist resolution (5). Moreover, the way a 
problem is understood and then promulgated will often outlast the people involved in solving 
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the problem. A framework that can accommodate the shifting definitions and the normative 
nature of terminology might also accommodate for the “bounded” rationality that is a perva-
sive condition of policy-making. Therefore, learning from diplomatic failure may sometimes re-
quire us to reframe what was thought as understood about causal and correlative relationships 
involved in those failures.  
By deconstructing intractable conflict using the Burkean comic frame one can shift the 
emphasis from the competing discourses of belligerents to the discourses of the environment 
where “compromise” is part of the vocabulary and the peace “process” is no longer the desired 
end and paradoxically, neither is reconciliation. Put another way, using Burke’s comic frame en-
ables an adjustment in the pentadic ratios that privileges the motives of the Scene over the 
Agent or the Act. For Burke, motives, as “shorthand for situations” provide both the rationale 
and direction for action. When Burke employs duty as a motive in Permanence and Change, it is 
as a term to “indicate a complex stimulus-situation wherein certain stimuli calling for one kind 
of response are linked with certain stimuli calling for another kind of response” (30). In the case 
of the MEPP, when a motive (e.g. security) belongs to and serves the Scene, it invites both bel-
ligerents to acknowledge the existence of contrasting realities which feed the motive. Realities 
are constituted rhetorically, not conveyed axiomatically. 
In the previous chapter, I referenced Carcasson’s approach to the narratives of the 
MEPP which categorized its actors into peacemakers and enemies of peace (3); two narratives 
which became the motive, in the Burkean sense, for actions on both sides of the conflict. In the 
discourse of intractable conflict, however, a narrative can become stagnant, inextricable from 
our conceptions of the conflict. Robert Rothstein blames the failure of the 1993 Oslo Peace Ac-
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cords on a “set of attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs that become embedded over decades of 
bitter conflict and are difficult to unlearn even if some kind of peace agreement—or explorato-
ry truce—has been signed” (1); this embedded model of perception restricted action as well as 
thought. For Rothstein, Conflict Syndrome was a vocabulary and cognitive framework where 
each act of violence fit too neatly into the narrative of a self-perpetuating paralysis instead of 
the peacemakers and enemies of peace distinction that Carcasson proffered. In contrast, the 
presence of Conflict Syndrome meant that every action on the part of one belligerent, no mat-
ter how benign, was interpreted by the other belligerent as a threat.  
Even the most recent effort to renew peace talks must accommodate for the syndrome. 
According to Secretary of State Kerry, “there are narrative issues; difficult, complicated years of 
mistrust that have been built up, all of which as to be worked through and undone, and a 
pathway has to be laid down in which the parties can have confidence that they know what is 
happening and that the road ahead is real, not illusory” (Kerry, January 4, 2014). Moreover, in-
action on the part of a belligerent was interpreted as a weakness to be exploited. For example, 
if Israel did not respond militarily to a Palestinian suicide attack, Telhami argues, then the mes-
sage would be that Israel was too weak to respond or that the tactic used in the attack was ef-
fective and should be repeated (367). Therefore, as the narrative adopts the characteristics of 
Conflict Syndrome it devolves into a normative logic behind the conflict that exacerbates biases 
and constrains potential solutions where eventually violence becomes the only form of symbol-
ic action.  
For the Middle East Peace Process, Conflict Syndrome became a “frame of acceptance” 
bracketing the U.S. paradigm for the MEPP with the potential to shape the attitudes of all in-
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volved or concerned and “fix attitudes that prepare for combat” (Attitudes Toward History 20). 
An integral aspect of Burke’s work to understand human motives and subsequent actions, 
frames of acceptance can just as easily be used to justify actions instead of guide them: Burke 
warns of this tendency when he comments, “if you break your leg, thank God you didn’t break 
your neck. . . We have it when the fox, unable to reach the grapes, decides they were sour. We 
find it in the jokes whereby men, in the face of danger, dwarf the danger” (Ibid).  Carcasson’s 
claim that an alternative narrative emerged from Oslo may be valid, but the narrative of 
peacemakers and enemies of peace is still constrained by Conflict Syndrome.  Moreover, 
Carcasson’s narrative actually reinforces the tenets of Conflict Syndrome much like how Burke 
describes how “the whole terminology of capitalism is found remarkable for its clear simplifica-
tion of social processes” (Ibid 93). The terminology not only describes reality; terminology con-
stitutes reality.  
The paths along a peace process are determined by attitudes and attitudes are deter-
mined by the frame of acceptance. Using a dramatistic “corrective” like Burke’s to reframe the 
rhetorical environment systemically may enable an alternative model to contrast Rothstein’s 
Conflict Syndrome or binary narratives like Carcasson’s and perhaps reveal opportunities which 
always existed in the system, but were simply concealed by the dominant vocabulary. If our ac-
tions are constrained by our motives (and by extension our vocabulary), then discerning the 
movement and potential of a motive is essential if one wishes to learn from Oslo and perhaps 
reveal future opportunities. For the balance of this chapter I discuss the comic framework with-
in the context of intractable conflict, compare how others have applied the framework to un-
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derstand social movement rhetoric, and then demonstrate how the comic frame might be used 
to unpack the intractable conditions that comprise the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
3.1 Comic Frame: Defined in/by the Context of Intractable Conflict 
Although the comic and tragic frames are often examined together, this is not to allude 
to a superiority of one over the other. They both belong to Burke’s larger literary framework 
concerning poetic forms that include epic, satire, etc. As a poetic form, comedy plays a distinct 
role in Burke’s project because it eventually becomes the core of his dramatistic methodology. 
Comedy is like the other poetic forms that provide paradigms through which one can come to 
accept or reject the situations faced. Each form can be categorized by it ends; the ends then 
affects the methods. For example, the epic form seeks to “make men ‘at home in’” primitive 
conditions; thus the method adopted includes magnification of the warlike hero to dignify the 
“necessities of existence” (Burke, Attitudes Toward History 35). The ends that Burke associates 
with comedy are ambiguous but he offers the following familiar summary:  “The comic frame 
should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Its ultimate would not be 
passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would “transcend” himself by noting his own 
foibles” (Ibid 171, emphasis original).  To achieve this ‘maximum consciousness’, Burke treats 
numerous approaches to comic framing that might be considered orientations or attitudes in-
stead of methods. This section addresses the importance of transforming what is invariably a 
tragic framework underlying the U.S. paradigm for perceiving the MEPP into a comic one.  I of-
fer the following three orientations as the ones most relevant to this study of intractable con-
flict. These approaches are not constrained by sequence or prerequisite, yet they can overlap in 
useful ways.   
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The dialectic of the scapegoat is perhaps the most widely discussed marker of Burke’s 
tragic frame.  In A Grammar of Motives, Burke outlines the dialectic of the scapegoat as a 
mechanism that when present in the discourse, an “enemy” is made knowable and can either 
serve as a vessel into which a community transfers its sins and expels as a way to “kill” the sin 
or as a unifying point upon which all parties can mutually agree upon as an “other” (406-408).  
By means of a scapegoat, a disparate people can constitute an identity even though they do not 
share a national border or flag. Such usage can be beneficial as a way to bridge a temporary ob-
stacle, but the long-term viability of an identity dependent on an “other” is questionable.  In 
contrast, the comic frame reduces the concentration of power in the scapegoat by chastising it 
as a clown instead of doing it violence (Carlson 448).  In her discussion of comic ritual as the log-
ic underlying Gandhi’s resistance strategy, Carlson demonstrates the closing of a ritual circle 
regarding the treatment of the clown: “comic rituals create social distance between reformers 
and the ‘clown,’ so that the clown’s faults first may be recognized, then chastised. After the 
clown’s foibles are revealed from a safe distance, the ritual demands a rapprochement, recog-
nizing the potential clown in all human beings” (448-449).  In this way, the comic frame shifts 
emphasis from the Act to the Scene and Agency; it shifts from the foibles of the clown to the 
ritual’s demand for rapprochement.  
The second attitude that emerges in the comic frame is the premise that “the progress 
of human enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as vicious, but as mis-
taken” (Burke Attitudes Toward History, 41 emphasis original ).  Burke posits that seen through 
the comic frame, all people are inherently mistaken; thus, each situation brings with it the po-
tential for chastisement instead of condemnation.  Each situation must accommodate for a 
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“special kind of blindness” brought on by the human condition that shifts the evil of a crime 
from the Actor to the Act (Ibid). In discussing Gandhi’s strategy of peaceful civil disobedience, 
Carlson shows how applying the comic frame is a decision on the part of the resistance. This 
comic option enables a resistance movement to internalize a premise “that human beings must 
have social order, but that they easily can become trapped into ‘evil’ practices by that order 
without being evil themselves” (Carlson 448). Of the four approaches I discuss, this one is the 
most tenuous when applied to intractable conflict. It is hard not to be outraged by violence. Es-
pecially in the context of Conflict Syndrome, a violent act like a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv or 
an assassination-by-missile in Gaza is rarely admitted, or accepted, as a mistake.   
Gregory Desilet and Edward C. Appel criticize Burke’s notion of comic framing partially 
for its lack of “warrantable outrage.” The authors contend that Burke marked Hitler as the 
“devil-function” while limiting the scapegoat moniker to only Hitler’s doctrine.  However, the 
authors contend, Burke does not escape the consequences for splitting hairs and by doing so 
“slips out of the comic frame rhetoric of ‘all people are mistaken’ and into the rhetoric portray-
ing not only one side (Hitler) as clearly wrong but also another side (Burke) as, by comparison, 
significantly right” (347, emphasis original). I will return again to Desilet and Appel’s criticism, 
but from this charge of inconsistency, one should already see the difficulty: are people dying 
because of the mistakes of others? Does applying the comic frame shift culpability for evil from 
Act to Scene? If so, then perhaps Scene might emerge as the “master term” and bring with it 
questions about the environment (social, diplomatic, economic) which were disguised by inad-
vertent focus on the Act or Agent.  
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Adjudicating this possible inconsistency depends on the context of the question. For 
Gandhi, non-violent resistance was the Agency for social change.  The Scene constituted by the 
rhetorical artifacts (in this case, Ghandi’s oral speeches espousing non-violent resistance) creat-
ed an orientation toward the comic framework which then reciprocated by shaping Gandhi’s 
strategy (Agency) of unquestioning and consistent non-violence. Even so, Desilet and Appel 
warn that the inward blindness that happens in the comic frame (due to acceptance of human 
foibles) can be dangerous as “blindness toward the inevitable limitation of human discernment, 
blindness toward the pervasive condition of blindness” (351).  Any approach to unpacking in-
tractable conflict should accommodate for this correlation between Scene (constituted rhetori-
cally) and the Agency (rhetorical methods and strategies) available so as to avoid the potential 
blindness that confuses how the relationships amongst belligerents function.  
The third approach refers to the many roles irony plays in the comic frame. Burke’s 
analysis of irony in his essay, “Four Master Tropes” points ultimately to “true irony” as a desired 
condition in the rhetorical environment. With true irony, as Burke outlines it, belligerents as-
sume a state of consubstantiality with each other. They reinforce their respective identities by 
arriving at “a sense of fundamental kinship” where they need each other. Moreover, they are 
mutually indebted in a kind of codependency where one “is not merely outside him as an ob-
server but contains him within” (Burke, A Grammar of Motives 514).  Once achieved, this con-
substantial condition enables numerous opportunities based on an unprecedented level of 
awareness of the other’s motives. In the context of the MEPP, this condition may never be 
achieved. It can, however, inform a comprehensive strategy of incremental social change tar-
geting the paradigm, rhetorical myth, and the terms and concepts of the narrative much as it 
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did for Gandhi. There are two other approaches to the trope of irony that Burke discusses and 
might be helpful. 
Burke introduces an aspect of irony that may work against his own goal of “true” irony 
outlined above. He posits that “we should ‘ironically’ note the function of the disease in ‘per-
fecting’ the cure, or the function of the cure in ‘perpetuating’ the influences of the disease” 
(Ibid 512). In this way, the disease and cure work in oscillation as the relationship adapts to the 
changing environment. Moreover, the identities of the Agents as well as the relationships that 
bind them must be constantly re-contextualized by observers. The adaptive nature of interna-
tional conflict is similar in that belligerents come with particular motives underpinning a con-
tentious issue.  
As the discourses defining the issue evolve, the problem gains a kind of granularity that 
might not have been there previously because an original position is subsequently influenced 
by the perceived agendas and actions of an adversary. If access to water was a contentious is-
sue between belligerents A and B, one might expect the value of the issue to ebb and flow as 
the level of sacrifice is experienced by each side. As the value shifts, it “perfects” the underlying 
problem presumably causing the friction in the first place. Soon what was once friction over 
water-rights becomes friction over something else that was previously concealed by an imma-
ture understanding of the other’s motives. Moreover, another criterion for intractable conflict 
is that the original or proximate cause of the conflict is not the reason a conflict actually be-
comes intractable (Crocker et al. 5). Instead, as the conflict resists resolution, it exponentially 
gains resilience through secondary and tertiary problems that confuse and distract resolution 
efforts. A current example of the impact of amorphous motives is in how Secretary Kerry de-
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scribes the rationale behind the private negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians in 
late 2013:   
Now, [the Israeli-Palestinian conflict] is deeply steeped in history, and each side has a 
narrative about their rights and their journey and the conflict itself. And in the end, all of 
these different core issues actually fit together like a mosaic. It’s a puzzle, and you can’t 
separate out one piece or another. Because what a leader might be willing to do with 
respect to a compromise on one particular piece is dependent on what the other leader 
might be willing to do with respect to a different particular piece. And there’s always a 
tension as to when you put your card on the table as to which piece you’re willing to do, 
when, and how. So it has to move with its particular pace and its particular privacy, 
frankly. And that’s why it’s so important not to be laying out any one particular compo-
nent of it at any given moment of time, because it actually makes it more difficult for 
those decisions to be made or for those compromises to be arrived at, or for one of the 
leaders to have the freedom to be able to do what they need to do in order to figure out 
the political path ahead, which is obviously real for both. (5 Jan, 2014) 
Although this lengthy extract from a press conference (in Jerusalem) reads like basic interna-
tional relations, it demonstrates how “perfecting the cure” to the conflict requires more than a 
linear problem-solution paradigm. Secretary Kerry’s analogy of the mosaic is a useful one—
more so than the puzzle. When complete, a ‘mosaic’ must be experienced holistically and sim-
ultaneously. It includes seemingly disparate components that range from political agents, eco-
nomic forms of agency, diplomatic purposes, informational scenes, and military acts: compo-
nents that may not fit together as planned but function together nonetheless. Building a mosa-
80 
ic, as an artist might, invites an abductive approach which incorporates new inputs as steps to-
ward the “true irony” inherent in the comic frame instead of the victimage or scapegoating in 
the tragic frame. 
On the other hand, the puzzle analogy is problematic for several reasons. Unlike a mosa-
ic, working on a puzzle begins from a certainty and is broken into component parts that then fit 
in a predetermined way. Belligerents may sit across the table from each other with their re-
spective pile of pieces and assume they are working together toward a common goal, but they 
may in fact be using pieces from different puzzles with different underlying motives. For exam-
ple, the ‘core issues’ in the MEPP may be the status of Jerusalem as capital of Israel and Pales-
tine, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, security, and territorial boundaries, but how 
each party defines the core issues is far from certain. So while a shared Jerusalem may be the 
stated shared goal, one party may envision a 90/10 split, while the other envisions a 50/50 split. 
It follows that perhaps trying to make the core issues fit together into a coherent puzzle is the 
wrong approach all together. At best, the various core issues, e.g. Jerusalem, might be separate 
and distinct puzzles which happen to share a single table: an arguably manageable situation.  At 
worst, working under a faulty assumption of deterministic certainty can be calamitous.  
The 2013 effort to restart negotiations began with the ambitious goal of final status so-
lutions, yet as the self-imposed nine month deadline (April 30, 2014) nears, the effort has quiet-
ly been repackaged as a project to establish a “framework for negotiations that will guide and 
create the clear, detailed, accepted roadmap for the guidelines for the permanent status nego-
tiations” (Kerry, 5 Jan, 2014). This pivot from final solution to framework is perhaps a reaction 
to domestic political pressures on all parties as tidbits of information leak out of the closely 
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guarded negotiations. The proximate and underlying causes for this apparent shift in purpose is 
the subject for another project and will likely follow precedents set by previous U.S. administra-
tions subject to political motivations. What it does emphasize for this current study is that a 
peace “process” might best be considered as an approach for perfecting the cure through an 
ironic oscillation between the problem(s) and solution(s). The final aspect of irony, nested with-
in a comic framework, I wish to address is irony’s role in actually reducing tension between ad-
versaries.  
In their criticism of Burke’s dramatistic theory of rhetoric, Desilet and Appel consider 
Burke’s use of comic irony as a conversion of warranted outrage through symbolic action (346).  
This is a helpful tactic when one wishes to confine a discourse to the comic frame and avoid the 
trap of evaluation that invariably creates an oppositional relationship (vice complementary). As 
mentioned earlier, slipping out of the comic frame can be triggered once the escalation to 
victimage and tragic scapegoating occurs. Comic irony provides a mechanism for adversaries to 
identify “internal blindness” and temper emotions before it exceeds its band of tolerance (349). 
As it might pertain to intractable conflict, this comic conversion is a “development” represent-
ing a confluence of symbolic actions: the adversaries perceive a “clown,” the clown’s action is 
accepted as a mistake, mistake is chastised, and exercise perfects the problem. One can see 
how a decisive shift from tragic to comic at the paradigm-level can cause secondary and tertiary 
effects manifested in the terms and concepts of the various narratives. When under a tragic 
framework, the concept of “Israeli security” can be readily understood in terms of physical bor-
ders and defensive systems. Acts like building the Separation Wall are perfectly consistent with 
the rhetorical myth of an Israel under siege by Arab neighbors since violence is scapegoated as 
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the primary threat to Israeli security. Considered comically, however, observers may begin to 
see the same Separation Wall as an articulation of a consubstantial relationship whereby vic-
tims and criminals are created by a single generative act. 
Maintaining the relevance of the comic frame requires a dialectic component Burke also 
associates with comic irony. In “Four Master Tropes”, Burke conceives of irony as a product of 
the dialectic interaction of terms: “a development which uses all the terms.” He goes on to de-
pict irony as a kind of master-perspective that creates an environment where the multiple sub-
ordinate perspectives can co-exist safely because they avoid evaluation and subsequent judg-
ment. Most importantly for my argument, this amalgamation of perspectives consists of “voic-
es, or personalities, or positions, integrally affecting one another” in a systemic fashion (Burke, 
A Grammar of Motives 512). The following two sections address Burke’s comic frame as it in-
forms the systemic nature of social movements and introduces the comic frame as an approach 
to unpack the intractable(ness) of conflict. 
3.2 Comic Frame: Distinctions and Methods 
To my knowledge, applications of Burke’s comic frame to particular examples of conflict 
resolution focus primarily on social movement rhetoric—none on understanding intractable 
conflict. While useful in understanding how the comic orientation influences the methods of 
successful resistance movements, other applications of the comic framework are pragmatically 
focused on the resisting party and overlooks the consubstantial relationship that exists be-
tween resisting and resisted.  Using Burke’s comic framework, Carlson and Powell both unpack 
particular social movements: respectively Gandhi’s resistance movement against British rule in 
India and U.S. Anti-Lynching Laws in the 1940’s. Both posit that as a nomenclature for re-
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sistance movements, Burke’s comic frame is especially well-suited because it reveals a move-
ment’s logic as based on ritual drama (Carlson) and its goal is maximum awareness of the fail-
ures in the overall system (Powell).  
Carlson deconstructs Gandhi’s non-violent resistance movement using the principles of 
the comic frame to establish “ritual drama” as a compromise posture between compliance and 
revolution. Central to Carlson’s argument is her revision of Leland Griffin’s familiar application 
of Burke’s dramatistic method to social movements by extracting Griffin’s approach from the 
tragic frame and resituating it in Burke’s comic framework. Doing so enabled Gandhi (and Carl-
son’s analysis) to ignore the tragic frame’s demand for a scapegoat and outright rejection of the 
social system (Carlson 446-448). Unfettered by the more revolutionary objectives demanded by 
the tragic frame, Gandhi could re-write the rules of resistance to fit his own plans that actually 
included the retention of aspects of the British system. Although the comic frame retains revo-
lution as an option, it does not mandate it. Instead, as Carlson argues, it asks only adherence to 
a ritual form: drama. The ritual form conceived through the comic frame does not seek to over-
throw a system, but to capitalize on its flaws (446). This is one example of the fluidity inherent 
in the comic frame that may be appropriate in my application of it to understanding intractable 
conflict. There are two other contrasts between the tragic and comic frames that are relevant 
to this study: homeopathic with allopathic treatments of conflict and open contrasted with 
closed systems.  
As a footnote (albeit a four-page one) to his discussion of elegy in Attitudes Toward His-
tory, Burke distinguishes between homeopathic and allopathic styles. This distinction is im-
portant for both Carlson’s argument supporting the “method” of Gandhi’s non-violent strategy 
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as well as my own forthcoming proposition an upcoming next section regarding the lessons 
from Oslo. A homeopathic style considers conflict with an eye toward accommodation, while 
the allopathic seeks direct refutation, if not obliteration, of the conflict. Burke offers an anec-
dote about Benjamin Franklin’s lightning rod experiment where the rod served as a homeo-
pathic remedy for lightning. The rod channeled the risk posed by the lightning instead of elimi-
nating it outright (Burke, Attitudes Toward History 45). In effect, Franklin accepted the risk of 
lightning as a natural condition of the environment. Therefore, considering his environment 
through the comic frame provided necessary constraints on Franklin’s desired ends. However, if 
there was a potential to stop lightning, then as Burke further argues, “the stylistic homeopath 
tends to become ‘psychologically unemployed’, because his strategy becomes a bad fit for the 
situation at hand” (Ibid 45). Worse is when a homeopathic style is unilaterally usurped by an 
allopathic one. In such a case, it is unlikely that the allopathic solution was really right; the allo-
pathic style simply shifted the problem so the available solution would fit. As an example, mag-
ic, according to Burke, regressed from its homeopathic principles when its “rituals became bu-
reaucratized, they shifted towards the ‘allopathic’ category of spell, antidote” (Ibid 47). As it 
applies to understanding intractable conflict where a solution may or may not exist, one might 
be better served to encourage a balance of styles.  
When balanced, or sequenced in some cases, the two styles can make up for the other’s 
shortfalls. The homeopathic style with its propensity for attenuating a negative condition, ex-
pectation management, and comfort with uncertainty may work to reveal potential in an oth-
erwise intractable situation. It does not directly address the aspect of the perceived problem 
with the highest reward and highest risk. Instead, the homeopathic approach seeks the periph-
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ery of the problem. Avoiding significant risk by working in the periphery becomes a way to 
maintain connection, create momentum, and perhaps reveal potential as the intractable situa-
tion is perceived to be more porous, i.e. less intractable. The numerous iterations of the MEPP 
are prime examples of avoiding the core problems in exchange for tenuous lines of communica-
tion. On the other hand, the allopathic alternative is quick to provide an antidote to the per-
ceived problem. When dealing with well-structured problems, the allopathic approach is of 
course appropriate. No one prefers an auto-mechanic comfortable with uncertainty. However, 
while one may not be comfortable with a homeopathic auto-mechanic, there may be times 
when uncertainty is an acceptable temporary condition as the problem is reduced to its essen-
tial logic. Even the most expert of mechanics may resort to a “let’s see what happens” approach 
until the real problem is uncovered.  
Social phenomena (of which conflict is one) are rarely well-structured because for the 
most part they function as open systems.  I could associate well-structured problems with 
closed systems, for example: automobile-as-system, but I would not consider an automobile a 
pure closed system because it still requires an input of energy and direction. I contend that the 
formal efforts to resolve aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Oslo 1993, Hebron 1997, 
Camp David II 2000, Aqaba 2003, Annapolis 2007, and Kerry 2013-2014) began as open systems 
as belligerents near the negotiation table, but become increasing closed as the actual negotia-
tions take place. Paradoxically, a conflict devolves into intractability due in part to repeated at-
tempts to resolve it (Crocker et al. 8, Northrup 63, Cohen 350). As each attempt to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict fails, or is perceived to fail by its constituents, the intractability of the 
conflict becomes more pronounced as expectations of intractability replaces hope for resolu-
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tion. It is not surprising that in a sixty-year-old conflict, hope and optimism must be carefully 
earned and can easily be lost: a dynamic I will address further in a later section.  
In their analysis of social movements as interpretive systems, Stewart et. al outline B. 
Aubrey Fisher’s systematic view of communication; the warp and woof of which is the differ-
ence between open and closed systems. For Fisher, closed systems are governed by the “prin-
ciple of equilibrium—the final state of the closed system is determined by its initial state be-
cause a self-contained system must sustain balance without any help from the outside” (Stew-
art et al 31). Moreover, a closed system has few response options when faced with “the princi-
ple of entropy” which exposes a system to an “irreversible process of disintegration” (31). It can 
only offer a counterforce—Fisher calls it negentropy—to slow down the process. There is a cor-
relation between the propensity for antidote in Burke’s allopathic style and the use of a coun-
terforce in Fisher’s description of a closed system. There is also a correlation between an intrac-
table conflict where “the sources of intractability are not the same as the original causes of the 
conflict” (Crocker et al. 5) and the determinism inherent in the “principle of equilibrium.” Argu-
ing the opposite, Fisher notes that an open system adheres to a “principle of equifinality 
[where] you can get anywhere from anywhere else, and you can get there from a variety of 
paths” (31). And as expected, an open system would assume a homeopathic posture toward 
the principle of entropy that triggered an antidote response before.   
3.3 Comic Frame in Application 
An open system would be comfortable with the dis-equilibrium described above be-
cause its ends are more about growth, not reifying certainty. To that end, Burke might associate 
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the “principle of equifinality” inherent in an open system with his own description of a Platonic 
dialogue in A Grammar of Motives: 
A Platonic dialogue is not formed simply by breaking an idea into its component parts 
and taking them up in one-two-three order . . . [it] is rather a process of transformation 
whereby the position at the end transcends the position at the start, so that the position 
at the start can eventually be seen in terms of the new motivation encountered en 
route. (442) 
Identical to Fisher’s “principle of nonsummativity” which describes the whole of interdepend-
ent parts as something “other than the simple sum of the individual parts” (Stewart et al 28), 
Burke’s requirements for a Platonic dialogue may only be appropriate in an open system where 
the interconnected motives are already untangled. In the context of intractable conflict, the 
nodes of the system may be connected by relationships but those relationships are based on 
the various motives the parties bring to bear. As convoluted as they are likely to be, the motives 
should be made explicit (through a Burkean dramatistic methodology I argue) if the belligerents 
sincerely hope to reduce the perceived intractability of their conflict.   
An approach informed by Burke’s comic framework follows exhaustive work done by 
peace and conflict scholars who have gone so far as to detail the myriad factors that make the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict a uniquely intractable one (Telhami and Cohen).   From the applied 
systems thinking community, David Stroh describes successful intervention in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as a process of “breaking a link between variables or changing variables” (6). 
Although “breaking” connotes an allopathic approach to the problem that I do not support, the 
systems perspective Stroh provides shifts the emphasis from a solution-set to problem-set in a 
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way under-emphasized by the peace and conflict studies community. Stroh’s systemic outline 
concludes with a recommendation to test “underlying mental models that drive so much of 
people’s behavior (6). Unfortunately, Stroh does not provide a pragmatic methodology for re-
vealing the ‘underlying mental models’ let alone test them.  
Although it may be obvious that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an open system, fol-
lowing Stroh, I advocate constructing the intractable conditions of the environment as explicitly 
open so as to articulate the difference between comic and tragic frames. Doing so adheres to 
Fisher’s “principle of equifinality” and enables a homeopathic strategy which can learn from its 
environment and incorporate options as they are revealed. Finally, one should note how trau-
matic changes in the environment effect open systems differently than closed ones. Where a 
closed system would deal with a problem allopathically (via antidote or negentropy), an open 
system would incorporate the changes as natural conditions and seek to capitalize on the 
strengths and weaknesses uncovered by the change. This is all the more important in a region 
like the Middle East where the ongoing Arab Uprising is triggering countless reverberations in 
an open system that demands an almost daily review of the rhetorical context.  
In sum: According to Carlson, Gandhi’s strategy for non-violent resistance proceeded ac-
cording to a ritual characterized by a recognition of both social and individual power; attempts 
at identification with the social order; emphasis upon epiphany as a ritual goal; and combina-
tion of a pragmatic view of human motives with a transcendent view of human unity to create a 
comic balance (447). My study does not propose a similar ritual (solution) to reconcile Israelis 
and Palestinians. In fact, this problem set is not one of resistance and resisted, it transcends 
both and demands the focus be on framing the discourses maintaining the intractable condi-
89 
tions instead of the Agents. It demands attention on the threats to identity for both sides and 
attracts focus to the rhetorical nature of the conflict’s intractable(ness), not the conflict’s ulti-
mate resolution.  
Although the first priority may be to weaken the paralyzing influence of Conflict Syn-
drome on the dominant paradigm, the first step in the process I am proposing is to introduce an 
alternative lens to unpack our understanding of the MEPP informed by Burke’s comic frame. 
Through dramatism (of which the comic frame is but one part), the unique characteristics and 
conditions which constitute an intractable conflict further undermined by Conflict Syndrome 
can be reframed and perhaps transformed such that the conditions function as part of a tracta-
ble conflict.  To be clear, Dramatism will not end the MEPP, it may only serve to mitigate the 
influence of Conflict Syndrome and help move the perception of the conflict from an intractable 
to tractable category of conflict. Achieving such a shift then leaves the task of reconciliation, 
conflict resolution, or conflict management to the practioners and policy makers in the field.  
Before I end this discussion of the systemic distinctions between comic and tragic 
frames, I will clarify the correlation I am drawing among Burke’s comic frame, homeopathic so-
lutions, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an open system.   First off, the three are not mu-
tually exclusive concepts. As discussed earlier, their opposite concepts must be accommodated 
for because they may actually function better in oscillation with each other, e.g. following a 
homeopathic approach until the potential emerges for an allopathic solution. These concepts 
are also normative in that they shape one’s perspective on conflict which in turn shapes the ac-
tions one might consider. While best suited for what Burke calls, a “man in society” (Attitudes 
Toward History 42), to be useful in understanding intractable conflict on the scale I am propos-
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ing, use of the comic frame must consider both the open nature of social systems and the ho-
meopathic, i.e. incremental accommodation of tension, so the frame does not slip from comic 
to tragic. As I have shown, accommodating for the systemic nature of intractable conflict is piv-
otal if the comic frame is to reveal ways to transform it.  Revisiting the rhetorical artifacts of the 
MEPP through this refined framework may reveal more questions than answers and will likely 
frustrate peace-process community justifiably weary of admiring the problem.  
3.4 Intractable Conflict Revisited 
Just as there are many definitions of peace, there are also many ways war can manifest 
itself as an extension of politics. By most accounts, however, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
currently in a state of not war and not peace. It is an intractable conflict in the sense that the 
belligerents have linked their socially-constructed identities to the presence of conflict and fear 
they cannot extract themselves from the conflict without threatening their identities. The ina-
bility to extract assumes the belligerents wish an end to the conflict; this is not necessarily the 
case in intractable conflict where the status quo provides a de facto conflict management which 
keeps the conflict from escalating. In fact, this particularly resilient conflict meets nearly every 
benchmark for “intractable” as defined in the peace and conflict studies community. In some 
cases, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the case study for what it takes to create, maintain, and 
fail to resolve an intractable conflict (Crocker et al).   
As introduced earlier in this chapter, Rothstein attributed the failure to implement the 
1993 Oslo Accords to factors like deficiency in the design of the accords, failures of implemen-
tation, and influence of domestic politics: factors identified by numerous scholars. But what 
makes Rothstein’s analysis poignant is that he accounts for the notion that all of the identified 
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factors were decisively undermined by the pervasive, yet transparent, condition of the intrac-
table environment: Conflict Syndrome.  Although not evaluative, this condition serves a norma-
tive function as a “frame of acceptance” in line with Burke’s tragic framework. In contrast, in-
tractable conflict shifts along a continuum of conflict driven by rhetorically constructed percep-
tions of reality. As complementing brackets to the dominant U.S. paradigm, both Conflict Syn-
drome and intractable conflict shape perceptions which then guides actions and reinforces the 
perception of intractability. It follows then that violence is a uniquely visible phenomenon 
which can shape where a conflict lands on the conflict continuum and the efficacy of Conflict 
Syndrome.    
As it is presently, ending or reducing violence seemed a helpful bridge between the rep-
resentatives of the primary adversaries involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the early 
1990s: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion, Yasser Arafat. Constituencies on both sides could readily accept a reduction of violence as 
a key tenet of peaceful coexistence. In addition, violence is quantifiable and qualifiable; it can 
be packaged for domestic consumption based on the motives of the Agents. There were several 
concessions involved in the Oslo Accords (Klieman 227-229), but the mutual recognition and 
the reduction of violence were two environmental preconditions. The first precondition was 
met as soon as the two parties agreed to negotiate, but the reduction of violence was a condi-
tion to be maintained, not just achieved. Paradoxically, however, scapegoating violence was 
perhaps the fundamental error in the Oslo Accords. Politically-charged violence (rockets or 
bulldozing homes) may be a symptom or a result, but it is always already a symbolic act. Con-
sidered through Burke’s dramatistic methodology, one should immediately see the problem 
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caused by ignoring the discontinuity of motives underlying the violent acts. While the belliger-
ents may agree on the viciousness of violence, scapegoating it over-emphasizes its causal role 
in the conflict and ignores the role it plays in the multiple discourses of the wider rhetorical en-
vironment. Scapegoating violence answers the demand of the tragic framework where “no so-
cial change is possible without some sort of violence” against a scapegoat upon which “evil” can 
be projected and then “killed” cathartically (Carlson 448).   
Furthermore, prioritizing the reduction of violence over the rights and freedoms of the 
Palestinians meant that the dominant “terministic screen” would be one of Israeli security. As 
Weinberger argues, “the notion of ‘ending violence’ meant that Israeli security criteria would 
trump or greatly restrict the independent control within the spheres of authority transferred to 
Palestinians” (4). Therefore, as long as violence is scapegoated by the belligerents and the in-
ternational community (and accepted by the dominant paradigm), solutions will always be 
short-sighted and the influence of Conflict Syndrome will likely prohibit progress. 
As an example of the kind of paralysis Conflict Syndrome can effect, if one belligerent 
cannot deliver on promises to reduce violence, the other party will use it as a sign of non-
compliance with the entire suite of negotiation topics. According to Northrup, the lack of capa-
ble institutions necessary to build confidence between belligerents is another marker for intrac-
table conflict (488). This mismatch of policy and capability is a useful example of how Conflict 
Syndrome does not always result in an intractable conflict and vice versa. If the PLO had the in-
stitutions (security, political, economic, informational) necessary to implement the Oslo Ac-
cords, perhaps the impact of Conflict Syndrome would not have been as prolific. The institu-
tions may have enforced the reduction of violence even as the “spoilers” within the Palestinian 
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community resisted steps toward resolution. Ultimately, the efficacy of the comic frame pivots 
on revising the symbolic purpose of violence, not the obliteration of violence. To achieve this 
revisionist objective, the violent act must be extracted from the rhetorical environment con-
strained by Conflict Syndrome and considered comically.  
There are other terms that would require similar treatment—statehood and security are 
especially problematic—yet the example of violence is enough to warrant the approach. We are 
reminded that the comic choice invites the premise “that human beings must have social order, 
but that they easily can become trapped into ‘evil’ practices by that order without being evil 
themselves” (Carlson 448). I am not arguing that violent acts are mistakes by trapped individu-
als. Nor am I offering the evaluative criteria for culpability of a “factional” tragedy or melodra-
ma whereby the “structuring of conflict appeals precisely because of its clarity and simplicity in 
assigning wrong predominately to one side” (Disilet and Appel 348). The comic frame simply 
destabilizes the Purpose of the violent Act by refusing to condemn an Agent with the “evil” 
moniker. As the criticism from Desilet and Appel emphasizes, it is difficult to avoid the charge of 
moral relativism here. But converting the “warrantable outrage” by way of symbolic action us-
ing the comic frame, helps reinforce Burke’s point that there is no room for irony in relativism 
(Burke, A Grammar of Motives 512). Raising expectations for peace from a negative absence of 
war to the positive “presence of social, spiritual, or ecological harmony” (Funk and Aziz 52) en-
ables the deployment of Burke’s “true” irony—whereby belligerents accept their consubstanti-
ality—as an attribute which shapes a homeopathic path towards a tractable conflict.   
Regarding acceptance frames in general, Burke begins the process of understanding 
with self-imposed constraints:  “Out of such frames we derive our vocabularies for the charting 
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of human motives. And implicit in our theory of motives is a program of action, because we 
form ourselves and judge others (collaborating with them or against them) in accordance with 
our attitudes” (Attitudes Toward History 92).  By applying the comic frame in particular, the 
ironic relationship between a violent act and its cure can be revealed as a primary contributor 
to intractable conflict. For example, as a missile shield becomes the solution to rockets being 
fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel, it triggers a paradox of technology that abandons the un-
derlying motives of the Act for its technological cure. The technological cure then refines the 
violent Act in the form of shifting tactics, e.g. suicide bombing instead of rockets, but it is a cure 
to the a proximate problem, not the underlying problem.   
Peter Wineberger, from the U.S. Institute of Peace, offers another example where a 
physical act in response to a proximate threat assumes a symbolic function once there is 
enough distance between the proximate threat and the original act. During the height of the Al 
Aqsa Intifada in 2003, the Israelis endured a series of suicide bombing attacks thought to origi-
nate from the West Bank. In response to this proximate problem, the Israelis built a separation 
barrier between itself and the West Bank that is now 273 miles long and still under construction 
(planned for 430 miles). As Wineberger put it, “the thing about the Israelis is that they’re ob-
sessed with security [and when] circumstances change, the measures they implement don’t. 
While I have some sympathy with the fact that were some suicide bombings in major cities in 
2003 so they build this wall, but that isn’t necessarily the answer now. But the wall is there” 
(Wineberger).  
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Figure 3.1The Separation Barrier as of 2012 
 
Twelve years after the wall construction (Agency) began to stop suicide bombings (Pur-
pose), the wall construction continues under the same motive: security. The original threat 
(Act), however, is effectively gone5 and the current threat to Israeli security, according to veter-
an Israeli negotiator Shaul Arieli, is that “Israel has 15 times the gross domestic product per 
capita of the Palestinian territories—that motivates tens of thousands of Palestinians to seek 
work in Israel, whether they have permits to do so. This slowly leads to a Palestinian ‘return’ to 
Israel” (Arieli). Once it is acknowledged how violence and its cure work in oscillation (via the 
comic corrective), one can begin to learn about the potential symbolic purposes of violence and 
how they may disproportionately influence the pentadic ratios.     
By re-situating violence—amongst myriad other terms—through the comic frame, one 
might then pursue an attitude toward conflict shaped by the comic frame. To that end, the con-
trast between allopathic and homeopathic attitudes is critical because it shapes the desired 
                                                     
5
 Some argue that the dramatic reduction of suicide bombings (from 55 in 2002 to 14 in 2004 when the 
wall was only 20% complete) should be credited to the Israeli military incursions and unilaterally-declared cease-
fires by Hamas (Harel and Palti).  
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Purpose and Agency inherent in the strategy. Rothstein notes that the pragmatic tasks of the 
Oslo Accords were knowingly unachievable by the belligerents, yet the outside world seemed 
surprised when the implementation of the Accords failed almost immediately. These pragmatic 
tasks included the equitable division of territory and the rules for peaceful coexistence to sup-
port the division (Rothstein 6). The agenda for the Oslo process did not include achieving these 
tasks, only that these tasks were the ideal conditions that future negotiations should strive for. 
In other words, the underlying Purpose of the Accords was to achieve an “exploratory truce” so 
that both sides could contribute to an environment for discourse that would eventually enable 
the pragmatic conditions mentioned earlier (7). The Oslo Accords was a five-year, incremental 
approach homeopathic (comic) in design, yet might be judged from its poor reception that it 
was billed to the respective constituencies as an allopathic (tragic) one.  
By most public accounts, the Oslo Peace Accords did little but reinforce the intractable 
nature of the MEPP. Although world leaders shook hands in front of cameras, the belligerents 
came away with little more than souvenirs from the White House. It would not be a stretch to 
condemn the Accords as a failure because few of its pragmatic objectives were achieved.  
Weinberger goes so far as to condemn the Oslo Accords as a demonstration of “complex co-
optation” whereby the asymmetric relationship that privileged Israel was preserved by the Ac-
cords and codified internationally at the expense of the Palestinians (13). As Kelman argues, 
however, if the Oslo Accords are considered an exploratory step in the “process” of a complex 
peace, systemic problems and mistakes, which I contend are rhetorical in nature, may be re-
vealed (102). One might blame cognitive frames like Conflict Syndrome for misunderstandings, 
but the selection of the frame is a choice. One could choose a frame that paralyzes our under-
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standing of motives because it ends the relationship between dialectic and irony: one that sus-
pends the Platonic dialogue necessary for learning about social systems. On the other hand, 
one could choose to approach the intractable environment as an open, adaptive system: one 
amenable to homeopathic solutions, comic irony, charitable attitudes toward the “enemy”, and 
results in a new vocabulary to deal with the motives of both sides of an intractable conflict.  
Thus far, I have detailed how Burke’s comic frame and his broader dramatistic method-
ology (which includes his myth project) might inform approaches to unseating Conflict Syn-
drome and perhaps ways to disentangle the systematic features of intractable conflict. The next 
chapter brings forward the major movements of the earlier chapters to rhetorically analyze a 
decisive wedge of U.S. foreign policy artifacts regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This dis-
tinctly U.S.-centered perspective focuses on the early years of the George W. Bush administra-
tion and interrogates why and how the very phrase “peace process” was expunged from the 
U.S. foreign policy-web.   
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4 TO DESTABILIZE A PARADIGM: A QUESTION OF CIRCUMFERENCE 
“Mr. President, if you change one comma, you will have changed U.S. policy in the 
Middle East” (Condoleezza Rice to President George W. Bush, 2002) 
 
Robert Ivie uses Burke’s dramatistic methodology to offer a timely (2004) criticism of 
the War on Terror as it unfolded to support U.S. policy toward Iraq. However, for policy makers 
Iraq was not the War on Terror it was merely a campaign in a war (as was the invasion of Af-
ghanistan). Elevating the invasion of Iraq as synecdoche for the War on Terror only simplifies 
the public consumption of the war by reducing the scope. In a similar fashion, Ivie uses Burke’s 
dramatism to simplify the complexity of war by making the relatively facile “devil” connection 
between Bush’s numerous speech acts regarding Iraq and Hitler’s dogma. Although Ivie’s analy-
sis is an informative methodological exercise in Burkean dramatism, it serves only to invite sup-
port for an already growing body of anti-Bush criticism. What if Ivie’s (Iraq-centered) Burkean 
analysis is instead nested into a longitudinal framework of the broader war which took place 
across numerous battlefields both rhetorical and physical? Put it back into context, as Weiser 
might argue6.  This chapter demonstrates how scholars and practitioners might avoid the pit-
falls associated with trying to simplify the complex-adaptive conditions of intractable conflict 
(usually through paradigm-fitting reduction). Situating the MEPP within the context of the 
broader U.S. War on Terror should help recontextualize tactical events of the conflict into a dis-
cernible strategic arc, or narrative, that is often more dialogically real than physically real. I con-
                                                     
6
 According to Weiser’s analysis of Burke’s wartime writings, the implications of Burke’s dramatism “are 
obscured when it remains separated from the wartime context from which it emerged” (286). 
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tend that to understand the U.S. perspective on what makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in-
tractable, one must unpack the underlying motives and vocabularies of the intractable criteria.    
4.1  A Roadmap to Peace Situated Within a War on Terror 
“Adoption of a paradigm necessarily involves selectivity, overemphasis, and even 
distortion, so that it is a theorist's duty to remain open to the possibility of error . 
. . [and that] theoretical orientations should include some scope for the critique 
of their own premises, that they should be knowingly provisional and partial, on 
the grounds that ultimate, integrated knowledge is a long-term aim rather than 
an immediate objective. (Coupe 45)  
 
The previous chapter introduced the Oslo Peace Accords as an opportunity to learn from 
past mistakes regarding the MEPP by approaching it through Burke’s comic framework. Instead 
of the Declaration of Principles generated from the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 2003 “Performance-
Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” or 
Roadmap, provided a phased approach to resolving the conflict based on three principles: Israe-
lis and Palestinians implementing the steps in parallel (instead of sequential), a robust monitor-
ing apparatus comprised of the United Nations, Russia, U.S., and the European Union (the 
Quartet) to ensure accountability, and a clearly defined end state.  As a plan, the parallel steps 
in the Roadmap assuaged Palestinians who were affronted by President Bush’s April and June 
2002 speeches which called for the Palestinians to cease violence first before obligating the Is-
raelis with any concessions. In implementation, however, the Roadmap adhered to a more U.S. 
centric paradigm and narrative.  
Winkler warns that narratives that do not evolve risk “losing their definitional currency 
for the members of the collective” (11). Just as a myth, according to Rowland, changes as it is 
reconciled with reality, there is also relevancy for an agile narrative. For Winkler, an evolving 
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narrative enables the critical participation of a community in the maintenance of its ideographs. 
But what happens to myths and narratives nested within paradigms? If the “parent” paradigm 
evolves, does it bring its subordinate myth and narrative along with it or does it render the nar-
rative obsolete or irrelevant? If the War on Terror was the paradigm guiding U.S. foreign policy 
in the George W. Bush administration (Winkler 166 and Elgindy 40), it makes sense that the U.S. 
narrative underpinning its policies in the Middle East and North Africa would follow suit even 
though the objectives of the War on Terror were not overtly connected with the objectives of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As outlined by Elliot Abrams, National Security Council member 
and senior director for Near East and North African Affairs in the Bush administration, imple-
mentation of U.S. policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was firmly rooted in the War 
on Terror paradigm. 
Abrams attributes the clarity of U.S. policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to 
the foreign policy decisions following 9/11. Hunting and assassinating terrorists became the 
prescribed tactic of the War on Terror (2002 National Security Strategy 5) so how could the U.S. 
not support Israel as it also hunted and assassinated with impunity? Before 9/11, Israeli incur-
sions into the occupied territories might be condemned by the U.S. and calls for restraint might 
echo in the halls of the United Nations. But as the U.S. took lethal steps to protect itself in ac-
cordance with its right to protect itself, so to did Israel. What prior to 9/11 was an understand-
ing of an intractable conflict centered on a shared obligation and responsibility to reduce vio-
lence became instantly more one-sided. As President Bush recalls, “I was appalled by the vio-
lence and loss of life on both sides. But I refused to accept the moral equivalence between Pal-
estinian suicide attacks on innocent civilians and Israeli military actions intended to protect 
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their people. My views came into sharper focus after 9/11” (Qtd in Abrams 21). Those views 
were reinforced in policy speeches, the National Security Strategy of 2002, and eventually in 
the 2003 Roadmap.  
As a paradigm, the War on Terror also provided the “frame of acceptance” out of which 
U.S. policy makers could develop “vocabularies for the charting of human motives” (Burke, Atti-
tudes Toward History 20). Foremost in the lexicon—the “god term”7—was security. In Grammar 
of Motives, Burke argues the term money provides a common rationale to undergird all human 
action. Likewise, the War on Terror paradigm uses security as a “god term” in order to trans-
cend “distinctions of climate, class, nation, cultural traditions” (110). The circumference around 
security would grow to encompass (and define) other terms like sovereignty, legitimacy, home-
land, and occupation each term finding consistency, and perhaps controversy, through its rela-
tionship with security.  For example, the term sovereignty set by Park in Chapter One of this 
study relied on ‘the state of anarchy’ for consistency. For Park, trying to understand sovereignty 
outside the circumference of ‘the state of anarchy’ would break the oscillating relationship be-
tween the concepts and destroy both—which was of course his purpose (51).  Similarly, sover-
eignty relies on security for its definition as long as it is understood through the War on Terror 
paradigm. Using security as the “god term”, U.S. policy-makers could marshal an entire suite of 
terms to support objectives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while keeping an eye on 
wider regional issues, e.g. invasion of Iraq (Ross, The Missing Peace 788).   
Evans and Newnham argue that the stability of the term sovereignty has been uncertain 
since the end of the Cold War.  Increasing economic and social interdependence in the 1990s 
                                                     
7
 Not to be confused with “master term” which designates the dominant pentadic term, e.g. Agent 
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caused borders to be more porous and invitations for foreign intervention expanded to human-
itarian concerns (Evans and Newnham 43). It follows that when sovereignty is understood with-
in the circumference of security, it begs pragmatic and philosophical questions about how U.S. 
policy makers in the Bush administration understood security. These answers, I contend, may 
be found in the policy decisions and in the way such policies were implemented.  
The sequence of security first (for the Israelis) and then sovereignty (for the Palestini-
ans) emerged as a prominent rhetorical shift from the peace efforts in the 90s. Beginning with 
President Bush’s April and June, 2002 speeches, U.S. public policy supported the two-state solu-
tion as the objective in exchange for an enduring security environment. In speeches that, ac-
cording to Condoleezza Rice, revealed philosophical and bureaucratic fissures between the De-
partment of State and the White House (55), George W. Bush abandoned the precedents set by 
his father and President Clinton who both stridently supported “a Palestinian state without re-
gard to what was within its borders” (Abrams 43). Instead of prioritizing the sovereignty of both 
parties, George W. Bush wanted the focus, thereby the rhetoric, to be on the security of Israel 
and reducing the centrality of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Just as the 1993 Oslo 
Accords scapegoated violence, so too did Bush’s early policy-speeches. But instead of scape-
goating violence in general, President Bush explicitly burdened the Palestinian leadership as the 
instigator and promulgator of violence. According to President Bush, the President of the PLO 
(and leader of the PA), Yasser Arafat, was the single obstacle to peace: “The situation in which 
he finds himself today is largely of his own making. He’s missed his opportunities, and thereby 
betrayed the hopes of the people he’s supposed to lead. Given his failure, the Israeli govern-
ment feels it must strike at terrorist networks that are killing its citizens” (Bush, 14 Apr, 2002). 
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Two months later, Bush pronounced his policy preference even clearer: “Peace requires a new 
and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born; I call on the Pales-
tinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror” (Bush, 24 Jun, 2002). In 
perhaps an uncharitable association, Bush scapegoated Arafat just as Hitler scapegoated the 
Jews (Burke “Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle”).  The resulting narrative shifted from one focused on 
“ending the cycle of violence” which constituted the Scene as a shared burden (Abrams 20) to a 
“war against terrorism” where an enemy could be identified; a problem outlined; and a solution 
implemented. The Bitzerian rhetorical situation did not call forth the rhetorical act; instead, the 
Scene emerged as the dominant “master term” and brought with it a propensity for determin-
ism that the narratives reified only too well. The revised Scene manifested itself in speeches, 
policy directives (and actions), and peace plans emerging from the War on Terror paradigm: a 
narrative with terms and concepts necessarily consistent with the circumference of security.  
Rice argues that the design of the War on Terror paradigm (instead of a War on al 
Qaeda) was based on a clear U.S. objective to establish an “international norm against terror-
ism . . . and to paint vividly an enemy against which the world could mobilize” (98).  As the 
“new” paradigm, the War on Terror prescribed the evolution of the narrative from the “old” 
paradigm of the 90s which adhered to the expectation that security would follow negotiated 
settlement. When it came to implementing the steps in the internationally-endorsed Roadmap, 
what was presented as a parallel effort (Israelis and Palestinians taking steps together) moved 
almost immediately to a sequential process which was more in line with the expectations of the 
War on Terror paradigm. Following Kuhn’s instrumental characterization of paradigms, advo-
cates of the War on Terror paradigm considered problems acute when they 1) reified the para-
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digm and 2) followed the rules of the paradigm. Or how Burke might characterize it: a “way of 
seeing is also a way of not seeing” (Permanence and Change 49). 
By its nature as a prescriptive, normative paradigm, the War on Terror was intended as 
an obstinate policy framework to eradicate all forms of “terror” using all elements of national 
power, e.g. diplomatic, military, and social. For example, Rice recalls:  
But when it came to rhetorical support and, in some cases, tools such as freezing terror-
ists’ assets, we were liberal in the definition of who was in and who was out. We be-
lieved that we had to discredit terrorism as a weapon, with no exceptions. There would 
be no carve-out for ‘freedom-fighters.’ No cause could justify the use of terror. (99)  
If the War on Terror paradigm demanded the preemptive eradication of potential threats to the 
U.S. or its allies (U.S. National Security Strategy 2002) then the problem represented by Pales-
tinian suicide bombers had off-the-shelf (allopathic) solutions that U.S. policy makers could log-
ically support with lethal actions and rhetorical strategies. Therefore, a theory like preemptive 
war and models like the invasion of Iraq demonstrate function as narratives with hierarchal 
linkages to the War on Terror paradigm.  
The exclusivity of the paradigm, however, also meant that new inputs or recommenda-
tions which did not conform to the narratives and myths nested within the War on Terror para-
digm would be marginalized and perhaps ignored altogether. Moreover, opportunities to im-
prove relations between Israelis and Palestinians could only be exploited when they were rec-
ognized as such; recognition only available when the paradigm shifts because the terms at hand 
no longer adequately explain the phenomena. Although it appears ubiquitous in retrospect, the 
perspective of the Bush administration was constrained by the paradigm it chose. Therefore, 
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potential opportunities for progress did not reveal themselves and diplomatic inaction by the 
early Bush administration was perceived as aloofness (Ross, The Missing Peace 788). As a result, 
the first efforts of the Bush administration have largely been marginalized by some of the most 
prolific scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution relevant to the MEPP. As a measure of 
its relevancy to the MEPP, some analysts even skip the first six years of the Bush administration 
and treat its last two as the only relevant contribution to the MEPP because a major, interna-
tional conference (Annapolis) was held to address final status issues (Muasher 26 and Alpher 
58). Considered through the “old” paradigm of the 90s, the 2007 Annapolis conference, orches-
trated by Secretary of State Rice, was a logical positive contribution to the MEPP because it an-
swered the expectations of a paradigm which sequenced negotiated settlement before securi-
ty. In Burkean terms, the 2007 Annapolis conference fulfilled the “form” of the old paradigm. As 
I have outlined, however, the War on Terror paradigm adopted immediately following 9/11 
completely inverted the sovereignty-then-security sequence. Therefore, evaluative criticisms of 
policy maneuvers in the early years of the Bush administration which do not account for the 
revised Scene shaped by the War on Terror paradigm miss a vital connection to the constraints 
of the rhetorical context.  
Whereas the Roadmap-as-written was endorsed by the Quartet (the E.U., Russia, the 
U.N., and the U.S.), the Roadmap-as-implemented signaled an early U.S. policy shift which privi-
leged the Agent (Arafat) and Act (terrorism) over the Purpose (extracting Israel from the Pales-
tinian territories) and Scene (security-then-sovereignty). In fact, in a “post-mortem” analysis of 
the Quartet, Elgindy argues that the U.S. and Israel never intended to implement a Roadmap 
which would obligate Israelis and Palestinians equally (14). Differences between a plan and its 
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implementation are normal: more so when dealing with complex, adaptive social systems. 
Moreover, the iterative nature of international policy development means that the agendas of 
the four members needed to be reconciled in order to hold a coalition, and thus its legitimacy, 
together. To that end, principles of Bush’s June 24th speech which prioritized a “security first” 
approach were deliberately deemphasized in the officially endorsed Roadmap—choosing in-
stead a “parallel” approach which deemphasized the quid pro quo inherent in Bush’s desired 
sequence. In a September 2002 National Security Council meeting to address the Roadmap 
drafting process, President Bush even expressed concern that the Roadmap “undermines the 
message on terrorism if we all appear to be rushing forward regardless of terrorist attacks and 
the lack of security reform on the Palestinian side” (Qtd in Abrams 58).  The ‘message on terror-
ism’ was a pivotal component of the security narrative because the paradigm deemed it so.  
One does not need to consider this particular rhetorical situation through a Burkean 
dramatistic perspective to discern the rhetorical elements of courses of action like the “security 
first” sequencing. As a key Middle East policy advisor to President Bush, Elliot Abrams’ perspec-
tive is a key component to understanding the U.S. administration’s approach.   Abrams, argua-
bly the architect of the Roadmap implementation, sees the problem of intractable conflict 
through a perspective governed by international relations paradigms, e.g. realism, idealism, or 
neo-realism. For Abrams, the proximate problem was the Israeli occupation of Palestinian terri-
tories and the violence and mistrust that it perpetuated. Within the circumference of the “god 
term” (security), occupation served a clear function; it meant security could be justifiably main-
tained by military means because diplomatic ones were not tenable. Policy makers understood 
that the terminological relationship between occupation and security could shift for pragmatic 
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reasons as Abrams remarks: “I believed [Israel] would leave most of the West Bank and Gaza as 
soon as it was safe to do so because I knew few Israelis who believed it was possible or sensible 
to continue ruling millions of Palestinians forever” (60).  Ross also notes the propensity for a 
shift as he cites comments from the late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as his cabinet was voting 
for the Roadmap in 2003: “the thought and idea that we can continue keeping under occupa-
tion—we might not like the word, but it is occupation—3.5 million Palestinians, is very bad for 
Israel, the Palestinians, and Israel’s economy” (The Missing Peace 792). Therefore, from a U.S. 
and Israeli perspective, the unsurprising solution was less concerned with the well-being of the 
Palestinians and more about achieving a set of manageable conditions for Israel.  From a rhe-
torical perspective, one should note how the concept of human rights is absent from the ra-
tionalizations. Economic stability and logistical constraints are concepts within the circumfer-
ence of security. In these examples, human rights is not within the circumference.   
In Burkean terms, displacing occupation from the circumference of security would not 
guarantee a two-state solution; but it would be an important intermediate objective along the 
path of political realism whereby security and national interests are the highest priority of polit-
ical life and policy makers generally assume a pessimistic view of the behavior of other actors or 
groups in the conduct of international relations (Haslam 12 and Fuller 227).  Ross and Makovsky 
characterize Abrams’ realist perspective in a less charitable way as being a ominously “neocon-
servative” one:  
For the neoconservatives, there is a basic myth when it comes to the pursuit of peace 
between Arabs and Israelis: the Arabs categorically reject Israel, and peace is not possi-
ble as a result. The corollary is that if the Arabs prove themselves in terms of accepting 
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Israel, then peace can be possible, but until that point there is no reason for U.S. en-
gagement on peace. Engagement is futile at best and counterproductive at worst, and 
as a result, disengagement is the right policy prescription [according to neoconserva-
tives]. (91) 
Ross and Makovsky formulate the above characterization of “the” neo-conservative perspective 
using the writings of neo-conservative stalwarts like Neil Podhoretz and Doug Feith as they 
were both commenting on the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s (102). I mention this context be-
cause as Lucaites and Condit argue, ideographic decisions are guided by narratives which are 
guided by characterizations emplaced from outside a community (7-8). The characterization of 
“neo-conservative” in the post 9/11 U.S. policy community was different from the characteriza-
tion in the early 1990s (Fuller 230). With the loss of a viable nation-state enemy (U.S.S.R.), 
“neo-conservatism” rapidly lost its relevance as a categorical contrast to political realism. “Neo-
Con” became a derogatory moniker used by opponents and as a symbol of ideological purity by 
adherents. The “neo-con” narrative, however, became an anachronism of the Cold War. There-
fore, following Lucaites and Condit, what would the narratives and ideographic characteriza-
tions of the early Bush policies be if they were evaluated as policies informed by political real-
ism instead of “neo-conservatism?”   
4.2 A Pentadic Process of Unpacking 
The scene-act ratio can be applied in two ways. It can be applied deterministical-
ly in statements that a certain policy had to be adopted in a certain situation, or 
it may be applied in hortatory statements to the effect that a certain policy 
should be adopted in conformity with the situation. (Burke, A Grammar of Mo-
tives 13, emphasis original) 
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The rhetorical preeminence of security (and how the Palestinian leadership failed to 
provide it), initiated with a U.S. presidential speech, was complemented by a bureaucratic shift 
away from the process of peace.  As a key advisor to the president, Abrams purged the phrase 
“peace process” from nearly every White House document because it connoted an “endless 
series of sessions that overlooked or even obscured realities on the ground” (Abrams 311). 
Dennis Ross served four U.S. administrations on Middle East affairs and interpreted Abrams’ 
purge of the phrase, “peace process” as an announcement to the world that “no longer would 
there be [a U.S.] envoy to the peace process” (Ross, The Missing Peace 784) and ultimately as a 
way to disengage from the region entirely (Ross and Makovsky 92-106 and Elgindy 40). Fur-
thermore, Ross charges that the advisors to President Bush believed that nothing could be done 
regarding the conflict therefore no political capital should be committed (Ross, The Missing 
Peace 784). However, in a 2013 interview with this researcher, Abrams defended his bureau-
cratic move as one focused on the Purpose of the peace process:  
I thought, when you talk about the Middle East Peace Process, you’re talking about es-
sentially Arab-Israeli negotiations: comprehensive agreement [or] final status agree-
ment. That’s how you get to [the] Camp David [Peace Conference, 2000] and [the] An-
napolis [conference, 2007]. That’s not what I’m for; I’m for a bottom-up approach and 
therefore it seemed to me that I should not talk about—and I should get others not to 
talk about—The Middle East Peace Process, but rather about getting Israel and Palestine 
to a better situation. Getting them to work together. Getting Palestinians to live better. I 
thought it was a way of de-escalating the rhetoric. It’s not so fancy as the Middle East 
Peace Process, it’s just seeing if anything can be done. (Abrams) 
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The broad strategy of U.S. policy, according to Abrams, is to deal with Israeli-Palestinian issues 
directly, and not attempt a comprehensive (with all Arab nations) peace agreement that many 
veteran diplomats have espoused as the Purpose of the MEPP. Additionally, when considered 
through a realist U.S. paradigm with security as a fundamental component, the Purpose of the 
Roadmap is to achieve a state of affairs where the Israelis could safely extract themselves from 
the occupied territories. Extending from this amended Purpose, the primary Agents are Israeli 
and Palestinian leadership; the Scene, as characterized by the endorsed Roadmap, is an envi-
ronment of mutual recognition of the problem-set as well as a mutual understanding of the so-
lutions; Agency includes the instruments of diplomacy, e.g. treaties, economic leverage, and 
concessions; and the Act is the publicizing and physical implementation of the Roadmap. Using 
the pentadic framework is a useful way to arrive at the “master term” for the Roadmap around 
which “terms of explanation and justification may be shown to cluster” (Overington 106) and 
invites a debate as to which pentadic term is most influential as the artifact moves from draft to 
implementation. Moreover, the common substance amongst the pentadic terms is what Burke 
would call the product of a careful reduction of terms until common rationale is revealed, i.e. 
the “god term” (Burke, Grammar of Motives 110). It follows then that understanding the “god 
term” is a critical task in unpacking U.S. policy. But as Burke warns, “even if any given terminol-
ogy is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; 
and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” (Language as Symbolic Action 
45, emphasis original). When security emerges as the “god term,” what aspects of reality are 
thereby deflected? 
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Reaching for a Burkean dramatistic method to overlay upon an international relations 
paradigm, like the realist one Abrams posits, is problematic because dramatism seeks to expose 
motives which guide action while political realism seeks to reify a chosen motive through ac-
tion. Regardless of their independent functions, the approaches can complement each other as 
they are not mutually exclusive. As I outlined earlier, the aim of Burke’s dramatistic framework, 
according to Overington, is the pursuit of “dialectical substance” or essence (105-106). Fur-
thermore, Burke’s dramatism is concerned with analysis of language, not reality, because “lan-
guage is itself the motive” for human action (Overington 93-95). On the other hand, in the in-
ternational relations community, political realism functions with the motive already in hand: 
security.  Perhaps destabilizing the definition, thus the function, of security will reveal insights 
into the intractable nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?  
The abbreviated pentadic analysis of the implementation of the Roadmap I offered 
above draws from multiple sources which I will address in detail later. It is important to note at 
the outset how this pentadic analysis contributes to the wider dramatistic methodology as ap-
plied to my particular topic: unpacking intractable conflict.  As King argues, the Dramatistic Pen-
tad is less concerned about truth and instead serves as a “method of discovering why people do 
what they do. Language is not analyzed for its truth, but for its strategic uses” (168).  The re-
sults of a pentadic analysis can be a revelation as to which pentadic “master term” governs the 
implementation of the Roadmap. However, any emerging revelation is always temporary; it is 
always an understanding in process. Ultimately, the pentad is a heuristic device that can be use-
ful in identifying, and perhaps fracturing, cognitive frameworks or the “gridlock” that accompa-
nies polarizing approaches (King 173-175). Earlier I introduced the Purpose of the rhetorical Act 
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(Roadmap) within the wider context of the MEPP.  As a U.S. perspective informed by political 
realism, the Purpose of the Roadmap (as an integral step in the MEPP) is to achieve a state of 
affairs so that the Israelis could safely extract themselves from the occupied territories. The fol-
lowing section details the influence the Scene had on the Purpose: a Scene-Purpose ratio. 
Mapping the artifacts which informed or represented the Bush administration’s policies 
toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides a sine wave of outputs which peaked at the be-
ginning and end of the administration’s two terms. The second Palestinian Intifada, or the “Al-
Aqsa” Intifada, followed on the heels of ineffectual peace conference hosted by President Clin-
ton at Camp David in 2000 (C. Smith 495).  The (proximate) cause of the intifada was Israeli 
Prime Minister Sharon’s controversial visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem, 
Mosque in September 2000, but the Clinton administration and the wider western media held 
Arafat responsible for both the failures at Camp David and the intifada (Ibid and Ross, The Miss-
ing Peace 730). Regardless of its causes, the Al-Aqsa Intifada quickly consumed the attention of 
the foreign policy team of the incoming George W. Bush administration until 9/11 shifted how 
U.S. policy would constitute the Scene and thereby the Purpose of U.S. policy in the Middle East 
dramatically.  
 In her memoir, Condoleezza Rice notes that the Bush administration came into the geo-
political environment with the goal to “simply calm the region” (54). Abrams also notes that in 
the Bush administration’s first National Security Council meeting, the NSC’s senior director for 
the Middle East postured the U.S. neutrally:  “Now is not the time for peacemaking; now is the 
time for conflict management. See if we can dampen this down . . . see if we can come up with 
a durable ceasefire and truce” (6). However, when extremists protected by their host govern-
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ment attacked the U.S., the U.S. responded with a global policy of preemptive warfare which 
shaped over a decade of U.S. foreign policy. From a U.S. policy perspective, the Palestinian inti-
fada assumed a new function as the rhetorical environment shifted because of the War on Ter-
ror paradigm. What was once a continuous exchange of Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli 
incursions into the Occupied Territories, assumed a one-sided narrative depicting a democratic 
state (Israel) being besieged by extremists protected by a rogue government (the PA). How the 
Scene would be constructed would have a recursive effect on the paradigm through which poli-
cy makers considered both the problems and solutions.  
Prior to 9/11 the Bush administration had two public, interconnected, policy efforts at 
play regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first was an international fact-finding mission 
initiated by President Clinton and lead by U.S. Senator George Mitchell. The findings of the 
Mitchell Report were sent to President Bush in April 2001 with the following sequenced rec-
ommendations: End the Violence, Rebuild Confidence, and Resume Negotiations. The balanced 
attribution for the turbulence, as well as its resolution, in the Mitchell Report was representa-
tive of the pre-9/11 Scene:  
Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is 
that the culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its 
place there is a growing sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort to violence . . 
. Political leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to reverse these danger-
ous trends; they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will be difficult. 
But it can be done and it must be done, for the alternative is unacceptable and should 
be unthinkable . . . Two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing 
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claims and religious differences have lead to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing 
conflict. They can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live side-by-
side in peace. (The Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report on the Middle East: 
Mitchell Report, emphases mine) 
One can see from this significant extract how the pre-9/11 Scene could be characterized by a 
shared obligation for progress. From a U.S. policy perspective, both belligerents shared the 
blame for the intifada and both were obligated to act. In stark contrast, Abrams characterizes 
the rhetoric of shared obligation inherent in the Mitchell Report as one charged with a “moral 
relativism” easy to adopt in the pre-9/11 world (7).  Abrams’ paradigm would prove to be much 
more constraining.  
The second U.S. policy example was an effort to operationalize “phase one” of the 
Mitchell Report: End the Violence. Days after a particularly horrifying suicide bombing in Tel 
Aviv in June 2001, President Bush deployed CIA Director George Tenet to the region charged 
with crafting and implementing a detailed and measurable plan for ending the violence in ac-
cordance with the Mitchell Report. Sharing the pre-9/11 Scene with the Mitchell Report, the 
Tenet Plan consistently drew the belligerents together as part of the solution: 
In keeping with its unilateral cease-fire declaration, the Palestinian Authority will stop 
any Palestinian security officials from inciting, aiding, abetting, or conducting attacks 
against Israeli targets, including settlers . . . In keeping with Israel’s unilateral cease-fire 
declaration, Israeli forces will not conduct “proactive” security operations in areas under 
the control of the Palestinian Authority or attack innocent civilian targets . . . Palestinian 
and Israeli security officials will identify and agree to the practical measures needed to 
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enforce “no demonstration zones” and “buffer zones” around flash points to reduce op-
portunities for confrontation. Both sides will adopt all necessary measures to prevent 
riots and to control demonstration, particularly in flash point areas. (Tenet Plan) 
Although Tenet was able to secure signatures from both sides, the ceasefire never materialized 
(Elgindy 5), and the Al Aqsa Intifada raged for several more years. From the above extract, one 
should discern a Scene marked by the assumption of power symmetry between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. Both belligerents were expected to exert power over their constituents to effect 
change in behavior. One might easily expect an Act demonstrating this symmetry, e.g. a mutual 
cease fire, as an Act consistent with the Scene. Unfortunately, by correlating the actions in a 
policy statement with the power those actions implied, it would be a simple matter to destabi-
lize the policy by proving one side was not meeting a stated expectation. Ultimately, where the 
Mitchell Report constituted a Scene of shared obligation, the Tenet Plan crafted a Scene under 
another pre-9/11 assumption that the Palestinian Authority (led by Arafat) could be held to the 
same expectations for action as the Israelis; an asymmetry Arafat could not overcome even if 
he wanted to (Ross, The Missing Peace 760-762). The asymmetric power structure invited con-
cerns over Arafat’s legitimacy as the leader of the Palestinians and viable partner for peace for 
the Israelis (Ibid).  But did policy makers allow consternation over the legitimacy of an Agent 
outweigh questions of power asymmetry? With such a power asymmetry in place, would a new 
leader even make a difference? Although speculative, these kinds of questions were exactly 
what Burke would have hoped the pentad might prompt as practioners and policy makers dis-
cern the underlying conditions of intractable conflict. 
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4.3 The Role and Influence of Scene on Policy: A Practioners Perspective 
There are two types of tragedies: the Shakespearean where everyone dies and 
there’s the Kafkaesque one where everyone lives but all are confused.  (Peter 
Wineberger of the U.S. Institute of Peace commenting on attempts to resolve 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, discussion with the author)  
 
The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) joined a congested field of approaches to end the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead of a comprehensive plan, it offered a comprehensive solu-
tion (end) which could be used as a leverage to gain Israeli compliance: the Arab world offers 
peace with Israel if Israel withdraws from territories captured in the 1967 war. More a declara-
tion than a detailed plan like the Roadmap or the Geneva Accords discussed earlier, The API 
was a reactionary counter-punch to the Quartet Roadmap in two significant ways: 1) Whereas 
the Roadmap was drafted and endorsed by the Quartet (U.S., E.U. Russia, and the U.N.), the API 
was drafted by the then Crown Prince (now King) of Saudi Arabia and signed by representatives 
of twenty-two Arab nations, and 2) the API sequenced the process as sovereignty first, security 
second: a pre-9/11 paradigm the U.S. was incapable of supporting in 2002. The two efforts did 
converge on an interesting point: neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians formally participated 
in the drafting of the documents. My purpose is not to evaluate the faults and efficacy of the 
API from a U.S. policy perspective, rather to situate the API as a rhetorical artifact constrained 
by the Scene. Although the API was subject to its unique 2002 rhetorical context, current U.S. 
policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to leverage the API itself to gain compliance from 
those Arab signatories who have twice since confirmed the API as the Arab position (Kerry, Re-
marks 5 Jan, 2014).  Therefore, as a relevant component of the current rhetorical environment, 
the API functions as a tool or method to perform a rhetorical act: Agency. But, as I will demon-
strate, the recursivity of a pentadic analysis means that definitions exist as a product of con-
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stantly oscillating ratios, e.g. Act-Scene. Burke warns of the iterative nature of the pentadic 
terms which also characterizes my approach to defining the contours of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict: 
There is, of course, a circular possibility in the terms. If an agent acts in keeping with his 
nature as an agent (act-agent ratio), he may change the nature of the scene accordingly 
(scene-act ratio), and thereby establish a state of unity between himself and his world 
(scene-agent ratio). Or the scene may call for a certain kind of act, which makes for a 
corresponding kind of agent, thereby likening agent to scene. Or our act may change us 
and our scene, producing a mutual conformity. (A Grammar of Motives 19) 
The balance of this section will introduce insights from those policy practioners, like Abrams, 
who had first-hand knowledge of the pentadic ratios (although they never described them as 
such) surrounding the API and the Roadmap. In so doing, I demonstrate how a heuristic frame-
work based on Burke’s dramatistic methodology detailed thus far might reveal potentials the 
U.S. could capitalize on if policy makers recognized the opportunities.  
As director for the Levant and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs at the National Security Council 
(under then-National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice), Robert Danin had a rare perspective 
on the machinations at play throughout the Bush administration regarding the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Although Danin served for three years on the National Security Council 
(where Abrams also served), he also served in the Department of State8 (working then with Sec-
retary of State Rice); his view of the rhetorical situation is comprehensive. In an interview with 
                                                     
8
While at the Department of State, Danin served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern af-
fairs. It is important to note that the National Security Council (NSC) is a separate assembly of select secretaries 
(and their staffs) in a president’s cabinet. The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor are both mem-
bers of the NSC.  When Rice moved from the National Security Advisor position to the Secretary of State, she 
brought Danin with her.   
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this researcher, Danin detailed the rhetorical environment for the API (and by extension, the 
Roadmap and Geneva Accords) with a distinctly pentadic emphasis on the Scene as the indis-
putable master term, but one limited by “god term”: security.  
For Danin, the API is a useful rhetorical artifact in that it can be used as a lens to under-
stand the political and rhetorical environment in 2002 as well as the environment in 2014. The 
API was adopted by the Arab League at its annual summit in Beirut on 27 March, 2002. With 
Saudi Arabia the primary sponsor, and so soon after 9/11 where fifteen of the nineteen terror-
ists were from Saudi Arabia, initial interpretations were cynical. In retrospect, according to 
Danin, the API was not taken seriously by the U.S. or Israel because “the Saudis dropped it on 
the door and ran. The argument I always invoke is that it was a good product, but there was no 
marketing . . . there was no grand gestures, there was no Saudi equivalent of a [Anwar] Sadat to 
Jerusalem9” (Danin). Due to the lack of an amenable rhetorical environment, the Act (the Arab 
Peace Initiative) was received as a “glass half full—[Israeli leadership] pointed to its deficiencies 
instead of pointing to the parts that were attractive and saying, ‘wow this is interesting; this 
could serve as a basis for how to move forward’” (Danin). Considering Danin’s interview 
through a pentadic framework, one should discern a pointedly cynical Scene under develop-
ment. For an Act to be consistent with the Scene Danin constitutes, the Act must be a prede-
termined failure. From Danin’s recollection of events, the API was interpreted to be more to do 
with Arab internal frictions regarding Arafat than any genuine intent to reconcile with Israel. In 
                                                     
9
 President Sadat (Eqypt) spoke at the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) on 19 Nov, 1977 marking the first visit 
from an Arab leader. The visit broke an Arab policy in place since 1948 and contributed to the public reception of 
the eventual peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (Quandt 189).  
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dramatistic terms, such gestures are not only marketing tools, as Danin characterizes them, but 
as tools to complicate the “circumference” of the security. 
As I detailed earlier, the “god term” (security) creates a circumference within which all 
other significant terms find their relational definition. For example, concession is defined by its 
relation with security; thus, concession connotes a threat to identity when it could connote less 
invasive attributes.  With such a constrained scope, it is not difficult to see why, instead of a 
sincere declaration of intent for reconciliation, the Scene constrained the Purpose of the API to 
that of “a way [for Arabs] to reach above the head of the [Israeli] government to the people of 
Israel” and entreat them to choose leaders who will seek peace instead of those “implacably 
opposed to peace” (Danin). In detailing the Scene-Act ratio, Burke argues “the main point is 
that any change of the circumference in terms of which an act is viewed implies a correspond-
ing change in the quality of the act’s motivation” (Burke, “Dramatism” 333). It follows then, to 
change the API (Act) one might look to change or expand the circumference of the terms.  
Retired Ambassador James Larocco described the geo-political context for the API as “a 
perfect storm of rhetoric, of media, [and] tension [which] totally crowded out any serious re-
flection on the API. It was lost on arrival” (Larocco). In addition, the violence of the intifada was 
at its peak so the respective publics were not prepared for a cease fire, let alone a comprehen-
sive peace. Furthermore, the medium chosen to present it to the U.S. audience was problemat-
ic. Abrams notes that the API was circulated a month before the Arab League summit in a New 
York Times column by Thomas Friedman: “an odd way to put something on the table if [then-
Crown Prince Abdullah] truly sought American backing” (Abrams 29). And consistent with the 
Agent-centered perspective constituted in Bush’s early speeches, Abrams describes an “incorri-
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gible” Arafat who was incapable of making peace; therefore, the API was an empty offer 
(Abrams, Interview).  
Considered dramatistically, one should readily conclude that the Act (the API) could not 
be “contained” by the Scene constituted by the growing body of rhetorical artifacts  (Burke, A 
Grammar of Motives 3-9).  It follows that the Scene is something to be acted upon or shaped, 
instead of something which is simply a consequence of a series of intersections amongst the 
rhetorical artifacts like the API, the Roadmap, and Bush’s speeches. Even if the Act was not con-
tained within the Scene, I do not think that Burke would condemn the API to the dustbin. In-
stead, he might offer two options inherent to the circular nature of the pentadic terms: 1) 
change the Act to fit the Scene, or 2) change the Scene to change to accommodate the Act. 
In describing the Scene from a Department of State perspective, Larocco10, characterizes 
narrative as the “press guidance” necessary to support the U.S. public relations campaign. And 
although embryonic in 2002, what Larocco called the War on Terror “narrative”—what I would 
call paradigm—immediately constrained options and reduced the “bandwidth” for competing 
narratives (Larocco). This reduced capacity for multiple narratives meant that any narrative arc 
would serve primarily to explain events in relation to the broader War on Terror paradigm, not 
determine events to affect the paradigm. Without room for additional narratives, anything in-
consistent or incompatible with the designs of a prescriptive paradigm was marginalized. With 
this reactionary, or passive, characterization of narrative-as-tool one can see how it might be 
useful in changing the Act to fit the Scene (Burke’s first option); a cursory listen to a “spin 
                                                     
10
 U.S. Department of State, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Near Eastern Affairs under Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell (2001-2004). 
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room” following a presidential debate or press conference would demonstrate this recursive 
process.  
Changing the literal text of the API was not an option for U.S. policy makers. However, 
changing how the text was received or used in the policy web was something well within their 
capabilities. Without directly endorsing the API as a viable U.S. policy option, Danin, Abrams, 
and Larocco each commented on the positive potential of the 2002 API. Through a pentadic 
analysis of their interviews (as artifacts about the early Bush years), I can describe an intersec-
tion amongst the artifacts whereby an inhospitable Scene crafted by a series of rhetorical arti-
facts..  
In regards to message reception, for Larocco, the relationship between narrative and 
myth is an adversarial one in contrast to the genus-species one I detailed in Chapter Two: “I’m a 
big believer in narratives because I think that’s the only way you can break through the myths.” 
Instead of considering myth in a generative capacity, getting through the myths of both the Pal-
estinians and the Israelis becomes the Purpose of the rhetorical Act (Larocco). In other words, 
myths are obstacles to progress; narratives are simply ways to get past the obstacles.  These are 
pragmatic applications of myth and narrative difficult to rebut.  One can see how easily myth 
can become a static and paralyzing component of the rhetorical situation. That being said, is it 
reasonable for rhetoricians studying an intractable conflict to expect a practitioner trying to 
create change in an intractable conflict to apply rhetorical methodologies (narrative and myth) 
in such an introspective manner?    
 Burke’s second hypothetical recommendation—to change the Scene to accommodate 
the Act—is the province of the rhetorician, but arguably the responsibility of the policy maker. 
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By bringing forward the earlier recommendation to change the Scene by expanding the “cir-
cumference” of terms, the policy maker is asked to consider the terms of the Scene as it is be-
ing constituted.  Instead of explaining what happened in the past, the policy maker designs and 
implements rhetorical artifacts to direct the Scene as it is becoming.  Here a policy maker might 
consider how his or her use of the term border brings with it a cluster of terms revealing the 
motives of the Agent. A legal term, border connotes physical separation of parties and mutual 
recognition of each other as well as the physical demarcation. Other terms like legitimacy and 
defendable also emerge as relevant terms carried along with border; which we should be re-
minded gains its own consistency from security: the “god term”.  Imagine if the circumference 
of terms (with security still at the center) was expanded to encompass the concept-term human 
rights. The stability of border would instantly be challenged and “kept off balance” as Booth 
would recommend. Border could then bring with it concepts like economic viability or potential. 
Legitimacy, concerned with human rights, could be mutually-defined so that both belligerents 
might share the definition. Even the undeniable physicality of the Separation Wall could be mit-
igated as its symbolic function is problemetized by the increasing influence of human rights in 
the paradigm.   Thomas Matyok, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Cen-
ter, characterizes what I am calling a focus on the circumference as the shift of emphasis away 
from the human—an ironic pivot for a scholar of peace and conflict studies:  
Instead of focusing on the human, we need to be more focused on the context, the criti-
cal structure within which the person makes decisions. The person is bounded by the 
context they’re in . . . They can only make certain decisions because of the structure 
they’re in. To ask them to make a decision outside of that doesn’t make sense . . . Think-
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ing outside the box is ridiculous: the issue is to get out of the box. As long as you’re still 
bounded by the box, you’ve limited what you can think [or] do. You’re bounded by the 
rationality of the box. (Matyok, Interview) 
Matyok later describes the cultural shift his discipline is undergoing as it deals with criticism 
from the academy which sees peace and conflict scholars as “living in the question” and with-
out any answers (Matyok, Interview). As he explains the expansion of his discipline, he returns 
to my emphasis on changing the circumference of terms: “The metaphor we were using: mar-
ginalization. Marginalized suggests you were at the center and moved to the edge. The issue is: 
we can move back to the center, or we can create large enough mass to create a new center of 
gravity” (Ibid, emphasis mine). Applied to expanding the circumference of the “god term”, a 
policy maker would need to build up enough “mass” around human rights to draw out the cir-
cumference of security.  
 Expanding the circumference to include human rights may require the current relation-
ships amongst terms to change, if not break. As a task for the policy maker, the relationship be-
tween legitimacy and border, for example, may need to slip from a legal to moral one. This is 
not to mandate that the old relationship be obviated by the new one, but that the old relation-
ship should account for the motives of the new one. Choosing from a wide array of rhetorical 
methods (myth and narrative are but two), a policy maker can increase the “mass” around a 
concept in order to compel the circumference, not coerce it. From the earlier extracts from 
their respective plans, one should see that U.S. special envoys Mitchell and Tenet attempted as 
much as they reified mutual obligation (albeit in a pre-9/11 context) using word clusters and a 
narrative of parallelism.     
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4.4 A Look Past the War on Terror Paradigm 
Before becoming President Obama’s special envoy to the 2013-2014 Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations, Martin Indyk described Obama’s approach to the peace process as a logical “theo-
ry of the case” whereby “the United States needed to repair its relations with the Arab and 
Muslim world because American troops were involved in two wars in the Middle East” (118). 
The primary tactic in this “theory of the case” was presidential outreach to the Arab and Mus-
lim world to reduce animosity for U.S. and Israeli positions. According to the theory, Arab lead-
ers would be more likely to “take risks for peace” by engaging with Israel on the core issues 
(Ibid 119). According to Indyk, diplomatic opportunities were assessed based on how well the 
engagement might “boost [Obama’s] credentials in the Muslim world and help him make peace 
at the same time” (121).  Simultaneously, U.S. policy would focus narrowly on supporting Israeli 
physical security against neighboring (rockets from Gaza) and regional threats (Iran). This in-
cluded continuing a 30 billion dollar military assistance package initiated by President Bush and 
a new $300 million package for the now well-known Iron Dome rocket defense system (118). 
There were other early initiatives along the U.S.-Israel track, but few of the diplomatic ones 
were successful, e.g. President Obama demanding an end to settlement construction in 2009 
significantly strained U.S.-Israel relations (C. Smith 519). The Acts in support of Israeli security 
fit the War on Terror paradigm, i.e. security first, then sovereignty. The Acts to reach out to the 
Arab and Muslim world, however, were more in line with political idealism than realism and 
surely did not adhere to the War on Terror paradigm. These are significant disconnects that 
should be acknowledged when policy is not matched by strategy; yet as paradigms shift, the 
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turmoil of transition can be both a time of risk and of potential depending on whether a policy 
maker recognizes the shift if occurring.  
President Obama’s famous Cairo Speech in June 2009 (where the API was first re-
introduced as a U.S. policy preference) was an indisputable signal to the entire world that the 
U.S. paradigm through which it perceived the U.S.-Arab relations was in flux.  However, the U.S. 
paradigm through which it perceived the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was firmly in line with the 
War on Terror paradigm: security first, then sovereignty. President Obama goes so far as to re-
introduce the Roadmap as the source of the agreed upon obligations and even presents the 
prerequisite that Palestinians abandon violence first, followed by Israeli support a two-state 
solution. One might conclude from this discrepancy that the vocabulary and concepts that 
comprise the War on Terror paradigm were becoming inadequate for interrogating events, yet 
were still being deployed by U.S. policy. Perhaps a paradigm shift was underway.  
On day two of the Obama administration, Secretary of State Clinton (re)assigned George 
Mitchell, fresh from a stint supporting peace in Northern Ireland, as the president’s special en-
voy for Middle East peace. Indyk characterizes this choice as an effort to bring direct negotia-
tions between Israelis and Palestinians back into the U.S. policy arsenal as it was before 9/11 
and following the inconsequential international conference of the Bush administration in 2007 
(112). In addition, soon after bringing Mitchell back into the business of Israeli-Palestinian rec-
onciliation, the administration moved Dennis Ross from the State Department to the National 
Security Council as the president’s “old hand” advisor on Israeli-Palestinian issues (Indyk 122). 
Both Mitchell and Ross served the Bush administration just as the War on Terror paradigm took 
hold on U.S. foreign policy. The notwithstanding the efficacy of their contributions, bringing 
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back these key actors in such prominent roles regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also con-
tributes to the notion that paradigms were overlapping.  
Characterizing the rhetorical context welcoming Kerry-led U.S. policy, Danin outlines a 
geo-political environment where there is no intifada (yet), and Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs-
in-general have many more common interests due to external threats, i.e. Iran, which did not 
exist in 2002 (Danin). Considered through my “change the circumference” approach, the “god 
term” is still security, but there is potential to increase the “mass” around other terms in order 
to destabilize what the U.S. considers a threat to Israel. Perhaps by destabilizing threat using 
other concepts like economic viability or water security, policy makers might reveal opportuni-
ties to weaken the intractability of the conflict by fracturing the obstinacy of the current terms 
of reference. For example, on 8 March, 2014, the U.S. State Department presented an econom-
ic initiative to stimulate the Palestinian economy through international capital investment in-
stead of donations (Patterson). Designed to generate billions in private sector growth, this initi-
ative was presented as part of a narrative of self-reliance (for the Palestinians) while maintain-
ing strict adherence to the U.S. policy of ensuring Israeli security. By bringing socio-economic 
issues to the fore, the State Department demonstrates an awareness of the importance of pre-
paring both publics for the “benefits of peace” (Ibid). As additional policy initiatives come to 
fruition, security, as the U.S. policy web understands it, may begin to pull away from what the 
War on Terror paradigm demanded.  
When asked how the rhetorical environment changed to warrant Secretary Kerry’s re-
introduction of the API, Abrams cautioned that although the War on Terror may not have the 
rhetorical influence on U.S. policy it did in 2002, the geo-political context is actually less condu-
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cive for progress along the Israeli-Palestinian peace track (Abrams, Interview). Moreover, the 
regional context is so unwelcoming that Abrams concludes that “the Secretary of State person-
ally believes he [alone] can do this” (Ibid). However, as outlined throughout this study, with his 
numerous trips to the region and countless interviews and news conferences, Kerry has tena-
ciously re-constituted a pre-9/11 Scene capable of containing the Act.  The question remains 
whether the Scene Kerry has crafted is prolific enough to hold back the influence of the geo-
political environment.   
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5  CONCLUSION 
The best we can hope for, then, is Burke’s own “comic” choice: to produce and 
exploit stalemate, a kind of undivine comedy. We develop a dialectic of mud-
dling-through, a deliberate interference with perfection by enforcing on every 
terministic screen an ironic reminder of other truths according to which it should 
be discounted . . . we shall try to cure mankind by keeping things off balance, by 
dissolving fixities, by turning the potential tragedy of fanatical annihilation into 
the comedy of muddled mutual accommodation. (Booth 257, emphasis mine) 
 
Booth is not arguing for the status quo or for a life where belligerents learn to live apa-
thetically without a solution in some kind of ‘muddled mutual accommodation’. Instead, Booth 
describes the systematic skepticism (critical theory) a rhetorical critic might practice as he or 
she unravels the motives of a rhetorical act. In other words, to destabilize objective certainties 
instead of organizing them hierarchically towards new knowledge. Refusing the tragic plot and 
embracing the comic is integral to Booth’s ‘dialectic of muddling-through’; and as argued in 
Chapter Three, embracing the comic is also integral to Burke’s dramatism. This study adheres to 
the comic impetus and offers a heuristic framework for approaching intractable conflict and for 
transforming its governing paradigms. In particular, this study treats the intractability of the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict in a post-“Peace Process” context. Although in flux, this paradigm is 
currently framed by the War on Terror and Conflict Syndrome and focused on the supposed 
reality of intractable conflict (instead of the intractable-ness of conflict). As this framework is 
operationalized by theories and context-specific models, the new paradigm can then be re-
framed as comic, the effects of the War on Terror and Conflict Syndrome may be mitigated, and 
the circumference of security can be expanded to encompass metaphysical attributes like hu-
man rights. From this evolving paradigm, the supporting narratives (comprised of terms and 
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concepts) may in turn expand to account for—or create space for—new usages which then re-
inforce the dominant paradigm.  
As this study closes, the efficacy of Dramatism-as-heuristic-methodology remains an un-
resolved question. The conclusions offered in these pages simply detail the framework for a po-
tential theory of action.  Policy makers and scholars in the discipline of peace and conflict stud-
ies should find in this research both a rationale for investing the necessary resources into un-
packing the paradigms through which belligerents approach intractable conflict and a method-
ology for directing long-term epistemic shifts in the bureaucratic policy web. Applying 
Dramatism as a heuristic should enable an analyst to unpack multiple rhetorical artifacts and 
produce either a synoptic perspective on the body of artifacts, or to reveal useful trendlines 
amongst them. With this kind of holistic understanding of the prescriptive potentials inherent 
in the rhetorical artifacts, one might also discern the prescriptive potentials in the dominant 
paradigm.  As a study in the spaciousness of rhetoric, this research complements work by rhet-
oric and communication scholars extending the scope of rhetoric (as Burke did) to include iden-
tification, the drama inherent in all human interactions, and progress toward the “purification” 
of war.  
As the last “landmark” essay in a volume of landmark essays on Burke, Condit argues for 
a post-Burke model of human discourse less aligned with the oppositional connotations of post-
modernism and instead extends “the essence of an older program into new contexts in light of 
new understandings” (“Post-Burke: Transcending the Sub-stance of Dramatism” 271). In an ef-
fort to draw out the particulars of Burke’s dramatism, Condit extends Dramatism into the 
“new” contexts of gender, class, and culture.  Coming ten years after Condit’s work, this study 
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might be considered an extension into a “new” global context where the certainty of sovereign-
ty can be destabilized. Moreover, my research is situated in a rhetorical environment which in-
terrogates violent conflict and can determine, through its terms, whether the violent conflict is 
intractable or not.     
As a set of variables and relationships that presumably account for a set of phenomena, 
the framework this study details should be applicable to any situation where social systems in-
tersect in incompatible ways. The phenomenon of intractable conflict on the scale I have intro-
duced has parameters well-defined by the peace and conflict studies community and is not iso-
lated to the Middle East. Moreover, I have argued, a conflict does not become intractable in 
reality; it is constituted as such by the belligerents, the peace makers, and the publics them-
selves. If intractability can be rhetorically constituted, perhaps it can be rhetorically un-
constituted. Thus the heuristic element of my framework directs a shift away from resolving the 
conflict itself and towards learning about what constitutes “intractable-ness.” Instead of trying 
to build a bridge across a river with unstable banks, my framework reveals how an intervention 
farther up-river may obviate the need for a bridge altogether.  
My Dramatistic-heuristic framework is admittedly unwieldy. There is no checklist or easy 
way to package it as a pentad or sextad.  In fact, applied as a model in a particular context, the 
framework may only exist as long as an intractable condition calls it into being. Or as Booth 
contrasts Burke’s comic framework with neo-Aristotelian criticism: “his method is better for 
solving the problem that his method has chosen to solve” (267). Once a conflict is no longer 
considered intractable, the intersections amongst rhetoricians, peace and conflict scholars, and 
policy makers become less self-critical and more instrumental. In other words, when resolution 
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is a viable option, the emphasis will shift from understanding the conditions, to enacting the 
solutions: the realm of policy makers.  
When dealing with problems that adapt to their environment, there will always be mul-
tiple perspectives which evolve as the problem adapts to a changing environment. The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is such a problem; and I have endeavored to characterize my use of it as a 
case study providing the units of analysis for my methodology, not to solve it or even propose 
possible solutions. As described in my rationale, the “truths” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
are born obsolete because the volatile geo-political context resets premises, hypotheses, and 
guiding assumptions. I would add to that characterization the deeply submerged paradigms up-
on which the premises, hypotheses, and assumptions are based upon. Paradigms that prescribe 
action, not just describe. Paradigms which can be paralyzed by decades of bitter conflict (Con-
flict Syndrome) and resist critical analysis.  
Booth argues that the purpose for Burke’s comic project is “to insure critical warfare ra-
ther than diminish it” (258): a tenet of any critical approach. Far from having the psychological 
instruments and methods necessary to eradicate Conflict Syndrome, my heuristic framework 
may only be useful in understanding where and how Conflict Syndrome negatively affects a giv-
en paradigm. As long as Conflict Syndrome operates unchecked in a rhetorical environment, its 
paralyzing influence will remain imbued in a given paradigm; its negative effects as ubiquitous 
as the paradigm itself.  
Approaching the case study from a deliberately U.S.-centric perspective is also problem-
atic because the U.S. is not technically a belligerent in the conflict (although the U.S. enables 
both) and so there is a lesser sense of urgency. Moreover, a U.S.-centric perspective invites the 
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same criticism Condit unleashes on Burke’s “ethnocentric version of Dramatism [which] threat-
ens to blind us to the multiplicity of different motive structures available in language” (“Post-
Burke: Transcending the Sub-stance of Dramatism 276). Acknowledging that criticism, I have 
demonstrated that a Dramatistic-heuristic framework problemetizes even the most submerged 
of paradigms.  Therefore, following Burke’s maxim that all human interactions are inherently 
dramatic, the ‘multiplicity of different motive structures’ is an assumed component, if not a 
prerequisite.   
Perhaps frustratingly so, this application of rhetorical methodologies is more a way of 
learning than a way of knowing or describing. It lacks the catharsis of an oppositional discourse 
like Marxism or as Wineberger laments his own shortfalls: a theory may help explain a conflict, 
but it does not offer a way out (Wineberger, Interview). And as a rhetoric, it enacts the nomen-
clature of identification rather than persuasion; an identification which reveals potential for lit-
eral action in addition to a way of describing a historical or literary event.  This framework is not 
a toolbox for negotiators to use when outlining proposed concessions or for policy makers ad-
dressing well-developed problems with off-the-shelf solutions. Instead, I can conclude from my 
research that taking steps back from the clarity of what is both physically and temporally close 
is an uncomfortable (if not dangerous) proposition. The paradigms through which we under-
stand the world are personal, embedded, and often bequeathed to us by the community that 
creates us. Making our paradigms explicit can be traumatizing because as a paradigm is re-
vealed by the vocabulary used to describe and explain the phenomena we encounter, we leave 
ourselves vulnerable to a critical gaze.  
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Our rhetorical myths, shaped by our paradigms, can be refined into a logic which then 
calls forth certain narratives to convey the myths to our publics.  Recursively, the narratives 
then reinforce the foundational myths and the myths push the paradigms further into the 
background until they are ubiquitous. With this self-perpetuating system in mind, I have argued 
that a critical step in shifting a conflict from intractable to tractable is to destabilize the para-
digms at play. It follows that in the vibrations of a once concrete paradigm, we may recognize 
slivers of potential change. It is these slivers of potential change where the efforts of rhetori-
cians, conflict and peace studies scholars, and policy makers might intersect in a critical way. On 
the other hand, resisting narratives, creating shared narratives, and debunking myths and nar-
ratives are all downstream efforts that may distract if not degrade efforts to change an intrac-
table condition. This is not meant to imply that treating narratives is an unnecessary activity; 
however, treating a narrative in isolation from its paradigm would amount to planning a trip 
without knowing the departure point.   
Although invaluable for myriad other reasons, looking downstream tends to beg solu-
tions instead of greater understanding of the problem. As I conclude, I must be careful in that I 
do not mischaracterize rhetorical myth as unidirectional; in fact, one might visualize rhetorical 
myth as the space between a paradigm and its narratives.  As our “most powerful stories”, rhe-
torical myth provides theoretical grounding for both its generative paradigm and its progeny: 
narrative. What I hoped to convey in these pages is that discerning a rhetorical myth is one 
heuristic step in revealing a governing paradigm. This is not to argue the impenetrability of rhe-
torical myth; myths do evolve. However, to overtly target a myth as the chink in the armor (as 
Rowland does) is to underestimate the pervasiveness of our most powerful stories.  Instead, I 
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have demonstrated how change occurs simultaneously along several avenues, i.e. paradigms 
and narratives, which in turn may mitigate the impact of a rhetorical myth.  In other words, to 
lay bear an underlying myth is to offer a critical—in this case, comic—gaze onto both paradigm 
and narrative.  
As an integral part of Burke’s dramatism, the comic corrective I have detailed in Chapter 
Three brings with it a capacity for “true irony” whereby the identities of belligerents are re-
vealed as consubstantial constructs and sets conditions for a homeopathic approach to resolu-
tion.  Key to the homeopathic path is the recognition of the ironic relationship between vio-
lence and its cure. For example, I offered the ongoing construction of the “separation wall” to 
demonstrate the potential consequences of ignoring the comic corrective. When we consider 
the ongoing wall construction a-rhetorically, we take the human action out of the drama and 
miss a heuristic opportunity to witness the epistemic break between a violent Act and its cure. 
Neglecting the comic corrective invites well-meaning publics to accept a constituted reality 
without the “critical warfare” Burke would recommend and what the “purification of war” 
would demand. 
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